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I. Introduction
Ever since this country was founded, lawyers and legislators in the
United States have feared the gradual loss of our national jurisprudence
to an international law of nations. Judicial suspicion of extrinsic legal
sources has resulted in a sharp conceptual division between national (or
municipal) law and the law of nations (or international law). Viewed as
separate and distinct, these two legal systems are treated as related but
independent parts of a "dualistic" system in which municipal law is gen-
erally superior to international law in domestic cases.1 The dualistic
preference for municipal sources stems from a strong belief in legislative
supremacy and thus naturally suits a Madisonian system that values de-
liberative and pluralistic decisionmaking. 2
In a Madisonian democracy, legislation is ideally the culmination of
an open, deliberative process. This process is designed to force compro-
mise among otherwise disparate factional groups. Whether viewed from
a normative3 or an economic4 perspective, the passage and interpretation
1. Under dualism, municipal law is superior to an international law when the national
legislature has not legitimated or incorporated the international law as a domestic source. See
generally Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 864 (1987) [hereinafter Henkin, United
States Sovereignty]; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
2347, 2349 (1991); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic
Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (1990).
2. The reference to legislative supremacy is not meant to exclude possible dualistic pref-
erences for judge-made common law. Although this Article focuses on conflicts between ex-
trinsic legal sources and domestic legislation, there may be a strong dualistic basis for favoring
municipal common law over some forms of international law. See infra text accompanying
notes 399-400.
3. In developing a theory of legislation, most traditional legal scholars advocated "legal
process" theories of legislation-theories that drew heavily from the Madisonian model of
representative government. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tentative
ed. 1958). In the seminal 1950s work that gave birth to the legal process school of statutory
interpretation, Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks attempted to reconcile the realities of
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of legislation lies at the very heart of the representative democracy. The
collective good is protected by institutional checks and balances, such as
the bicameral system and the executive veto, that structure the enact-
ment of domestic legislation. Before legislation becomes law, this deli-
cate balance works to check both legislative opportunism and special
interests.5 The strength of this system lies in its unflinching commitment
to the participatory democratic process, a commitment most often en-
forced by the courts.6 When viewed in this context, it is easy to see why
international law has traditionally held a precarious position in United
States jurisprudence. International law is a system of treaties, agree-
ments, and customs created in large part outside this representative sys-
tem, untested by the pluralistic forces that drive the legislative and
executive branches. The use of international sources introduces new
judicial interpretation with the Madisonian model. They accepted that much legislation is in
fact sponsored by special interest groups, but argued that when certain procedural safeguards
are followed, such group involvement does not skew the public purpose outcome. See
Jonathan Turley, Transnational Discrimination and the Economics of Extraterritorial Regula-
tion, 70 B.U. L. REv. 339, 351-52 (1990) [hereinafter Turley, Transnational Discrimination].
The test for all legislation, therefore, was "whether it is the product of a sound process of
enactment." HART & SACKS, supra at 715.
4. Discarding traditional normative theories of legislation, public choice theorists apply
microeconomic analysis to the legislative process, incorporating contemporary theories of mar-
ket exchange. Under this theory, legislation is no longer viewed as some public-regarding
compromise; rather, it is analyzed as a simple commodity. There is a market for legislation
and, as in any other market, "legislative protection flows to those groups that derive the great-
est value from it, regardless of the overall social welfare." Richard A. Posner, Economics,
Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. R v. 263, 265 (1982).
Just as there is a "market equilibrium" point for the supply and demand of commodities,
public choice views legislative outcomes as the equilibrium of private political power. Adopt-
ing or rejecting a legislative measure is a factor of simple market exchange. Legislators are no
longer seen as willing vehicles of societal goals; instead, they are egoistic, rational utility maxi-
mizers. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (1979) (describing this societal view as
"[t]he basic behavioral postulate of public choice, as for economics").
5. See THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 426-27 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in [Congress] ... often promote
deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority.").
6. The Supreme Court has repeatedly interceded when it perceived a circumvention of
legislative procedures. These procedures were designed in part to reduce the impact of faction-
alism. See generally Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63
TEx. L. REv. 207, 218-22 (1984) (describing procedural checks on factionalism and how legis-
lative veto can frustrate them); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked Preferences] (arguing that the
structure of government set up by the Constitution, as well as much of constitutional jurispru-
dence, reflects a purpose to root out discriminatory or redistributive legislation favoring special
interest groups at the expense of the less powerful). For example, in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983), the Supreme Court struck down the legislative veto with reference to the dangers
of factional power. The Court noted that the presentment and bicameralism requirements of
Article I were meant to limit factional influence and that the judiciary bears responsibility for
maintaining those limitations. See id. at 940-43, 946-51, 957-59.
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players and new forms of "legislation" into the carefully balanced Madis-
onian system.
Although international scholars have long claimed that the drafters
consciously incorporated international law into the Constitution, 7 early
United States courts largely limited the application of international stan-
dards to such narrow areas as piracy cases and maritime matters.8 Re-
cent events, however, have galvanized what was once a collateral role for
international law. To put it simply, the world is shrinking. National
boundaries are quickly losing their significance in both business and law. 9
With these changes have come pressure to incorporate international prin-
ciples into domestic litigation and increasing interest in international law
as part of a unified, or "monistic," legal system with municipal law. :0
7. For excellent discussions of this question, see Lea Brilmayer, International Law in
American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2283-85 (1991), Edwin D. Dickin-
son, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States (pts. 1 & 2), 101 U.
PA. L. REV. 26, 792 (1952-1953), Henkin, United States Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 866-70,
Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819,
829-37 (1989), and Koh, supra note 1, at 2351-55.
8. See, e.g., United States v. The Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 592-94
(1841) (deciding that kidnapped Africans did not become "pirates or robbers" within the
meaning of a treaty with Spain when they rose up and seized control of the Spanish ship on
which they were illegally held); The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 39 (1826) (decid-
ing that a mistaken attack on an American warship was not a piratical aggression); The Ante-
lope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120-23 (1825) (holding that the international slave trade carried
on outside the United States was neither piracy nor contrary to the law of nations, and thus
could not be enjoined or punished by the United States); Thompson v. The Catharina, 23 F.
Cas. 1028 (D. Pa. 1795) (No. 13,949) (reasoning that a court could look to the laws of other
nations to decide a point in a maritime contract dispute on which U.S. law was silent). In
Thompson v. The Catharina, the district court traced the history of maritime law from its
Rhodian origins and warned courts "not to betray so much vanity, as to take it for granted,
that we could establish more salutary and useful regulations than those which have, for ages,
governed the most commercial and powerful nations, and led them to wealth and greatness."
Id. at 1029.
9. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Pre-
sumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 639-55 (1990) [hereinafter
Turley, When in Rome] (describing transnational significance of environmental and employ-
ment regulations).
10. Professor Louis Henkin offered a particularly powerful defense of monistic values in
his work on the Chinese Exclusion Case. Notably, Professor Henkin viewed the historical
trend as a move away from monistic roots and toward dualism:
International law is the law of the land, for the executive branch as well as the
courts.... Two hundred years ago the framers of the Constitution were, I believe,
comfortable with a monist approach to international law. If we are to maintain the
respect that our nation has historically accorded to that law, we must press no fur-
ther the move toward extreme dualism, which the Court began in Chinese Exclusion
one hundred years ago; indeed, we must reverse it.
Henkin, United States Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 886.
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The institutional differences between dualistic and monistic systems
are most evident in cases of statutory construction in which municipal
and international sources come into direct conflict.11 For example, in the
United States, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
regulates the containment, treatment, movement, and disposal of solid
waste. 12 Assume a state wishes to send its solid waste by barge to a de-
veloping nation. 13 The shipment is opposed by environmental groups,
who claim that the receiving nation has neither the expertise nor the fa-
cilities to handle the waste and only offers low-cost dumping because it
needs a quick infusion of capital.14 Assume further that the statute is
silent on the question of transnational shipment, but it endorses the crea-
tion of private markets to expand waste disposal capacity and, by anal-
11. Although interesting comparisons can be made, the distinction between monistic and
dualistic conceptions of international law should not be confused with the similarly named
distinction in constitutional law. Professor Bruce Ackerman has argued in favor of a "dualist
democracy" in which decisions by the American people are accorded greater weight than deci-
sions by their government. BRUCE AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 33 (1991).
Nevertheless, as will become evident later in this Article, the creation of a hierarchy of interna-
tional sources based on their democratic procedural characteristics has an interesting analogue
in dualist theory of democracy: under each of these doctrines, "only those initiatives that
survive this specially onerous higher lawmaking system [can] earn the special kind of legiti-
macy the dualist accords to decisions made by the People." Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional
Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 461 (1989).
12. The Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) was amended by the RCRA in 1976, and
governs all exportation of wastes from the United States. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
In 1984, Congress passed the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) to specifically
govern the exportation of hazardous waste. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3224 (1984) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1988)).
13. This is not a fanciful assumption. See Laurie Garrett, The Toxic Trashing of Central
America, NEWSDAY, Jan. 15, 1991, at 59 ("According to documents presented to the Salvado-
ran government, [a Texas company] offered to counter overcrowding and 1986 earthquake
damage in the southern port town of La Union by shipping coal fly ash from municipal utilities
in Houston, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Norfolk, Va., to El Salvador."); Andrew Porterfield,
Dumping a Love Canal on the Third World?, NEWSDAY, Feb. 1, 1988, at 49 ("Records from
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ... show that hazardous waste exports shot up
from 30 notices of shipments in 1980 to more than 400 in 1986.... EPA officials warn that
hundreds of additional shipments escape any documentation by slipping through regulatory
loopholes... ."); West Shipping Waste Woes to Third World, CHI. TRIB., July 11, 1988, at Cl
(noting that the cost of disposing waste in the United States is between $250 and $350 per ton,
compared with $40 per ton in some developing countries).
14. The lengths to which developing nations will go to obtain capital are most evident in
places like the Marshall Islands, where only 70 square miles of land are spread over one half
million square miles of ocean. Even with this limited living space, local residents fought for
the right to sell the use of their land as a dump for waste from California and Washington.
Bob Drogin, Paradise Lost Now It's A Dump, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1990, at Al (describing
"[the] 20 square miles of lagoons filled with millions of tons of trash [with collateral health
effects on the residents]"). The small island of Majuro received $56 million a year for import-
ing the trash. Id.
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ogy, expressly authorizes interstate shipment for that purpose.' 5 In
applying this statute, however, a court may also face a variety of interna-
tional sources that oppose transnational shipment of solid waste. 16 These
sources may take the form of a United Nations resolution, an executive
agreement, or customary international law.17 The court must then make
a qualitative decision on the relative importance of municipal and inter-
national sources in statutory construction. A strict dualistic approach
would bar or subordinate the consideration of all these international
sources. Conversely, a classic monistic approach would treat some of the
international sources as equal to the municipal sources in resolving the
statutory gap or ambiguity. Theoretically, in a monistic system, it is even
possible for international sources to override a direct statutory man-
date-such as the RCRA permitting process for transnational waste
shipment.
This Article explores the monistic model and the extent to which
new forms of "international legislation" are compatible with a Madis-
onian system. Specifically, this Article addresses the conflict between
municipal and international sources in the context of two principal ca-
nons of construction that lie on the borderland between national and in-
ternational law: the presumption in favor of international law and the
presumption against extraterritoriality. These two long-established ca-
nons, which once had much in common, have diverged in recent cases-
the presumption in favor of international law assuming a more monistic
meaning and the presumption against extraterritoriality developing
strong dualistic characteristics. This divergence presents a unique oppor-
15. Congress faced this issue in 1984 when it amended RCRA to cover the exportation of
hazardous waste. See HSWA § 245(a), 98 Stat. at 3262 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (1988)).
The statute now requires exporters to follow notification procedures for obtaining the consent
of receiving nations before shipping any hazardous waste. See id. These changes, however, do
not provide permit standards that would guarantee that the receiving nation has the capability
of handling hazardous waste. The proposed Waste Export Control Act would require such
permits but has, thus far, failed to garner sufficient support in Congress. See H.R. 2358, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. see. 3, § 12003(b)(7)-(9) (1991).
16. See Burton Bollag, Developing Countries Win Support for Curbs on Toxic Dumping,
N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 22, 1988, at C4; Edward Cody, 105 Nations Back Treaty on Toxic- Waste
Shipping, WASH. PosT, Mar. 23, 1989, at Al.
17. In addition to international treaties, customs, and agreements, these sources may in-
clude decisions of international courts, such as the International Court of Justice or the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, opinions of preeminent jurists (as used to establish customary
international law), and decisions of international organizations or conferences. While treaties
and statutes are given equal weight under the Constitution, dualistic courts generally disfavor




tunity to explore the continued validity of both dualism and its underly-
ing principles.
The first canon developed from a powerful judicial aversion to vio-
lating international norms, leaving such decisions to Congress and the
President. Under the presumption in favor of international law, the
courts will opt, whenever possible, for a statutory interpretation that con-
forms to rather than conflicts with international principles.1 8 The second
canon is an outgrowth of the first and, consequently, is more narrow in
focus. Under the presumption against extraterritoriality, courts resist the
application of United States laws beyond the territorial borders in order
to avoid international conflicts.19 "Extraterritorial" jurisdiction is ac-
tively minimized to avoid unnecessary international entanglements and
controversies. Because an international dispute is perceived as outside
the normal domain of United States courts, judges presume that laws do
not apply outside the country absent an express statement to the contrary
by Congress. 20
The language of the canons, however, can deceive. The presump-
tion in favor of international law, for example, was written in a monistic
fashion but used for a dualistic purpose. While ostensibly incorporating
international law into the municipal system, the presumption has primar-
ily served to justify the refusal of jurisdiction in cases with international
dimensions. 21 The increasing transnationalization of legal and economic
affairs, however, has increased the potential monistic applications of this
canon.
The possible use of international law or custom to interpret ambigu-
ous statutes, or "gap-fill," presents significant legal process and public
choice questions. The presumption in favor of international law may be
read to favor compliance with developing contemporary international
obligations as well as compliance with international obligations existing
at the time of a statute's enactment. The increasing reliance on interna-
tional sources in statutory interpretation often ignores the fact that these
sources are materially different in character from conventional legisla-
18. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains .. ").
19. For a discussion of the historical and legal development of the presumption against
extraterritoriality, see Turley, When in Rome, supra note 9, at 603-38.
20. See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) ("The canon of construction
which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, is a valid approach whereby unex-
pressed congressional intent may be ascertained." (citation omitted)).
21. See infra Part III.A.
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tion. This Article maintains that before courts use such sources (or mod-
ify dualistic canons to facilitate their use), it is important to consider the
implications of these differences for a Madisonian system.
The "public choice school" offers a useful perspective on the differ-
ences between international and municipal legislation.2 2 In recent years,
public choice scholars have applied economic theories to the legislative
process, refuting some assumptions of the earlier, and still dominant,
legal process school.23 While not necessarily rejecting legal process the-
ory, public choice theory isolates weaknesses in the conventional legisla-
tive process-weaknesses that courts must consider in structuring their
interpretative role.24 The public choice critique is most relevant here for
its suggestion that the legislative process is more susceptible to special
dealing and factional advantage than the legal process school has recog-
nized. 25 When analyzed as a form of legislation, international sources
present a number of public choice difficulties associated with interest
group activity. The point of this Article is not to offer a unified public
choice theory for international law, but to suggest an alternative basis for
22. Courts and scholars have directed considerable effort to analyzing the dynamics of
conventional legislation and the various barriers to legislative excess. The study of legisla-
tion-legisprudence-has sharpened and at times challenged traditional understandings of the
legislative process. Though once considered a curiosity in school curricula, the study of legis-
lation is gaining acceptance among law schools as a basic requirement for law students. For a
splendid synthesis of legisprudential material, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY (1988).
23. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227 (1986) [here-
inafter Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation] (relying on economic theory of legisla-
tion in proposing that the "Constitution was designed to serve public rather than private
interests"); Turley, Transnational Discrimination, supra note 3, at 370 (applying both eco-
nomic and legal process theories to the enactment of employment discrimination legislation).
One of the most valued contributions of the law and economics school from which public
choice theories grew is its critique of traditional legisprudential concepts. There is a rich and
expanding library of public choice scholarship. One of the better explications of this material
can be found in DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991). See also Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice,
74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988); Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation, supra.
24. Public choice criticisms can strengthen legal process principles by recognizing legisla-
tive failures and altering interpretative approaches accordingly. See generally Turley, Trans-
national Discrimination, supra note 3, at 349-65 (discussing public choice scholars' importation
of social science and economic theories of collective action and market efficiency into the pub-
lic purpose-public choice debate).
25. See generally MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF
POLITICAL MARKETS 69-70 (1981); MUELLER, supra note 4, at 39; MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); E.E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 35 (1960).
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dualistic values. Rather than regarding dualism as an outgrowth of in-
ternational law principles, this Article explores dualism as an inherent
value of a Madisonian system that favors particular forms of legisla-
tion-those tested by the deliberative pressures of the legislative process.
The judicial introduction of a source created wholly outside the
Madisonian system poses a number of challenges to the delicate balance
set up by the drafters of the Constitution.26 Perhaps the greatest chal-
lenge is to the fundamental belief in legislative supremacy that underlies
both the traditional legal process school of statutory interpretation and
the developing public choice school. The conflict between municipal and
international sources is in this sense a classic conflict between legislative
supremacy and judicial discretion. Another challenge arises from the po-
tential role of international sources as a new avenue for special dealing,
or rent-seeking,27 outside of the legislative branch. To date, public
choice scholarship has focused on the contemporary viability of institu-
tional procedures designed to inhibit rent-seeking in domestic legislation.
This emphasis on domestic rather than international legislation is readily
understandable given the limited conflict between domestic and interna-
tional sources in the past. An examination of international legislation,
however, reveals that the creation and application of international
sources present wholly different public choice implications for a repre-
sentative system. Applying theories of legislation to international
sources is not an attempt to "legitimate" international law but rather an
attempt to translate international sources into a common context for
comparison. Absent such a comparison, the domestic application of in-
ternational sources will remain problematic for traditional judges and
academics steeped in the Madisonian tradition.
Part II of this Article explores the foundations of both dualism and
monism. Dualism is traditionally linked with a narrow definition of pub-
lic international law that confines international law to relations between
and among sovereign nations. Under this view, individuals are excluded
from the "legislative process" of international law and are only secon-
dary beneficiaries of its results. This approach suggests that dualism is
the product of external, or "exogenous," values. Part II then addresses
several deficiencies with this approach and advances an alternative basis
for dualism that reflects the internal, or "endogenous," values of a
Madisonian democracy. Specifically, this Part suggests that dualism's
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. "Rent-seeking" refers to the use of government forces to achieve an advantage or to
obtain a good on terms more favorable than those available under a prevailing market rate.
For a discussion of rent-seeking, see infra Part IV.
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mistrust of extrinsic sources is a product of pluralistic values. Next, Part
III discusses the various justifications for dualism in the context of the
two principal canons of construction.2 8 Although these canons are often
used in modem cases, their common origins in the early nineteenth cen-
tury have escaped close scrutiny. The dualistic applications of these ca-
nons are examined in conjunction with two related doctrines, the last-in-
time doctrine29 and the political question doctrine. 30 These two doc-
trines are offered as examples of restrictive institutional rules that courts
have created to avoid the "constitutional periphery"-the uncertain con-
stitutional area between the judicial, legislative, and executive
branches. 31 Part III suggests that the dualistic canons originally served a
similar institutional function. 32 Faced with uncertain authority in the
area of foreign relations, courts developed "clear statement" rules that
deferred such questions to Congress and the executive branch. Moti-
vated by concerns of institutional legitimacy, courts unnecessarily lim-
ited their own interpretative role even as regulatory and market
conditions became increasingly transnational.
Part IV challenges these institutional legitimacy arguments as over-
broad and anachronistic in contemporary cases. Assuming that extrinsic
sources are problematic because they circumvent the conventional legis-
lative process, this Part considers the various possible forms of interna-
tional law from both traditional and economic theories of legisprudence.
A public choice analysis indicates that the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality actually increases the dangers of rent-seeking in the legislative
branch. By requiring a "clear statement" of congressional intent, the
presumption restricts courts from using statutory interpretation to force
hidden deals into open legislative debate. 33 Conversely, the impact of
rent-seeking in the executive branch upon international legisprudence is
less clear, particularly with regard to the use of the presumption in favor
of international law. 34 This comparison of international and municipal
legislation leads in Part V to the reexamination, and ultimately the rejec-
tion, of the presumption in favor of international law. The "decanoniza-
tion" of the presumption would allow courts to deal directly with the
institutional tensions produced by source conflicts. Although the pre-
sumption is but one limited example, it offers a provocative microcosm of
28. See infra Part III.A-B.
29. See infra Part III.C and text accompanying note 208.
30. See infra notes 248-257 and accompanying text.
31. See infra Part III.D.
32. See infra notes 237-241, 258-273 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part IV.A and text accompanying notes 362-364.
34. See infra Part IV.B.
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the tensions along the borderland of international and municipal law. It
demonstrates that any transnational role for United States courts must
stand on a conceptual foundation rooted in the Madisonian tradition.
II. The Importance of Being Dualist: Alternative International
and Institutional Theories of Dualism
Dualism is strictly defined as a doctrine that treats international and
municipal law as separate and distinct legal systems. Traditionally, dual-
ism is linked to a narrow conception of international law that confines its
operations to the realm of sovereign relations. 35 This "horizontal" the-
ory of international law was introduced by Jeremy Bentham. In 1789,
Bentham coined the term "international law,"' 36 defining it as a legal sys-
tem operating horizontally on a single plane between nation-states
alone. 37 Specifically, this approach rejects a "vertical" theory of interna-
tional law that recognizes a single system of law operating on the planes
of both sovereign powers and individual citizens. In this sense, horizon-
tal theory is "sovereign-centric," 38 treating international law as the prod-
35. Lord Alfred Denning and other English judges have referred to dualism as a doctrine
of "transformation" under which international law can become municipal law only through an
independent municipal act. See Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nig., 1977 Q.B.
529, 533-54 (C.A.); see also J.G. Collier, Is International Law Really Part of the Law of Eng-
land?, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 924, 925 (1989) ("Dualism is associated with positivist theories
and with the notion that States, not individuals, are the primary subjects of international
law.").
36. Bentham observed: "The word international, it must be acknowledged, is a new one;
though, it is hoped, sufficiently analogous and intelligible. It is calculated to express, in a more
significant way, the branch of law which goes commonly under the name of the law of nations
...." JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGIS-
LATION 296 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789).
37. Id. at 296-97. See generally M.W. Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of "In-
ternational Law, " 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 405 (1984).
38. This fixation on national borders has become increasingly irrelevant in areas such as
endangered species protection:
It is difficult to overstate the extent to which international environmental coop-
eration has become integrated with economic, trade, science, and technology issues,
and the panoply of other forces that bear on sound environmental practices and en-
hance living conditions.... Improved scientific understanding of complex ecological
interrelationships has helped to blur the distinction between international and do-
mestic concerns. It is now understood that local or regional economic activities may
have serious international consequences from direct, indirect, or cumulative environ-
mental effects. For example, economic development that contributes to a loss of spe-
cies, even within a relatively small region of the world, may have broad international
implications.
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ExEcUTIvE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY: TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 262 (1990).
Horizontal theory is strikingly similar to the traditional autonomous concepts underlying
torts and other domestic liability systems. In torts, for example, the traditional approach
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uct of relations among sovereign nations and rejecting any other legal
authority that transcends national borders. 39 The linkage of horizontal-
ism and dualism is implicit in the works of two early proponents of dual-
ism, Heinrich Triepel4° and Dionisio Anzilotti,4 1 who saw international
and municipal law as inherently distinct and incompatible. 42
The traditional Benthamite definition of dualism is also evident in
works by Professors Louis Henkin and Harold Koh. Professor Henkin
reduced dualism to the view that international law is "a discrete legal
system ... [that] is law for nations and creates rights and obligations
among them; it operates wholly on an inter-nation plane."' 43 Professor
Koh defined dualism in a similar fashion:
A strictly dualistic view denies a meaningful role to both individuals
and domestic courts in the making of international law. In a dualistic
system, individuals injured by foreign states would have no right to
pursue claims directly against those states in either domestic or inter-
national fora. Instead, their states would pursue those claims for them
views legal responsibility as a function of individual, atomistic actions. Feminists like Profes-
sor Leslie Bender have argued for an alternative definition based on collective responsibility
and interconnectedness. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort,
38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 33 (1989); see also Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-
Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 61-62 (1987) (describing feminist cri-
tique of autonomous individualism as a male construct). Just as feminists have challenged the
atomistic or self-autonomy view in municipal law, critical legal scholars have begun to ques-
tion sovereign-centricity, offering instead a more global or collective understanding of interna-
tional law. See, e.g., Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law, 32
HARV. INT'L L.J. 81, 98 (1991).
39. See LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS 84 (1989).
40. Triepel argued that international and municipal law govern different populations and
thus are not legitimately applied in a unified or monistic system. As Professor John Starke
explained,
[Triepel] contends first that they differ in the particular social relations they govern;
state law deals with individuals, international law regulates the relations between
states, who alone are subject to it. Secondly, he argues, their juridical origins are
different; the source of municipal law is the will of the state itself, the source of
international law is the common will (Gemeinwille) of states.
J.G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 1936 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 66, 70 (citing HEINRICH TRIEPEL, VOLKERRECHT UND LANDESRECHT (Leipzig, C.L.
Hirschfeld 1899)).
41. Anzilotti distinguished international from municipal law in a fashion similar to
Triepel:
[International laws] are binding by reason of the principle 'pacta sunt servanda,' and
cannot be repealed except as laid down by international law. [Municipal laws] are
binding by reason of the rule which enjoins obedience to the legislature's prescrip-
tions, and can only be repealed in the manner provided by the public law of the
particular community concerned.
Id. at 73 (quoting 1 DIONisIo ANZILorrI, CORSO Di DIRrrTo INTERNAZIONALE 51 (1900)).
42. For a discussion of the dualistic theories of Triepel and Anzilotti, see id. at 70-74.
43. Henkin, United States Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 864.
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on a discretionary basis in international fora, and subsequently deter-
mine the rights of those injured individuals to redress as a matter of
domestic law.44
The traditional definition of dualism in horizontal, sovereign-centric
terms suggests that the continued viability of dualistic interpretation is
largely dependent on the outcome of the ongoing debate over the defini-
tion of international law. Horizontalism would confine international law
to what is commonly termed public international law, and specifically
exclude private international law.45 Under the traditional definition of
dualism, courts treat the systems as distinct because municipal courts
cannot regulate or punish the behavior of sovereign powers. Although
this argument has compelling historical support in the United States, this
Article ultimately suggests an alternative justification for dualism based
on the intrinsic values of Madisonian democracy. Before considering any
alternative, however, it is important to establish the historical meaning
and possible deficiencies of the traditional horizontal model.
A. Dualism as an Exogenous Value: A Sovereign-Centric (Horizontal)
Model
Jurists have questioned the legitimacy of vertical international law
in municipal disputes since the early second century. Like many nations,
the Roman Republic faced this question as the inevitable result of eco-
nomic and political growth. In the early Roman Republic, Roman law
was only for Romans-foreigners were excluded from the protections of
the Civil Law. Since the early republican economy consisted primarily of
domestic trade, this legal exclusion was probably insignificant and un-
controversial at the time. As Rome evolved into a commercial and mili-
tary world center, however, the old republican assumptions threatened
future international trade in the capital city. By A.D. 138, after the reign
of Augustus, the Roman Empire was thriving and Rome itself bustled
with foreigners and international commerce. 46 While foreign trade was
the Empire's lifeblood, foreign traders presented a legal dilemma. The
Roman jurists attempted to solve this problem by creating a special law
for disputes between foreigners or between a foreigner and a Roman citi-
zen. This law was a primitive form of jus gentium, or a law common
44. Koh, supra note 1, at 2349 n.10.
45. The division of international law into "public" and "private" realms obviously re-
mains quite controversial in some academic circles. Many scholars have argued that such a
distinction is artificial at best. See, e.g., M.W. Janis, Individuals as Subjects of International
Law, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 61, 75 (1984); see also infra text accompanying note 67.
46. 1 ANZILOTr, supra note 41, at 51.
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among nations.47 Thus, foreigners were no longer expected to "do as the
Romans do." Rather, Roman judges attempted a compromise by devel-
oping a law that was neither purely Roman nor foreign.
Jus gentium was a striking example of a "vertical" system of inter-
national law. The Romans recognized an international law that tran-
scended the formal relations of states to include the claims and privileges
of individuals under a law "common to all men."'48 This system worked
vertically between the planes of both sovereign powers and citizens.
Dualistic values often reflect the horizontal theory that limits the
scope of international law to the inter-nation plane. Theoretically, inter-
national principles may be applied within a dualistic system, but any ap-
plication is wholly a matter of domestic discretion. Conversely, monistic
values often reflect a vertical theory of international law in which both
domestic and international law are part of a single system of justice that
binds a country's legislature and courts.49 A monistic court recognizes
international law as a legal authority independent of domestic legislative
authority-an authority fully "legitimated" without any municipal act. 50
Under the horizontal definition of international law, dualism is
based on "exogenous values"-values derived from outside the municipal
system. More specifically, dualism is viewed as a reflection of the belief
that international law is legitimate only on the level of inter-state rela-
tions. This traditional linkage between dualism and horizontalism im-
plicitly rejects a possible endogenous conception of dualism as the
product of values inherent to the municipal system itself. Later sections
of this Article discuss such an alternative, endogenous basis for dualism,
but there are a number of other deficiencies in linking dualism to either a
vertical or a horizontal definition of international law. Before stating the
positive case for an endogenous theory, three of these deficiencies merit
discussion here.
First, the dualistic-horizontal linkage implies a traditional horizon-
tal approach to international law in this country. On close examination,
however, early United States history provides little real support for a
47. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 n.2 (1988).
48. Id.
49. For discussions of the distinction between monism and dualism, see HANS KELSEN,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553-88 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1966), WERNER
LEvi, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 22-25 (2d ed.
1991), J.G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 72-74 (10th ed. 1989),
and Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 1127-34.
50. This theory that international law does not require a predicate legitimating municipal
act is sometimes called "incorporation," particularly in England. See, e.g., Trendtex Trading
Corp. v. Central Bank of Nig., 1977 Q.B. 529, 553-54 (C.A.).
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tradition of either verticalism or horizontalism.51 On the surface, the
United States' system may suggest both a vertical theory of international
law and a monistic tradition of judicial review. For example, Article I of
the Constitution expressly authorizes Congress to "define and punish...
Offenses against the Law of Nations."' 52 It also empowers Congress to
prosecute "Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,"153 crimes
under international law. Article III gives the federal courts jurisdiction
under treaties as well as under "the Laws of the United States."154 Fur-
ther, the courts may hear all cases involving "Ambassadors, other Public
Ministers and Consuls; ... Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;
... [and] Controversies... between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." 55 Moreover, while the term "law of
nations" was dropped from Article 111,56 the drafters spoke repeatedly of
the law of nations as part of the legal system inherited from the English
common law.
5 7
These references to the law of nations, however, can be misleading.
58
Virtually all of these references involve horizontal conflicts over treaties,
51. See infra Part III.A.
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
53. Id.
54. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
55. Id
56. An early draft of Article III, apparently written by James Wilson, would have ex-
tended federal courts' jurisdiction to cases arising under the "Law of Nations," but the phrase
was deleted without explanation. See generally Jay, supra note 7, at 830 (noting that the final
version of Article III "parceled matters dealing with the law of nations into ... separate
categories ofjurisdiction"). This deletion and some Federalist writings have led some academ-
ics to conclude that the drafters intentionally placed the law of nations outside the "Laws of
the United States." Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41
VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1222-23 (1988). But see Jay, supra note 7, at 831-32 (arguing that the
drafters understood the law of nations as part of the "Laws of the United States" in Article
III).
57. John Jay spoke most directly on the subject of international law: "The proposed
Constitution, therefore, has not in the least extended the obligation of treaties. They are just as
binding and just as far beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts now as they will be at any
future period, or under any form of government." THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 394 (John Jay)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961) ("Under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the
laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner [in
the federal courts] .... ").
The importance of the law of nations was borne out by the enactment of the Alien Tort
Statute as part of the First Judiciary Act, giving federal courts jurisdiction over "all causes
where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (1988)).
58. The historical support for vertical and monistic approaches to international law can
be equally deceptive. The drafters certainly inherited the concept of the law of nations from
January 1993] INTERNATIONAL LEGISPRUDENCE
ambassadors, or the interests of foreign sovereigns. Likewise, piracy and
other crimes committed on the high seas are governed by international
law only in the sense that nations are recognized as having the right to
act in international waters to protect their citizens and commerce. Mari-
time jurisdiction is another matter. Made part of federal jurisdiction by
the Constitution, law merchant (lex mercatoria) is generally accepted as
a form of private transnational law.59 Lex mercatoria, it might be ar-
gued, is one limited example of verticalism amidst the otherwise horizon-
tal, sovereign-centric emphasis of early United States law. 60
England, but the "incorporation" of the law of nations in English law was and continues to be
as much a source of debate in England as in the United States. See generally Collier, supra
note 35, at 925. The English courts have recognized the incorporation of the law of nations
into the English system. See, e.g., Barbuit's Case in Chancery, 25 Eng. Rep. 777, 778 n. 1 (Ch.
1736) ("[T]he law of nations.., in its fullest extent [is] part of the law of England."). Never-
theless, many English judges have with equal firmness required international principles to be
adopted by and conform to municipal decisions-a distinctly dualistic position. For example,
in a decision by Lord Richard Alverstone, the well-known jurist disagreed with a colleague's
monistic statement, remarking:
[T]he expressions used by Lord Mansfield when dealing with the particular and
recognised rule of international law on this subject, that the law of nations forms part
of the law of England, ought not to be construed so as to include as part of the law of
England opinions of text-writers upon a question as to which there is no evidence
that Great Britain has ever assented, and a fortiori if they are contrary to the princi-
ples of her laws as declared by her Courts.
West Rand Cent. Gold Mining Co. v. The King, [1905] 2 K.B. 391, 407-08. See also Chung
Chi Cheung v. The King, 1939 App. Cas. 160 (P.C. 1938) (appeal taken from H.K.) (Lord
Atkin) ("It must be always remembered that, so far, at any rate, as the Courts of this country
are concerned, international law has no validity save in so far as its principles are accepted and
adopted by our own domestic law."). This confusion is evident in the writings of Lord Den-
ning, who has vacillated between monistic and dualistic rulings. Compare Trendtex Trading
Corp. v. Central Bank of Nig., 1977 Q.B. 529, 554 (C.A.) (endorsing "incorporation," or mon-
ism, and applying limitations on immunity principles under international law) with Thakrar v.
Secretary of State for the Home Office, 1974 Q.B. 684, 702 (C.A.) (applying a "transforma-
tion," or dualist, rule to deny an immigration claim based on international law).
59. Koh, supra note 1, at 2351; see also Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of
International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221 (1978).
60. In later cases, the suggested incorporation of international law often included forms
other than strict public international law. In 1895, for example, the Supreme Court stated:
International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense-including not
only questions of right between nations, governed by what has been appropriately
called the law of nations; but also questions arising under what is usually called
private international law, or the conflict of laws, and concerning the rights of persons
within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private or public,
done within the dominions of another nation-is part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts of justice, as often as such questions are
presented in litigation between man and man, duly submitted to their determination.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
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Nevertheless, it is clear that neither the Constitution nor early cases
manifest a purely horizontal or vertical system of international law.61
Second, even assuming that the United States' approach could be
classified as horizontal or vertical, neither definition of international law
actually compels the adoption of a monistic or a dualistic system. The
particular definition of international law is distinct from the question of
its incorporation. Horizontal theory justifies a decision to bar the appli-
cation of international sources in private domestic disputes. Monism and
dualism simply delineate general positions on the relative hierarchy of
international versus municipal laws. In other words, the question of
whether a state recognizes a horizontal or a vertical system will only
affect the scope of the international law that would be applied under a
monistic system or selectively applied under a dualistic system. Thus, a
state could be a monistic jurisdiction and still follow a horizontal theory
of international law. Such a horizontal-monistic system differs from a
vertical-monistic system only in that the former produces fewer potential
domestic applications, because it defines international law along a narrow
band of public international disputes.
Moreover, the mere incorporation of international principles does
not in itself suggest monism or exclude dualism. Dualism does not reject
the application of international sources. Rather, under dualism, domes-
tic law controls the decision as to where international law may be used
within the "domestic legal hierarchy. ' 62 As Professor Henkin noted, du-
alistic systems "dictate whether international law is subject to constitu-
tional limitations and whether it is equal, superior, or inferior in
authority to strictly domestic law when the two conflict."' 63 Thus, a du-
alistic system could in fact favor international sources as a matter of do-
mestic law.
In adoptingjus gentium, for example, the Romans did not automati-
cally adopt a monistic system. Quite to the contrary, jus gentium selec-
tively incorporated international principles compatible with municipal
laws. Likewise, soon after the ratification of the Constitution, Congress
enacted the Alien Tort Statute as part of the First Judiciary Act.64 The
Alien Tort Statute expressly gave federal courts concurrent jurisdiction
61. Professor Koh made this point with great force: "In short, long before the modem
period, United States courts routinely applied international law in domestic cases without re-
gard to whether the dispute concerned private or public international law or could be charac-
terized as 'horizontal' or 'vertical.'" Koh, supra note 1, at 2353.
62. Henkin, United States Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 865.
63. Id
64. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (1988).
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over "all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States."'65 Congress's decision to
grant federal jurisdiction over tort actions based on international law is
perfectly consistent with a dualistic system. In fact, it might be argued
that such a statute would be redundant if the Constitution were based on
a monistic system. It would be incorrect, therefore, to say that the
United States has a monistic tradition simply because it has recognized
the authority of international law in the form of treaties, or any other
international source. Certainly, any such tradition cannot be traced to
early English cases, which evidence similar equivocation on the status of
international law in municipal courts.66
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the horizontal justification
for dualism has become an anachronism in the twentieth century by vir-
tue of the increasing judicial and academic recognition of vertical claims.
In fact, many commentators now reject the very distinction between hor-
izontalism and verticalism or public and private international law. Judge
Philip Jessup used the term "transnational law" instead of "international
law" precisely because the latter failed to convey the real mix of "[b]oth
public and private international law... [with] other rules which do not
wholly fit into such standard categories. '67 The traditional linkage of
horizontalism and dualism, therefore, is no longer compelling today.
The United States has long recognized vertical international claims. His-
torically, the only question has been the relative weight to be given inter-
national sources, particularly when they conflict with municipal sources.
The horizontal or sovereign-centric theories do not suggest a rationale
for favoring or disfavoring these sources; they simply reaffirm a right to
reject international sources altogether in private cases.
B. Dualism as an Endogenous Value: An Institutional Legitimacy Model
Although it is sometimes justified on the basis of horizontalism, du-
alism can no longer rest on such a narrow and controversial foundation.
It would be a mistake, however, to discard dualism as an anachronism
without exploring alternative justifications. While horizontal theories are
fast becoming passe, dualism clearly remains a force within United States
jurisprudence.6 8 This suggests that dualistic values may serve other func-
65. Id.
66. See supra note 58. For a discussion of dualism in the English courts, see Collier,
supra note 35, at 925 (noting that "English Judges seem traditionally to have leaned towards
the monist view").
67. PHILIP C. JEssup, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956).
68. See infra notes 152-159, 200-201 and accompanying text.
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tions beyond their possible horizontalistic, sovereign-centric roots. This
Article suggests that modem dualism is best understood as a product of
endogenous, intranational values. Under this view, dualistic canons of
construction reflect the internal values and institutional preferences of a
representative democracy.
These canons, principally the presumption in favor of international
law and the presumption against extraterritoriality, were developed to
define and limit the courts' role along the borderland of municipal and
international law. They represent what Professor William Eskridge has
called "meta-rules"-rules of statutory construction that require espe-
cially high standards of clarity.69 Professor Eskridge offered the pre-
sumption in favor of international law as an example of a meta-rule
derived from "the notion that the Court should be reluctant to interpret
laws expansively when doing so would approach the constitutional pe-
riphery."'70 This use of the presumption in favor of international law is
based on an endogenous value of institutional legitimacy. Whether faced
with a customary international principle against extraterritoriality or a
formal treaty obligation, the Supreme Court has historically viewed in-
ternational conflicts as falling near the "constitutional periphery" of its
judicial powers. 71 The Court continues to regard international law as
heavily imbued with political questions and potential institutional com-
plications.72 Under separation of powers principles, 73 such decisions are
considered to be outside the judiciary's legitimate institutional domain.74
69. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1007, 1019-20 (1989) [hereinafter Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation].
70. Id. at 1020, 1027-28.
71. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431-33 (1964) (refusing
to decide propriety of foreign expropriations under international law, citing potential conflict
with executive branch attempts to secure compensation through negotiations with expropriat-
ing nation); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1945) (holding courts may not enlarge
immunities related to foreign policy beyond the limits recognized by the political branches);
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (holding judiciary is conclusively
bound by political branches' determination of who is the de jure or de facto sovereign of a
foreign territory).
72. The most recent example of this judicial deference appeared in United States v. Alva-
rez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992), in which the Court refused to address the propriety of
state-sponsored abduction of foreign citizens, leaving this sensitive question to the executive
branch. Id. at 2195-96.
73. See infra Part II.B.1.
74. See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195-96 (deferring to the executive branch on
international law arguments regarding the propriety of obtaining personal jurisdiction over
criminal defendant through state-sponsored abduction); Oeten, 246 U.S. at 302 (reasoning that
conduct of foreign relations, having been committed to political branches by the Constitution,
is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
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(1) The Countermajoritarian Rationale
Although the dualistic canons clearly reflect judicial uncertainty
about the constitutional periphery of international disputes, the specific
cause of this uncertainty was left undefined in past cases and remains
shrouded in ambiguity. The most common institutional justification for
judicial restraint is the separation of powers argument that courts must
defer such "political questions" to the legislative and executive
branches.75  This justification, which we may refer to as the
"countermajoritarian rationale," reflects the inherent institutional ten-
sion between the judiciary and the "political branches. '76 In a system
that emphasizes the republican ideals of deliberative process and plural-
ism, 7 7 the courts serve an often countermajoritarian, undemocratic func-
tion.78 Although an independent judiciary serves to protect the country
from majoritarian tyranny, federal judges exhibit all the most worrisome
traits of an elitist, countermajoritarian group: they are unelected, life-
tenured, highly educated, and for the most part wealthy individuals sub-
ject to removal only for serious misconduct.
7 9
The traditional response to this countermajoritarian fear is to re-
strict the courts' role in the legislative process by limiting judges to strict
interpretative principles.8 0 This is not to say that judges do not legislate
under a tripartite system. The Supreme Court has long recognized a leg-
415, 420 (1839) (holding judiciary is bound by executive branch determinations or assumptions
regarding sovereignty of other nations).
75. For descriptions of the political question doctrine, see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
81 (1976) (noting political branches' flexibility in responding to foreign affairs; consequently,
judicial review of these branches' decisions in area of immigration and naturalization is nar-
row), Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (noting that various formulations describing
political questions are essentially a function of separation of powers), and Antolok v. United
States, 873 F.2d 369, 379-84 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (unjoined opinion of Sentelle, J.) (describing
matters relating to the diplomatic recognition of foreign sovereigns as within the exclusive
domain of the political branches and thus not subject to judicial review).
76. For a now-classic explication of the countermajoritarian rationale for judicial re-
straint, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (2d ed. 1986).
77. See id. at 21.
78. Id.
79. For discussions of judicial political traits, see JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980), JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIs-
TRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980), and MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITU-
TION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 9 (1982).
80. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 79, at 1; HART & SACKS, supra note 3, at 638-39; RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 272-74, 292-93 (1985); Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1899), reprinted
in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 203, 207 (1920).
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islative role for courts in statutory interpretation. In the words of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, however, when judges legislate "[they must] do
so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular
motions."
81
Monism is in some ways the fulfillment of the worst
countermajoritarian nightmare. 82 By taking law from sources outside of
the system, a judge seems to threaten the integrity of the tripartite system
itself. Monism rejects the belief that legal authority in a democracy can
only be derived from within the domestic democratic process. By apply-
ing international over municipal sources, judges appear to be not only
acting politically and independently of the other branches, but doing so
at the expense of our legal sovereignty. To make matters worse, these
unelected officials are deferring to foreign sources that are themselves
arguably produced by elitist, undemocratic bodies. 83 As is shown below,
international law derives from various sources aside from the formal
agreements of sovereign states. These sources can be based on something
akin to international legislative history---customs or principles that are
byproducts of foreign relations rather than formal sovereign voting.
84
Monistic interpretation, therefore, may appear to embody the deadly
combination of an unelected official applying undemocratic and extrinsic
sources in a field (foreign relations) that is viewed as quintessentially
political.
The countermajoritarian rationale favors a narrow institutional role
for courts in statutory interpretation.8 5 Courts have generally confined
their legislative role to the Holmesian "molar and molecular" through
either textualist or intentionalist principles of interpretation. Textualism
confines the court's interpretation to the actual statutory text enacted by
Congress.86 An intentionalist interpretation is distinguished by a judicial
inquiry of more liberal scope, but remains focused on the question of
81. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
82. The very definition of monism by some scholars, treating international law as beyond
even constitutional limitation, inevitably arouses countermajoritarian fears. See, eg., Stein-
hardt, supra note 1, at 1106 n.7 ("In the monist paradigm, the international and municipal
legal systems comprise a single universal order, with international law as the normative supe-
rior. Under a monist view, therefore, international law is not subject even to the constitutional
limitations of municipal law.").
83. See infra note 356 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 351-357 and accompanying text.
85. But cf GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)
(arguing that courts ought to begin a "common law" process of renovating obsolete statutes,
using such techniques as updating statutes by overruling them).
86. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 340-41 (1990). A product of the formalist school of statu-
tory interpretation, strict textualism has largely fallen out of contemporary use with the gen-
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Congress's intent in enacting the statute.8 7 Regardless of its actual inter-
pretative approach, however, a court motivated by countermajoritarian
fears will favor a minimalist role in statutory interpretation, often by ap-
plying strict canons of construction.88  This minimalist approach is
clearly at work in the application of the canons that govern the border-
land of municipal and international law. Applications of these canons
often lead to strict textualist approaches. While generally viewed as an
extreme judicial philosophy in statutory cases, strict textualism retains
vitality in cases along the borderland with courts that would otherwise
apply intentionalist principles in statutory cases.
Although it provides a classic justification for narrow interpretative
rules, the countermajoritarian rationale proves on closer examination to
be a poor basis for contemporary dualistic values and canons. Various
factors militate against a countermajoritarian rationale. First, the ration-
ale has been challenged in other areas as a form of constitutional hyste-
ria, seldom supported in practice.8 9 Scholars have noted, as did
Professor Michael Tigar, that "if we examine the Court in the perform-
ance of the judicial review function, we see that it is no more counter-
majoritarian in the nature of things than the Congress and the President
are majoritarian in the nature of things." 90 Admittedly, this common
criticism does not fully answer the countermajoritarian argument inas-
much as (unlike federal judges) Members of Congress and the President
are elected and serve at the pleasure of majorities. After all,
eral demise of formalist theory. See Turley, Transnational Discrimination, supra note 3, at
392; cf infra note 98 and accompanying text.
87. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 86, at 325-26. For a critical review of textualist and
intentionalist theories, see id. at 324-45.
88. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485-90 (1917) (stating that when
language of statute is plain and does not lead to absurd or impracticable results, there is no
occasion for judicial construction and courts must take such language as the sole evidence of
ultimate legislative intent); see also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing against judicially implied causes of action because they allow
"the Judicial Branch to assume policymaking authority vested by the Constitution in the Leg-
islative Branch").
89. Among other protections against countermajoritarianism is legislative supremacy, a
concept recognized by even the most activist of judges. Under this doctrine, Congress retains
the authority to override any judicial excess in nonconstitutional decisions. For an example of
legislative supremacy in action, see infra notes 181-184 and accompanying text.
90. Michael E. Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine, " and Foreign Re-
lations, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1142 (1970); cf William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 322 (1989) (characterizing the assumptions underlying
countermajoritarian fears as "oversimplified"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1528 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation] (citing commentary that argues that the Constitution is either
countermajoritarian or supports only a limited democracy).
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countermajoritarian elected officials present something of a self-cor-
recting problem in a Madisonian democracy. The criticism nevertheless
challenges the actual basis of countermajoritarian fears, given the pres-
ence of other constitutional and institutional safeguards on judicial ex-
cess, such as the appointment and impeachment provisions, 91 the
legislative supremacy doctrine,92 and Congress's control of federal
courts' jurisdiction.
93
Second, and on a more basic level, the countermajoritarian rationale
actually amounts to little more than a tautological argument: courts are
countermajoritarian because courts are not majoritarian. More specifi-
cally, the rationale does little to support dualism beyond yielding a gen-
eral preference for judicial abstinence in statutory interpretation. It is
not self-evident why the undemocratic character of courts should compel
either the rigid dichotomy of municipal and international sources or the
supremacy of municipal sources.
It is, of course, possible to recognize the countermajoritarian prob-
lem and still allow courts to interpret statutes by reference to sources
extrinsic to the municipal law. Intentionalists have often analogized this
interpretative role to that of an "honest agent" 94 or, as Judge Richard
Posner once advocated, a loyal soldier.95 Under this view, statutory pro-
visions serve as a series of commands to courts-commands that must be
carried out as precisely as possible.96 A court may find that a textual
91. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Appointments Clause); id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5, § 3, cls.
6-7, art. II, § 4 (impeachment provisions); see also id. art. III, § I ("The Judges... shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour. .. ").
92. Professor Daniel Farber described the legislative supremacy doctrine as "grounded in
the notion that, except when exercising the power of judicial review, courts are subordinate to
legislatures." Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO.
L.J. 281, 283 (1989).
93. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("Congress may from time to time ordain and establish"
lower federal courts.); id § 2, cl. 2 ("iTihe supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction...
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as Congress shall make."). For discussions
of jurisdictional control as a response to countermajoritarianism, see PERRY, supra note 79, at
125, and Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opin-
ionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. Rnv. 895 (1984).
94. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and
the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 60 (1984) ("Judges must be honest agents of the
political branches."); see also United States v. 9/1 Kg. Containers, 854 F.2d 173, 179 (7th Cir.
1988) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Judges' role is to decipher and enforce the existing scheme, whatever
they think of its wisdom."), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1010 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 405, 437-41 (1989) (explaining agency
theory of intentionalist interpretation and discussing common criticisms).
95. Judge Posner has incorporated this military analogy into a more dynamic interpretive
approach, called "imaginative reconstruction." See Richard A. Posner, Legislation and its
Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REv. 431, 432, 445-48 (1989).
96. Posner explained:
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reference to international values illuminates a legislative objective,
thereby making the application of extrinsic sources necessary to fulfill the
true majoritarian intent of Congress.
Finally, the countermajoritarian rationale has lost much of its ap-
peal in the courts as judges have moved away from both textualism and
narrow intentionalism in other areas. 97 It is notable that the use of inter-
national sources has increased concurrently with a discernible trend to-
ward contextual interpretation. While strong advocates of a "plain
meaning" approach remain, 98 judges today are more willing to consider a
variety of sources, including international law, in determining the proper
application of a statute. 99 Some concerns regarding countermajoritarian
decisionmaking may still arise in statutory interpretation, but courts
have generally put formalistic responses to these concerns aside under
the pressures of "the age of regulation." 100 Courts have recognized a
need to update and clarify statutes in light of changed circumstances that
Congress is unlikely to address.101
By the command analogy I mean simply that it is helpful to think of statutes on the
analogy of commands, as of military superiors to their subordinates .... The supe-
rior officer's command may have become garbled in transmission or may fail to cor-
respond to conditions on the ground, yet the subordinate still must act, in a way that
will best carry out the common enterprise-and this whether or not he shares the
precise values of his superior.
Id. at 448.
97. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 22, at 592-94 (arguing that the plain meaning
rule has lost vitality); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in
the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 195 (1983) (observing that the plain
meaning rule "has effectively been laid to rest" in the Supreme Court); Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEo. L.J. 353, 376-78 (1989) (suggesting that
courts used dynamic interpretative techniques-techniques that were not limited to text and
historical context but also considered contemporary societal, political, and legal contexts-to
decide cases under the McFadden Act, which regulates branching by national banks).
98. Most notable is Justice Scalia. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("[I]f the language of a statute is clear, that lan-
guage must be given effect .... ").
99. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 22, at 696-98 (describing the common use of vari-
ous extrinsic sources in statutory interpretation); Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 1152-56 (stating
that recent Supreme Court cases "suggest a broad endorsement of international principle in the
interpretation of statutes").
100. The last fifty years have witnessed an explosion of command and control regulations.
Although there were once only a few statutory schemes regulating distinct subjects, there is
now a stratified record of related statutes passed at different times. These statutes overlie one
another, with later schemes often making preceding schemes obsolete. For a discussion of
such statutory obsolescence, see ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 22, at 844-46 (describing
four ways that statutes can become obsolete). Much has been written on the problem of updat-
ing obsolete statutes. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 85; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EM-
PIRE (1986); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20
(1988); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 90, at 1479.
101. See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 100 (viewing statutory interpretation as a journey
[Vol. 44HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
(2) The Pluralistic Rationale
This Article explores an alternative basis for dualism in modem
cases. This alternative justification, which we may refer to as the "plu-
ralistic rationale," focuses on the importance of international sources as a
new form of legislation in a Madisonian system. A dualistic perspective
considers both international law and the laws of other nations to be ex-
trinsic sources because they are created largely outside the domestic leg-
islative process. Extrinsic legal sources are viewed as destabilizing and
dangerous to a system that is principally motivated by the desire to influ-
ence legislation.102 It is faith in the legislative process that prompts dis-
parate factional groups to seek compromise rather than conflict in
achieving their social and economic goals.103 This faith can be severely
shaken either by the existence in Congress of hidden special dealing that
circumvents majoritarian pressures or by the availability of alternative
avenues to Congress for attaining factional goals. 104 This Article consid-
ers both of these dangers to the legislative process as they arise from the
use of extrinsic sources in domestic cases.
Clearly, both the countermajoritarian and pluralistic rationales for
dualism rest on institutional concerns of courts operating on the constitu-
tional periphery. There is, however, a difference in emphasis between the
two rationales. The countermajoritarian rationale rejects a judicial role
in resolving questions that are political or potentially divisive. Requiring
extreme judicial deference, this narrow view of institutional legitimacy
produces predictable results in borderland cases that are viewed as heav-
that only begins with enactment; statutes "mean" nothing until judges, lawyers, administra-
tors, and laypersons interact with them, and such interaction may change statutory meaning).
102. An analogous distrust for extrinsic sources is most evident in "dealist" literature,
which regards the legislative process as a free market that operates more efficiently as a func-
tion of internal forces than in response to tampering from without. For dealists like Judge
Frank Easterbrook, who view broad intentionalist interpretation as dangerous to the process,
the application of extrinsic sources would present an even greater threat. See Frank H. Easter-
brook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CH. L. REv. 533 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Statutes'
Domains]. These scholars are uncomfortable with the use of municipal legislative sources
other than the statutory text in judicial interpretation. Past concerns over the legitimacy of
such municipal sources as committee reports obviously pale in comparison to the concerns
regarding the use of sources with origins completely outside the municipal system.
103. See generally Turley, Transnational Discrimination, supra note 3, at 349-54.
104. International sources such as executive agreements may offer such alternative ave-
nues. See infra notes 343-349 and accompanying text. For discussions of the disruptive role of
groups that seek special access or secret deals, see Daniel A. Farber, Democracy and Disgust:
Reflections on Public Choice, 65 CH.-KFrr L. RPv. 161 (1989), Jerry L. Mashaw, The Eco-
nomics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123 (1989),
and Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice
Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. RIv. 2121 (1990).
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ily laden with political issues. A court can trigger countermajoritarian
fears by simply identifying an issue of foreign relations in a case. The
countermajoritarian fear is heightened further when the court views a
borderland case as requiring the rejection of traditional concepts like the
sovereign-centricity of international law.105 By framing the decision in
this way, courts reduce cases to ultimate political questions that compel
only one result under a countermajoritarian rationale: extreme judicial
deference to the legislature in the form of a strict textualist approach.
The pluralistic rationale shifts the inquiry into international sources
away from this outcome-determinative construct to consider their func-
tion as a new form of legislation within the tripartite system. The plural-
istic rationale focuses on the dangers of including an alternative
legislative form in a system that is built on the assumption that all fac-
tional groups must go through Congress to achieve their social and eco-
nomic goals. This concern drives to the heart of the still-dominant legal
process school of statutory interpretation. While the countermajori-
tarian rationale primarily aims to restrain the potential growth of judicial
activism and elitism, the pluralistic rationale emphasizes judicial author-
ity as a guarantor of democratic process. Courts perform this function
through judicial review and their insistence that legislation follow the
constitutionally mandated procedures of bicameralism and present-
ment.10 6 By preventing circumvention of the checks and balances incor-
porated in our representative democracy,10 7 courts facilitate deliberative,
majoritarian decisions by Congress and the executive branch. Dualistic
rules ostensibly serve this proceduralistic purpose by favoring municipal
sources derived from within the system.
III. Canons Along the Borderland: Dualism, Statutory
Interpretation, and the Constitutional Periphery
When viewed from a pluralistic standpoint, judicial mistrust of ex-
trinsic sources simply reflects a preference for legislative products that
105. For an argument that social justice may require the rejection of such traditional con-
cepts, see Purvis, supra note 38, at 93-98.
106. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1983) ("[P]olicy arguments supporting
even useful 'political inventions' [specifically, the legislative veto] are subject to the demands of
the Constitution which defines powers and, with respect to this subject, sets out just how those
powers are to be exercised.").
107. This function of the courts is a driving force behind the legal process school. See
Turley, Transnational Discrimination, supra note 3, at 349-53 (describing legal process school's
public purpose approach as based on the belief that procedural safeguards in Madisonian
model of representative government would check special interests and allow collective pres-
sures to motivate the enactment of legislation).
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have been "tested" by an open and deliberative process. Regardless of
whether a judge follows a formalist 08 or legal realist 0 9 or legal process
approach, 110 international sources can only be truly legitimated, or re-
jected, on this legislative basis. With its economic critique, the public
choice school has contributed much to the study of interest group forces
in the legislative process.1 ' Before turning to this interest group analy-
sis, however, it is important to consider the origins and applications of
dualistic values in statutory interpretation. Remarkably little has been
written on the background of and relationship between the two principal
dualistic canons along the borderland of municipal and international law.
It is to that question that we must now turn. Those readers less inter-
ested in the canons themselves may skip this background discussion in
favor of the subsequent analysis of the changing institutional role for
courts in transnational cases." 2
A. Charming Betsy and the Presumption in Favor of International Law
Originating in the early nineteenth century, the presumption in
favor of international law clearly predates the presumption against extra-
territoriality. Commentators generally trace the presumption in favor of
international law back to Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy," 3 a
case that reads like an Errol Flynn epic. On July 3, 1800, the United
States frigate Constellation encountered a small trading schooner, the
Charming Betsy, on the open seas." 4 At the time, the United States was
waging an undeclared war with France, and Congress had enacted a
number of measures to restrict trade with the enemy." 5 These included
108. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. Rnv.
781, 792-810 (1989) (describing traditional formalism as the belief that the application of gen-
eral rules can conclusively produce unique answers in particular cases).
109. See generally Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. Rnv. 465
(1988) (book review) (describing legal realism as based on pragmatism, encompassing beliefs
that it is impossible to derive unique legal rules from existing precedents, that judges should
make law based on contemporary understandings of social reality, and that judges should
never formalistically or mechanically apply rules without regard for their social consequences).
110. See generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL.
L. Rnv. 919, 940-46 (1989) (book review) (describing traditional legal process theories as
attempts to legitimate and constrain judicial decisionmaking by carefully delineating its
processes and limits, and by remaining true to the public purposes of the laws).
111. See Turley, Transnational Discrimination, supra note 3, at 349-65 (comparing the
public choice and legal process schools); infra Part IV.
112. See infra Parts IV-V.
113. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). For a discussion of Charming Betsy, see Steinhardt,
supra note 1, at 1135-62.
114. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 66 (district court's opinion).
115. See generally ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLrnCS AND DI-
PLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WrTH FRANCE, 1797-1801 (1966).
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the Federal Nonintercourse Acts, which prohibited all commercial trans-
actions "between any person or persons resident within the United States
or under their protection, and any person or persons resident within the
territories of the French Republic, or any of the dependencies
thereof."' 16 The skipper of the U.S.S. Constellation, Captain Alexander
Murray, was under orders from President Adams to seize any vessel
trading with the French.' 1 7 The President specifically referred to Danish
vessels in his instructions to United States sea captains:
You are not only to do all that in you lies to prevent all intercourse,
whether direct or circuitous, between the ports of the United States
and those of France and her dependencies, in cases where the vessels or
cargoes are apparently, as well as really American, and protected by
American papers only, but you are to be vigilant that vessels or cargoes
really American, but covered by Danish or other foreign papers, and
bound to or from French ports, do not escape you.18
The Charming Betsy was a United States trading schooner operating
out of Baltimore when it first attracted Captain Murray's attention. In
April 1800, after dropping off a load of flour at St. Bartholomew, the
schooner sailed to St. Thomas of the Virgin Islands to be sold to Jared
Shattuck, a Danish subject. 19 The ship then sailed (under a Danish flag)
for Guadaloupe, a French possession. Before landing at Guadaloupe,
however, the luckless schooner was first seized by French privateers and
then captured by the Constellation. Captain Murray seized the vessel
under the Nonintercourse Acts, sold its cargo, and took the schooner to
Philadelphia.' 20
The seizure of the Charming Betsy and sale of its cargo prompted an
almost immediate suit in Philadelphia by the Danish consul, who ob-
jected to the taking of a Danish vessel. The consul argued that the ship
was not only sailing under a foreign flag, but was also owned by a Danish
citizen. Although Shattuck was born in the United States, he left for St.
Thomas around the time of the Constitution's ratification and therefore
may never have been a United States citizen.' 2' Moreover, Shattuck
lived in St. Thomas for twenty years, became a Danish burgher, and
116. Federal Nonintercourse Act, ch. 10, § 1, 2 Stat. 7, 8 (1800) (expired 1801). The
Federal Nonintercourse Acts provided as punishment for their violation in part that "any ship
or vessel, owned, hired, or employed wholly or in part by any person or persons resident
within the United States, or any citizen or citizens thereof resident elsewhere . . . shall be
wholly forfeited, and may be seized and condemned." Id. at 7-8.
117. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 78 (argument of Captain Murray's counsel).
118. Id. at 78-79 (quoted by Captain Murray's counsel).
119. Id. at 115-16.
120. Id. at 116.
121. Shattuck had apparently left the United States in 1789 or 1790. Id.
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swore loyalty to the King of Denmark.12 2 The Danish consul therefore
denounced the application of the Nonintercourse Acts to Shattuck as a
violation of international law and the sovereign authority of Denmark.
The federal district and appellate courts agreed with the consul, ordering
the return of the vessel and the payment of compensation. 123 The case
was then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall held in favor of
Shattuck. Marshall viewed the issue as one of simple statutory interpre-
tation and the violation of international principles of conduct. 124 The
seizure of the schooner, he noted, placed a United States law in potential
conflict with international principles governing the protection of all for-
eign citizens outside United States territory.1 25 Marshall stated that "an
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations
if any other possible construction remains."12 6 Consequently, the Court
held that "the Charming Betsy, with her cargo, being at the time of her
recapture the bonafide property of a Danish burgher, is not forfeitable,
in consequence of her being employed in carrying on trade and com-
merce with a French island." 1
27
Although Charming Betsy can be viewed narrowly as defining what
constitutes "a person under the protection of the United States,"128 the
case became the bedrock for a series of later decisions involving interna-
tional law and judicial construction.12 9 The progeny of Charming Betsy
122. Id.
123. The district court awarded the vessel and full damages to Shattuck. On appeal, the
court modified the order to deduct the costs incurred by Captain Murray from the sale of the
cargo. Id. at 117. Both parties appealed the court of appeals' decision to the Supreme Court.
Id.
124. See id. at 118-21.
125. Id. at 120. Marshall argued that this was not a case of a citizen in a foreign country:
He is not a person under the protection of the United States. The American citizen
who goes into a foreign country, although he owes local and temporary allegiance to
that country, is yet, if he performs no other act changing his condition, entitled to the
protection of his own government; and if, without the violation of any municipal law,
he should be oppressed unjustly, he would have a right to claim that protection, and
the interposition of the American government in his favor would be considered a
justifiable interposition.
Id.
126. Id at 118.
127. Id. at 120-21.
128. Id. at 120.
129. The Court again endorsed the presumption in favor of international law in MacLeod
v. United States:
The statute should be construed in the light of the purpose of the Government
to act within the limitation of the principles of international law, the observance of
which is so essential to the peace and harmony of nations, and it should not be as-
sumed that Congress proposed to violate the obligations of this country to other
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apply a strict presumption against extraterritorial applications in the face
of countervailing international principles. 130 In Lauritzen v. Larsen, for
example, the Court held that a Danish sailor injured on a Danish ship in
Cuban waters had no remedy under United States laws. 1 31 The sailor
had filed suit under the Jones Act, which provided relief for "any seaman
who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment."'
132
The Court observed that "[b]y usage as old as the Nation, [United States
laws] have been construed to apply only to areas and transactions in
which American law would be considered operative under prevalent doc-
trines of international law."' 13 3 One such principle, the Court noted, is
that a state should not regulate foreigners on the high seas or otherwise
outside of its borders. 34 Presented with this international principle and
a "simpl[e] ... problem of statutory construction,"' 135 the Court applied
the presumption from Charming Betsy to narrowly construe the Jones
Act. 136
Similarly, in McCulloch v. Socieded Nacional de Marineros de Hon-
duras, the Court held that the National Labor Relations Act did not
extend to the operation of ships under foreign flags. 137 After noting the
absence of a clear legislative decision on the matter, 38 the Court found
that such an application would implicate the "well-established rule of
international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the in-
nations, which it was the manifest purpose of the President to scrupulously observe
and which were founded upon the principles of international law.
229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913).
130. Charming Betsy is often cited for another, more general canon of construction:
"[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction
is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
131. 345 U.S. 571, 592-93 (1953).
132. Ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688
(1988)).
133. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 577.
134. The Court cited an English case for this rule of "maritime jurisprudence." Id. at 578
(citing The Queen v. Jameson, [1896] 2 Q.B. 425, 430).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 577-78. The Court stressed the importance of respecting
non-national or international maritime law of impressive maturity and universality.
It has the force of law, not from extraterritorial reach of national laws, nor from
abdication of its sovereign powers by any nation, but from acceptance by common
consent of civilized communities of rules designed to foster amicable and workable
commercial relations.
Id. at 581-82 (footnote omitted).
137. 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963).
138. Id. at 20.
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ternal affairs of a ship."'139 Applying the presumption, the Court held
that the application of a United States labor law to a foreign-flagged ves-
sel would "arouse[] vigorous protests from foreign governments and cre-
ateo] international problems for our Government."' 14
More recently, in Weinberger v. Rossi, the Supreme Court applied
Charming Betsy to narrowly interpret a federal statute in deference to an
executive agreement between the United States and the Philippines.'
41
The executive agreement established hiring preferences for Filipino citi-
zens at United States military bases in that country. 142 A subsequently
enacted federal statute, however, prohibited discriminatory hiring by the
military, except when required by treaty. 143 Defining executive agree-
ments as treaty obligations, 144 the Court relied in part on Charming Betsy
to support its refusal to apply the law to the Philippines.
145
The common denominator of these presumption cases is the per-
ceived violation of international principles. 146 As demonstrated by Wein-
139. Id. at 21.
140. Id. at 17; see id at 21.
141. 456 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1982).
142. Base Labor Agreement, May 27, 1968, U.S.-Phil., 19 U.S.T. 5892, 5892-93 '"The
United States Armed Forces in the Philippines shall fill the needs for civilian employment by
employing Filipino citizens, except when the needed skills are found.., not to be locally
available, or when otherwise necessary for reasons of security or special management needs
143. See Act of Sept. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, § 106, 85 Stat. 348, 355, reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 7201 note (1988). Weinberger differs from the usual presumption case in that the
statute involved expressly stated that it could be trumped by contrary treaty obligations. The
statute provided that "[u]nless prohibited by treaty, no person shall be discriminated against
by the Department of Defense." Id. The question before the Court, therefore, was whether an
executive agreement constituted a treaty obligation. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 28-29.
144. The Supreme Court held that "some affirmative expression of congressional intent to
abrogate the United States' international obligations is required in order to construe the word
'treaty'... as meaning only Art. II treaties." Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 32.
145. Id. The Court acknowledged the clear difference between Weinberger and Charming
Betsy:
While [Charming Betsy] appl[ies] with less force to a statute which by its terms is
designed to affect conditions on United States enclaves outside of the territorial limits
of this country than [it does] to the construction of statutes couched in general lan-
guage which are sought to be applied in an extraterritorial way, [it is] nonetheless not
without force in either case.
Id
146. See also United States v. Victoria, 876 F.2d 1009, 1010-11 (Ist Cir. 1989) (discussing
international protection afforded to "stateless vessels" in upholding an arrest on the high seas).
The rule of Charming Betsy is now a recognized part of the United States' law on foreign
relations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 114 (1986) ("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as




berger, these principles can be derived from a variety of sources and often
do not fit formal definitions of "international law."' 47 In his article on
international sources, Professor Ralph Steinhardt explored the varying
definitions of "international law" under the presumption in favor of in-
ternational law.148 He showed how courts use customary international
law and treaties as virtually interchangeable foundations for the pre-
sumption. Courts often cite international custom as the basis for restrict-
ing statutory interpretations under the presumption, thereby
"undermin[ing] the traditional distinction between customary and con-
ventional law."149 Drawing a distinction between international law and
international comity in past international cases, Professor Steinhardt
challenged the view of the presumption as simply limiting extraterritorial
jurisdiction, instead treating it as "an affirmative warrant for applying
more substantive international standards in the construction of domestic
statutes."150
With the growing importance of both international law and interna-
tional organizations, it is tempting to use Charming Betsy and its pre-
sumption in favor of international law for more substantive,
nonjurisdictional purposes.' 51 This new role, however, is clearly at odds
with the presumption's original dualistic applications. Early cases apply-
ing Charming Betsy express a strong judicial aversion to international
conflicts. These cases largely involved alleged violations of prescriptive
jurisdiction principles-principles of customary international law.' 52
Charming Betsy, 53 Lauritzen,154 and McCulloch'" all involved extrater-
147. The meaning of the presumption is clearly in the eye of the beholder. An internation-
alist, for example, might argue that this presumption reflects the problem of exporting domes-
tic law into a normally international realm rather than the problem of importing international
law into a normally domestic realm. Dualists would clearly subscribe to the latter
characterization.
148. See Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 1161.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1144.
151. See id.
152. For a definition of prescriptive jurisdiction, see infra note 203. This includes the
nationality principle, which usually refers to a state's positive right to regulate its own citizens.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 (1986). The nationality principle can also stand for the inverse proposition: a state
should not regulate foreign nationals beyond its borders.
153. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (action by
Danish ship owner against the United States for seizing vessel); see supra notes 113-127 and
accompanying text.
154. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (action by a Danish sailor against a Danish
shipping company under the Jones Act); see supra notes 131-136 and accompanying text.
155. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (ac-
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ritorial disputes in which at least one party was a foreign national. 156
This strong judicial concern for the nationality and territoriality princi-
ples of customary international law157 can be traced to an established
English canon of construction that stands for the same jurisdictional
proposition as Charming Betsy. The English canon, derived from mari-
time cases, states:
[I]f any construction otherwise be possible, an Act will not be con-
strued as applying to foreigners in respect to acts done by them outside
the dominions of the sovereign power enacting. That is a rule based on
international law by which one sovereign power is bound to respect the
subjects and the rights of all other sovereign powers outside its own
territory. 158
Arguments favoring extraterritorial regulation of foreign nationals often
prompt a quick application of Charming Betsy by United States courts to
limit an ambiguous statute to less controversial, territorial
applications.159
tion against a Honduran-flagged vessel under the National Labor Relations Act); see supra text
accompanying notes 137-140.
156. Similarly, in Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957), the
Court refused to interpret the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 so as to govern a
Panamanian vessel within a United States port. After citing various cases of narrow construc-
tion, the Court emphasized:
For us to run interference in such a delicate field of international relations there must
be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed. It alone has
the facilities necessary to make fairly such an important policy decision where the
possibilities of international discord are so evident and retaliative action so certain.
We, therefore, conclude that any such appeal should be directed to the Congress
rather than the courts.
Id. at 147. The Court expressed much the same position in MacLeod v. United States, 229
U.S. 416, 434 (1913) (involving action by British merchants against the United States), quoted
supra note 129, and The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (action by Buenos Aires
native to recover Spanish cargo seized from British ship during War of 1812).
157. See supra note 152.
158. The Queen v. Jameson, [1896] 2 Q.B. 425,430. But see Mortensen v. Peters, 8 Fr. (J.)
93, 100-01 (Scot. H.C.J. 1906) (ruling that if the legislative act is clear, it must be observed
even if it confficts with international law).
159. But see Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195 (1918) (applying American Ba-
nana's presumption against extraterritoriality in an action by foreign seamen against a foreign
vessel under the Seamen's Act). This strong trend against extraterritorial jurisdiction may also
reflect the traditional view that the nationality principle is a poor basis for jurisdiction when
the wrongdoer (or defendant) is a foreign national. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 cmt. b (1986) (even though
Congress or the Constitution may supersede international law's force as domestic law, the
United States remains bound internationally).
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B. American Banana and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
The Supreme Court's aversion to international conflict is equally ev-
ident in a second, related canon of construction that developed after
Charming Betsy: the presumption against extraterritoriality. Cases ap-
plying the presumption in favor of international law generally involve
regulation of foreign-flagged vessels, 16° treaty violations, 161 or actions
against foreign citizens. 162 Running throughout these cases is a strong
judicial concern with institutional legitimacy in the area of international
relations-a concern that is also evident in cases applying the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality. A brief review of the presumption against
extraterritoriality reveals a legal and historical development similar to
that of its common-law predecessor.
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., an American banana
exporter operating in Panama sued another exporter for alleged viola-
tions of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 163 Among other things, the Ameri-
can Banana Company (ABC) charged the United Fruit Company
(UFC)164 with hiring a local army that invaded and physically confis-
cated the ABC plantation. 165 Writing for the Court, Justice Oliver Wen-
160. See, e.g., Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970); McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571
(1953).
161. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503
(1947).
162. See, e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383 (1959);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 493-94 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
163. 213 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1909). The facts of this case illustrate the intrigue of the "ba-
nana wars" in Latin America. For a discussion of the dispute, see CHARLES DAVID KEPNER,
JR. & JAY HENRY SOOTHILL, THE BANANA EMPIRE: A CASE STUDY IN ECONOMIC IMPERI-
ALISM 53-63 (Russell & Russell 1967) (1935).
164. The United Fruit Company has the dubious distinction of inspiring the term "banana
republics" to refer to Latin American countries that operated at the behest (if not the beck and
call) of U.S. business concerns. The company was founded in Costa Rica by an American
entrepreneur named Minor Keith in the 1870s. Susanna McBee, In Central America: Why
Distrust of US. Runs Deep, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 17, 1983, at 36. Keith merged
his company with the Boston Fruit Company to create the United Fruit Company. Banana
multinationals like UFC and its rival, Standard Fruit, dominated whole countries to protect
the considerable land holdings they developed in the late 1800s. During the period of the
American Banana decision, the U.S. military repeatedly intervened in Honduras, Panama,
Nicaragua, and Guatemala to protect the interests of UFC and other multinational corpora-
tions. See id.; see also infra notes 333-341 and accompanying text.
165. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 354-55. The history of UFC is a remarkable collection
of corporate interventions in the affairs of states. See infra note 340. Although UFC is now
part of the United Brands Corporation, accusations of transnational corporate meddling and
intrigue have continued to contemporary times. In one particularly well-known event, a coup
ousted Honduran General Oswaldo Lopez Arellano in 1975 following revelations that his gov-
ernment was taking bribes from UFC. McBee, supra note 164, at 38.
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dell Holmes ruled that the dispute raised issues that the Court did not
have the power to resolve. Given the absence of a statutory provision
authorizing extraterritorial application, Holmes held that the Sherman
Act applied only within the territorial borders of the United States. 166
To hold otherwise, Holmes concluded, would be to violate Panama's sov-
ereign rights. 167 Thus, while recognizing that Congress could order it to
violate international law, the Court refused to do so without an express
congressional mandate. 168
Holmes outlined a rough presumption for extraterritorial cases
based on his understanding of international comity and the principles of
prescriptive jurisdiction. He noted that "the general and almost univer-
sal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done." 169
This recognized principle of sovereign prerogative, Holmes concluded,
"would lead in case of doubt to a construction of any statute as intended
to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over
which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power." 170
Courts often defend the presumption against extraterritoriality on
the grounds that extraterritorial regulation is an area laden with political
controversy and difficult policy questions.1 71 Courts view the legislative
branch as the proper forum for the resolution of such issues. 172 This
deference to Congress is particularly evident in the Court's opinion in
Foley Bros. v. Filardo.17 3 In that 1949 case, the Court was asked to apply
the Eight Hour Law to the employment of an American cook working
for an American company in Iran and Iraq.174 The Eight Hour Law
166. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357.
167. Id. at 358. When the dispute began, Panama was still part of Columbia. Id. at 354.
168. See id. at 357.
169. Id. at 356.
170. Id at 357.
171. In an earlier article, this author considered the presumption against extraterritoriality
in American Banana from a public choice perspective, and proposed eliminating the presump-
tion as a way of facilitating Madisonian ideals by liberally interpreting statutes to fulfill their
stated "public-regarding" purposes. In doing so, courts would force "hidden deals" to the
surface and compel legislators to balance the public costs against the private benefits of their
decisions. Turley, Transnational Discrimination, supra note 3, at 349-58, 387-92.
172. While the presumption against extraterritoriality defers to the legislative branch,
other rules defer to the executive branch in international cases. Perhaps the best example is
the political question doctrine. See infra notes 248-257 and accompanying text.
173. 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
174. Id at 282-83. The Eight Hour Law provided that no employee "shall be required or
permitted to work more than eight hours in any one calendar day upon such work" except
when paid for work "in excess of eight hours per day at not less than one and one-half times
the basic rate of pay." 40 U.S.C. §§ 324-325a (1940), repealed by Work Hours Act of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-581, § 203, 76 Stat. 357, 360.
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required "time and a half" overtime compensation for American work-
ers, but the American company insisted that such labor laws applied only
within the United States. 175 The Court agreed with the company, re-
marking that areas such as extraterritorial labor regulation are "the pri-
mary concern of a foreign country."' 176 In reaching its decision, the
Court ruled that ambiguous statutes should be presumed strictly territo-
rial in application absent a "clearly expressed" congressional intention to
the contrary. 177 The Court noted that Congress did not normally engage
in extraterritorial regulation and would not have done so without making
its intentions clearly manifest in the statute. 178 Thus, in interpreting am-
biguous laws, the Court advocated the "assumption that Congress is pri-
marily concerned with domestic conditions."' 179
After Foley Bros., courts repeatedly applied the presumption in the
interpretation of statutes that were silent or ambiguous on extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction. 180  Most recently, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co.,' 18 1 the Supreme Court applied the presumption to restrict Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964182 to territorial applications. 183 Rejecting
175. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 283. See generally Turley, When in Rome, supra note 9, at
617-18 (describing the application of Foley Bros. to extraterritorial labor disputes).
176. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 286.
177. Id. at 285.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Boureslan v. ARAMCO, 892 F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), affd sub nom. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111
S. Ct. 1227 (1991); Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1985) (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345, 1356-59 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Atomic Energy Act and Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act).
In theory, the presumption serves as a clear judicial statement to Congress as to the de-
gree of clarity required for a law to have extraterritorial application. In practice, however, the
cases are far less uniform and predictable. In a previous work, this author explored similar
extraterritorial cases in four different regulatory areas and showed how courts have reached
radically divergent results under extraterritorial review. See Turley, When in Rome, supra
note 9, at 598. On close examination, the outcome of extraterritorial review appears more a
function of the statute's subject matter than of its degree of linguistic clarity. Market statutes
(for example, antitrust and securities) are often applied extraterritorially while nonmarket stat-
utes (for example, environmental protection and employment discrimination) are usually de-
nied such application. See infra notes 189-195 and accompanying text. This interpretative
difference under the presumption cannot be explained by either the statutes themselves or
various jurisdictional concepts. In fact, the different treatment given equally ambiguous stat-
utes appears to be guided more by judicial sentiments than by any jurisdictional principle.
Turley, When in Rome, supra note 9, at 638-54.
181. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988), amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, §§ 104-112, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-79.
183. ARAMCO, 111 S. Ct. at 1229. The holding of ARAMCO was overridden within the
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
INTERNATIONAL LEGISPRUDENCE
an agency's interpretation of the statute, Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained:
[The presumption against extraterritoriality] serves to protect against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which
could result in international discord.
In applying this rule of construction, we look to see whether "lan-
guage in the [relevant act] gives any indication of a congressional pur-
pose to extend its coverage beyond places over which the United States
has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative control." We as-
sume that Congress legislates against the backdrop of the presumption
against extraterritoriality. Therefore, unless there is "the affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed," we must presume it "is
primarily concerned with domestic conditions."
18 4
In the ARAMCO opinion, the presumption appears robust and vir-
tually irrebuttable absent an express statement of congressional intent.
The opinion's language bears out the Court's clear concern for institu-
tional legitimacy and proceduralistic values. By deferring to Congress,
the Court upheld a "clear statement" rule that maximizes the role of the
legislative process in resolving controversial matters. The Court seems to
require a much higher standard of proof to rebut the presumption than is
normally associated with a presumption or canon of construction. 185 As
for Title VII, there was ample legislative 186 and implied textual evi-
dence 187 of congressional extraterritorial intent. Chief Justice Rehnquist
year by an act of Congress. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a)-(b)(1),
105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 2000e-1 (Supp. III 1991)). Congress
previously overrode a similar ruling against the extraterritorial application of the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act. See Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
459, § 802(a)-(b), 98 Stat. 1767, 1792 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(f)(1), 630(0
(1988)), construed in Pfeiffer, 755 F.2d at 555, 559-60.
184. ARAMCO, 111 S. Ct. at 1230 (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285, Benz v. Compa-
nia Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957), and Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285) (second
alteration by court).
185. See Turley, When in Rome, supra note 9, at 619.
186. For a discussion of the legislative and textual support for extraterritoriality under
Title VII, see id. at 619-24.
187. Title VII itself lacked an express, positive mandate, but the statute included language
firmly implying an extraterritorial intent. The most significant provision was that which ex-
cepted certain aliens from the statute's protections: "[Title VII] shall not apply to an employer
with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State ..... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988),
amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(b)(1), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077.
This provision's negative implication suggested that the law applied abroad; it would not have
been necessary to include a provision that expressly excluded aliens from the Act's coverage if
the Act automatically excluded extraterritorial employers. Turley, When in Rome, supra note
9, at 620-22; accord Bryant v. International Sch. Servs., 502 F. Supp. 472, 482 (D.N.J. 1980),
rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982).
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nevertheless read the presumption as requiring more than inferential or
implied support for extraterritorial jurisdiction. 188
What is peculiar about the ARAMCO decision is that the supposed
uniformity and potency of the presumption is evident only in the opinion
itself and not from a review of modem extraterritoriality cases. Such a
review reveals that courts vary widely in their treatment of equally am-
biguous statutes.1 89 In four areas-antitrust, securities, employment,
and environmental law-courts apply the presumption in a disturbingly
selective manner. In antitrust and securities cases, courts have tradition-
ally allowed liberal extraterritorial application even though the statutes
are silent on the subject of extraterritoriality. 90 The courts often justify
this interpretation based on the inherent transnational character of mod-
em markets. As Judge Malcolm Wilkey argued in his opinion in Laker
Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,
[c]ertainly... territorial sovereignty is not such an artificial limit on
... legitimate sovereign interests that the injured state confronts the
wrong side of a one-way glass, powerless to counteract harmful effects
originating outside its boundaries which easily pierce its "sovereign"
walls, while its own regulatory efforts are reflected back in its face.' 9 1
In employment and environmental cases, however, Judge Wilkey's
fears are easily realized: courts routinely reject all extraterritorial appli-
cations of statutes that carry clear transnational implications.192 Even
188. ARAMCO, 111 S. Ct. at 1230.
189. See Turley, When in Rome, supra note 9, at 603-34 (discussing cases).
190. See id. at 608-17. Although the Court first articulated the presumption in American
Banana, an antitrust case, see supra text accompanying notes 163-170, courts dropped the
presumption from later cases in favor of more liberal interpretations of the antitrust laws. See,
e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945). Courts also
tend to read penal statutes more liberally, giving them extraterritorial application without
clear expressions of congressional intent on the subject. The Supreme Court adopted an ap-
proach similar to that of the antitrust and securities cases when it stated in United States v.
Bowman that for many criminal statutes, "strictly territorial jurisdiction would... greatly...
curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as
easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at home." 260 U.S.
94, 98 (1922); see also United States v. Larsen, 952 F.2d 1099, 1100 (9th Cir. 1991) (inferring
congressional intent for extraterritoriality from the nature of the offenses); United States v.
Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 80 (1990); United
States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Orozco-
Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1087-88 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984); United
States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136-37 (5th Cir. 1980) (same). These cases primarily dealt with
drug laws; courts have applied the strict presumption in other criminal areas. See, e.g., United
States v. Javino, 960 F.2d 1137, 1142-43 (2d Cir.) (holding federal firearms statute to be terri-
torial in scope), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 477 (1992).
191. 731 F.2d 909, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
192. See Turley, When in Rome, supra note 9, at 617-34.
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statutes like the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),19 3 which
was designed to protect the "global commons," have been confined to
territorial applications. 194 In these areas, courts apply a strong presump-
tion, expressly deferring to Congress's decisions on the inherently polit-
ical questions of extraterritoriality. In a recent employment case, for
example, the Second Circuit recognized the changes in world markets,
but still ruled against extraterritorial application of collective bargaining
laws:
In the present "global economy" ever-expanding trade makes it
increasingly possible that foreign industry might affect commerce "be-
tween [a] foreign country and any State." But to construe [the statute]
as governing collective bargaining agreements in such an industry
"would inevitably lead to embarrassment in foreign affairs and be en-
tirely infeasible in actual practice. ...
If Congress wants federal courts to enforce collective bargaining
agreements between foreign workers and foreign corporations doing
work in foreign countries according to the body of labor law developed
[under this law], such legislative purpose must be made unmistakingly
clear. 19
5
The Supreme Court in ARAMCO failed to address why market vio-
lations "easily pierce . . . 'sovereign' walls"' 196 but environmental and
employment violations do not. For Chief Justice Rehnquist, the question
is not one of balancing alternative interpretations, but one of satisfying
an intentionally high standard under the presumption.1 97 Reasoning that
Congress would not lightly create international conflicts and that a court
should never presume such an intent,1 98 the Court in this sense applied
the presumption as a "clear statement" rule-requiring an "'affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed.' "199
193. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c (1988 & Supp. I 1989 & Supp. I 1990).
194. See Turley, When in Rome, supra note 9, at 628-29. But see Defenders of Wildlife v.
Lujan, 911 F.2d 117, 123 (8th Cir. 1990) (interpreting Endangered Species Act "as a whole"
and finding an implied "congressional commitment to worldwide conservation efforts"), rev'd
on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
195. Labor Union of Pico Korea, Ltd. v. Pico Prods., 968 F.2d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 1992)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1988), and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963)) (first alteration by court).
196. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 923.
197. See ARAMCO, 111 S. Ct. at 1231 ("We need not choose between these competing
interpretations as we would be required to do in the absence of the presumption against extra-
territorial application .... ").
198. In line with its "assum[ption] that Congress legislates against the backdrop of the
presumption against extraterritoriality," id at 1230, the Court reasoned that "had Congress
intended Title VII to apply overseas, it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with
foreign laws and procedures," id. at 1234.




Putting aside the uneven treatment accorded past market statutes,
the Supreme Court's use of a stringent clear statement rule is consistent
with the origins of both common-law presumptions. The majority in
ARAMCO actually relied on a number of cases that dealt with the older
presumption in favor of international law.2°° These cases require a
higher standard of clarity in the interpretation of statutes that would
"implicat[e] sensitive issues of the authority of the Executive over rela-
tions with foreign nations."'20 ' As in the cases following Charming Betsy,
the Court left the perceived complexity of international conflict to Con-
gress and the President. The following discussion shows that the Court's
institutional legitimacy concerns-as well as its support for the contin-
ued use of the presumptions-are largely misplaced.
C. The Last-in-Time Doctrine and the Dualistic Applications of the
Borderland Canons
Both Charming Betsy and American Banana reaffirmed the dualist
principles of their days. Both presumptions manifest a strong deference
to the legislative and executive branches in judicial decisions on the use
and importance of international sources. This dualist tradition jealously
guards the supremacy of municipal law, even in possible contravention of
treaty obligations. 20 2 Although the extreme dualism of the nineteenth
century is now a legal relic, courts continue to structure their statutory
interpretations along municipal lines, with a heavy aversion to interna-
tional entanglements or conflicts.
Both American Banana and Charming Betsy present courts with
traditional canons of construction that turn on Congress's original in-
200. See id. at 1232 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,
372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963), and New York Cent. R.R. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31 (1925)).
201. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979), quoted in ARAMCO,
111 S. Ct. at 1239 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall strongly criticized the use of
these cases in his dissent in ARAMCO. See 111 S. Ct. at 1238-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Similar criticisms appeared in the dissent from the Fifth Circuit's opinion in the case. See
Boureslan v. ARAMCO, 892 F.2d 1271, 1277 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (King, J., dissenting),
affd sub nom. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
202. Under the original English doctrine, "municipal law" was read quite narrowly. In
England, the creation of treaty obligations that conflict with municipal law poses special diffi-
culties for dualistic judges:
[I]f the international legal obligation is contained in a treaty, then, because a treaty is
concluded by the Crown in the exercise of the prerogative and because the Crown
cannot by the prerogative alter the law of the land, the obligation does not form part
of the law of English and may not be enforced by the courts unless it has been incor-
porated into English law by means of legislation.
Collier, supra note 35, at 925 (citing The Parlement Beige, 4 P.D. 129 (P. 1879) (Sir Robert
Phillimore)).
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tent.20 3 Although their emphasis is highly static and intentionalist, it
would be a mistake to view the two canons as simply originalistic expres-
sions of statutory interpretation: if this were the case, courts would not
require a special rule for disputes with extraterritorial or international
dimensions. A strict textualist or contractarian approach would suffice if
courts merely feared countermajoritarian judicial activism.204 Yet, in
both cases, the Court exceeded conventional interpretative standards to
require especially clear evidence of congressional intent.
205
203. At its most basic level, an extraterritorial dispute raises two distinct questions for a
court: First, the court must determine whether Congress gave it authority to adjudicate the
dispute. This question of "subject-matter" jurisdiction is generally resolved by the statutory
text, but when extraterritorial cases arise, Congress has commonly failed to mention extraterri-
torial jurisdiction. Second, the court must determine whether Congress has authority to regu-
late the particular extraterritorial behavior. This question is one of "prescriptive jurisdiction."
See FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1315 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (defining prescriptive jurisdiction as a state's authority to regulate "the conduct, rela-
tions, status or interests of persons or things, whether by legislation, executive act or order, or
administrative rule or regulation" (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 6 cmt. a (1965))). In essence, there are three types of
jurisdiction:
(a) jurisdiction to prescribe, L e., the authority of a state to make its law applicable to
persons or activities; (b) jurisdiction to adjudicate, Le., the authority of a state to
subject particular persons or things to its judicial process; and (c)jurisdiction to en-
force, Le., the authority of a state to use the resources of government to induce or
compel compliance with its law.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. 4,
introductory note (1986); see also id § 401.
Although these jurisdictional concepts often merge in contemporary cases, the central
question of extraterritorial review is one of subject-matter jurisdiction-whether Congress
wanted to extend the courts' jurisdiction under a statute to extraterritorial disputes. See, eg.,
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927) (antitrust statute); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 608 (9th Cir. 1976) (same); Leasco Data Process-
ing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333-34 (2d Cir. 1972) (securities statute);
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (same), rev'd on other grounds en banc, 405 F.2d
215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945) (antitrust statute). Thus, in Charming Betsy the Court
reasoned that Congress would not idly violate international principles without making its in-
tent clear in the text of a statute. See 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118. Likewise, the American
Banana Court reasoned that Congress does not normally concern itself with extraterritorial
matters. See 213 U.S. at 357.
204. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text and infra Part III.D.
205. Judge King mistakenly argued in Boureslan v. ARAMCO that the presumption
against extraterritoriality requires a less stringent showing of legislative intent than does the
presumption in favor of international law. See 857 F.2d 1014, 1023 (5th Cir. 1988) (King, J.,
dissenting) ("A separate, more stringent standard is properly reserved for cases in which the
exercise of jurisdiction, extraterritorial or otherwise, would violate international law."), afl'd
on reh'gen banc, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990), affd sub nom EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991). The case law suggests otherwise. See generally Turley, When in Rome,
supra note 9, at 623-24 & n.175 (discussing Judge King's interpretation). From the outset,
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The strong dualistic tradition underlying these two presumptions
meshed easily with the laissez-faire policies of the early twentieth cen-
tury.206 This was a time of tremendous economic growth and foreign
commerce for United States business. Congress and the executive branch
fostered this entrepreneurship through a variety of legislative and diplo-
matic measures.207 Not surprisingly, there is a strong similarity between
these presumptions and a third canon that developed around the time of
the American Banana decision. Under the "last-in-time doctrine," the
Supreme Court mandated that conflicts between statutes and treaties be
resolved in favor of the later enacted measure.20 8 In the Head Money
Cases, the Court stressed that treaty violations are matters for govern-
ments to address either through state-to-state negotiation or ultimately
by war.209 The Court concluded that "so far as a treaty made by the
United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial
cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Con-
gress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal." 210
Although this principle of legislative supremacy over treaty obligations
has always attracted criticism, 211 the Supreme Court has consistently de-
American Banana was primarily a statement of judicial resistance to extraterritorial regulation
and imposed a very high standard of proof.
206. See infra notes 332-342 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., infra notes 332-342 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); The Head Money
Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884); see also The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815)
(holding that international law governs "[t]ill such an act [of Congress] be passed").
209. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598.
210. Id. at 599.
211. Some of the first critics of such a rule were John Jay and Alexander Hamilton, both
of whom viewed treaties as outside the proper legislative authority of Congress to alter or
negate by later legislative acts. John Jay brought this point home most forcefully:
This idea [that treaties are subject to later legislative reversal] seems to be new and
peculiar to this country, but new errors, as well as new truths, often appear. These
gentlemen would do well to reflect that a treaty is only another name for a bargain,
and that it would be impossible to find a nation who would make any bargain with
us, which should be binding on them absolutely, but on us only so long and so far as
we may think proper to be bound by it. They who make laws may, without doubt,
amend or repeal them; and it will not be disputed that they who make treaties may
alter or cancel them; but still let us not forget that treaties are made, not by only one
of the contracting parties, but by both, and consequently, that as the consent of both
was essential to their formation at first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter or
cancel them.... [Treaties] are just as binding and just as far beyond the lawful reach
of legislative acts now as they will be at any future period, or under any form of
government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 394 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Ruth Wedg-
wood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229, 365 (1990)
(noting Hamilton's position, in agreement with Jay, that "treaties were sacrosanct and not
subject to legislative supersession" (citing ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE DEFENCE No. 38
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ferred to clear congressional decisions on the continued validity of inter-
national agreements.212
The original last-in-time doctrine is the virtual embodiment of the
endogenous values underlying dualism: it requires that courts give way
to a domestic legislative decision to violate a standing treaty or custom-
ary international law.213 Over the years, however, courts have gradually
qualified this doctrine. In Cook v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that "[a] treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by
a later statute unless such purpose on the part of Congress has been
clearly expressed. ' 214 While the Court has held that the need for a clear
expression is not a per se rule,215 courts in modern cases have routinely
denied attempts to supersede treaty obligations, honoring the last-in-time
doctrine more in the breach.216 For example, in Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co.
(1795), reprinted in 20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 22, 24, 25 n.* (Harold C.
Syrett ed., 1974))).
212. For a recent application of this rule, see United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 745
(1986) (holding treaty with Indian tribe to be abrogated by Eagle Protection Act).
213. See, eg., The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1871) ("A treaty may
supersede a prior act of Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty."); The
Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (The "law of nations" may be superseded by an
Act of Congress.).
214. 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933). Cook presented a novel variation of the last-in-time prob-
lem because it involved the reenactment of an antecedent statute that ostensibly became the
subsequent authority to the treaty. In that case, the 1924 Treaty between the United States
and Great Britain, a self-executing treaty that governed smuggling of intoxicating liquors and
searches of British vessels, conflicted with a provision of the Tariff Act of 1922, which allowed
for wider searches and was reenacted in 1930. The Court held that "[the Treaty was not
abrogated by re-enacting.., the Tariff Act of 1930 in the identical terms of the Act of 1922,"
because Congress had not "clearly expressed" such an intent. Id. at 119-20; see also United
States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 221 (1902) ("[Tihe purpose by statute to abrogate ... a
treaty, or the purpose by treaty to supersede.., an act of Congress, must not be lightly
assumed, but must appear clearly and distinctly from the words used in the statute or in the
treaty."); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888) (holding that later enactments
trumped a prior treaty); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. Unit A
Apr. 1981) ("Only when Congress clearly intends to depart from the obligations of a treaty
will inconsistent federal legislation govern."), cert dismissed, 454 U.S. 1130, and vacated on
other grounds mem., 457 U.S. 1128 (1982), appeal dismissed, 725 F.2d 970 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984); Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (finding clear
congressional intent to abrogate treaty through a later enactment), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
(1973).
215. See Dion, 476 U.S. at 739 (explaining that although explicit statement of congres-
sional intent to abrogate treaty is preferable, such an intent can also be found from clear,
compelling, and reliable evidence in legislative history).
216. See, eg., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (holding later enacted statute
did not abrogate executive agreement); United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F.
Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding later enacted anti-terrorism statute did not abro-
gate United States' obligations to United Nations); see also Trans World Airlines v. Franklin
Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (holding Congress's repeal of statute that served as
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(America), the Fifth Circuit acknowledged a conflict between the Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaty with Japan and the later
enacted Civil Rights Act of 1964.217 Under the FCN Treaty, Japanese
companies were ostensibly given the authority to hire only Japanese exec-
utives and managers, 21 8 in direct conflict with Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, which prohibited discrimination in employment on the basis
of national origin.219 Although it recognized that Title VII, by operation
of the last-in-time doctrine, "might be thought to nullify inconsistent
principles of domestic law created as a by-product of the Treaty," the
court refused to hold the subsequent legislation controlling without a
clearly expressed congressional intent to that effect. 220  Without such
clear "congressional guidance," the court stated, it would be inappropri-
ate "to abrogate the American government's solemn undertaking with
respect to a foreign nation. 221
While courts struggle to protect antecedent treaty obligations
through the clear expression rule, they may be less protective of antece-
dent statutory authority threatened by a last-in-time treaty. 222 Last-in-
benchmark for Warsaw Convention liability limits did not render those limits unenforceable);
cf. Diggs, 470 F.2d at 465-66 (upholding later enacted statute that Congress passed in "blatant
disregard" of treaty obligation to United Nations).
217. See 643 F.2d at 355. In Spiess, American employees of a wholly owned Japanese
subsidiary alleged that the company restricted managerial promotions and benefits to Japanese
citizens, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id.
218. The FCN Treaty with Japan provided: "Companies of either Party shall be permit-
ted to engage, within the territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical ex-
perts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice." Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, art. 8, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070.
219. Title VII provided:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
220. Spiess, 643 F.2d at 362 (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963)). The Spiess court actually applied both the last-in-time
doctrine and the presumption in favor of international principles. The court noted that it
must, whenever possible, construe Title VII to be consistent with the FCN treaty, and it also
acknowledged its obligation to follow a last-in-time statute that clearly superseded such treaty
provisions. See id. at 356, 362.
221. Id. at 362.
222. See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933) (holding that validity of
extradition treaty did not depend on whether offense was a crime under local law).
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time treaty cases often come to a court with attendant political questions
that are viewed as better left to the "political branches. ' 223 The result
can be a heavy presumption in favor of treaty sources over statutory
sources. For example, the court in Antolok v. United States224 considered
tort claims stemming from nuclear testing conducted by the United
States in the Marshall Islands after World War II. Residents of the Mar-
shall Islands filed suit against the United States under the authority of
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which waived sovereign immu-
nity.225 The United States, however, argued that the FTCA, passed in
1946, was superseded by the Compact of Free Association between the
United States, Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands, which pro-
vided a full settlement of all nuclear testing claims-including any then
pending or later filed in United States courts.226 The court held that the
Compact divested United States courts of jurisdiction over the plaintiffs'
FTCA claims for nuclear testing damages.227 While the majority based
its decision on its interpretation of the Compact, Judge David Sentelle
expressed a strong view that "this is one of those areas of foreign rela-
tions textually committed to the political branches to the exclusion of the
judiciary. ' 228 Concurring in the judgment, Chief Judge Patricia Wald
criticized the majority's use of questionable legislative authority to sup-
port its reading of the Compact-authority that, she argued, was at best
ambiguous, and at worst supportive of the residents' claims.
229
Conversely, the recent district court opinion in United States v. Ge-
orgescu,230 a case involving a later enacted statute, illustrates the original
dualistic values underlying the last-in-time doctrine. There the court
considered the prosecution of a foreign national for child molestation
223. For a discussion of the political question doctrine, see infra notes 248-257 and accom-
panying text.
224. 873 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Although Antolok involved a last-in-time treaty, one
of the three judges deciding the case heavily relied on the political question doctrine. See id. at
379-84 (unjoined opinion of Sentelle, J.). As noted elsewhere in this Article, both doctrines
(and the two presumptions) can have relevance in cases in which international and municipal
sources conflict. See infra notes 371, 380 and accompanying text.
225. Antolok, 873 F.2d at 370-72; see FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1988).
226. Antolok, 873 F.2d at 370-73; see Compact of Free Association, June 25, 1983,
§§ 103(g)(1), 177, 99 Stat. 1770, 1782, 1812 (1986) (reprinted as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 1681
note (1988)).
227. Antolok, 873 F.2d at 373-74.
228. Id. at 381 (unjoined opinion of Sentelle, J.).
229. Id. at 387-90 (Wald, C.J., concurring in judgment). Chief Judge Wald also suggested
that the Compact, under the majority's interpretation, might amount to an unconstitutional
deprivation of access to the courts, but declined to address that question "absent clear evidence
that Congress did in fact intend to effect an unconditional withdrawal of jurisdiction." Id. at
395 (Wald, C.J., concurring in judgment).
230. 723 F. Supp. 912 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
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that occurred during an international flight aboard a foreign aircraft. 23'
The case involved a conflict between the Tokyo Convention, 23 2 signed
and ratified by the United States in 1966, and a 1987 statute governing
sexual abuse crimes committed on aircraft.233 The Convention expressly
allowed criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed during international
flights, even aboard aircraft of foreign registry. The defendant, however,
stressed a provision that limited attempts by states to "interferefl with an
aircraft in flight," generally defined as forcing an aircraft to land or un-
duly delaying its flight. Arguing that the United States interfered with
the flight in violation of the international agreement, the defendant chal-
lenged the jurisdiction for his arrest and prosecution. 234 In rejecting the
defendant's interpretation of the Convention, the court referred directly
to the last-in-time doctrine. Even if the prosecution violated interna-
tional law, the court noted, "this fact does not lessen the validity of the
statutes as superseding domestic legislation. ' 235 Citing Charming Betsy,
the court went on to distinguish the realms of international and munici-
pal law:
While the courts must make a fair effort to interpret domestic law in a
way consistent with international obligations, in the event of irrecon-
cilable conflict, the courts are bound to apply domestic law if it was
passed more recently. The statutory provisions under which defendant
is being prosecuted were passed subsequent to the development of the
traditional notions of international law jurisdiction to which defendant
argues this court is confined. They were also passed subsequent to the
Tokyo Convention. The domestic statutes are controlling.236
This language, with its sharp distinction between the two systems, is
highly indicative of dualistic decisionmaking. In stressing the
proceduralistic importance of superseding congressional action, the court
protected the Madisonian values of deliberative process and legislative
supremacy. Moreover, the court treated the conflict as one between a
municipal source and an international source legitimated by the munici-
pal system. Its focus was on the procedural over the normative; on the
municipal legitimation rather than the international principle.
The last-in-time doctrine and the presumption in favor of interna-
tional law may appear synonymous in some cases. Chief Justice Mar-
shall actually seemed to lay the groundwork for both doctrines in
231. Id. at 913.
232. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept.
14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
233. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1472(k)(1) (1988); see Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. at 917-18.
234. See Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. at 920.
235. Id. at 921.
236. Id. (citations omitted).
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Charming Betsy. After declaring the presumption in favor of interna-
tional law, Marshall noted that a "plainly expressed" congressional state-
ment to the contrary must nevertheless always control in cases of
conflict. 237 Marshall's limiting language reaffirmed legislative supremacy
through the clear meaning of a statute under review or, by implication,
later legislative acts.
238
While the last-in-time doctrine is expressly dualistic in its deference
to Congress, Charming Betsy shows the presumption in favor of interna-
tional law to be equally dualistic in application. Chief Justice Marshall
honored international law primarily in its avoidance-not in its applica-
tion.239 Although the Court recognized that international principles pro-
tected the luckless Mr. Shattuck, it did not apply those principles as
controlling precedent or rules. Charming Betsy represents the very es-
sence of dualistic values: the decision whether to incorporate or to ex-
clude international principles rests with the municipal governmental
structure. If Charming Betsy were truly monistic, on the other hand, the
presumption would be a simple rule mandating the application of inter-
national principles.
As with the presumption in favor of international law, the language
of the presumption against extraterritoriality can deceive. At first glance,
the presumption appears to advance a monistic model by respecting in-
ternational principles of prescriptive jurisdiction. After all, the presump-
tion was created by the direct application of an international source in
the form of the customary international law on prescriptive jurisdiction.
In reality, however, the original presumption was more isolationist than
internationalist. At the time of its inception, most forms of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction were viewed as per se violations of international law. In
a dualistic system, international discord is a matter for Congress and the
executive branch to resolve through a deliberative legislative process.
The Supreme Court has used the canon essentially to avoid international
law and international complications by leaving such matters to Con-
237. See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 119. The interplay of the two doctrines is
particularly interesting in Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), in which the court juggled the two
presumptions with evident difficulty. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
238. The recent Georgescu case demonstrates how the last-in-time doctrine might trump
an international source. See supra text accompanying notes 230-236.
239. Like the Charming Betsy Court, later courts used the presumption primarily to deny
jurisdiction in order to avoid some perceived conflict with another nation. See, e.g., Commod-
ity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 493-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying
Charming Betsy to deny jurisdiction in a case that pitted the Commodity Exchange Act against
international principles of sovereignty, and construing the Act to make sure its application
would not violate international law).
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gress. 240 The Court appears more concerned with avoiding "interna-
tional discord" than it is with fostering "international law."924 1
D. The Political Question Doctrine and-the Evolution of Institutional
Legitimacy
In all three of these doctrines, the dualistic function of the rules was
based entirely or in part on a separation of powers rationale. The appli-
cation or rejection of international sources in domestic cases was viewed
as a usurpation of the constitutional authority of either the Congress or
the President and thus an illegitimate exercise of judicial powers.242 This
would explain, in Professor Eskridge's terminology, the use of meta-rules
at the inception of these doctrines to avoid the constitutional periphery of
foreign relations and international conflicts.2 43 It does not, however, ex-
plain the contemporary use of such rules.2 4 4 In numerous cases, courts
have shown a growing willingness to resolve disputes in what was once
the constitutional borderland. 245 International sources are increasingly
part of the domestic legal system, through treaties, executive agreements,
or extraterritorial statutes.246 Thus, courts are now more accustomed to
applying international sources as municipal law or, in some cases, di-
rectly as international law.
2 47
The past institutional legitimacy arguments for these doctrines will
continue to lose potency as courts adopt a more expansive institutional
perspective. These arguments are based on rigid institutional notions
and countermajoritarian fears, and are simply less compelling for courts
240. See Turley, When in Rome, supra note 9, at 603-34; supra Part III.B.
241. See Turley, When in Rome, supra note 9, at 634.
242. See supra notes 171-172, 200-201, 213-236 and accompanying text.
243. Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, supra note 69, at 1019-20.
244. See supra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
245. See, e.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S.
400, 409-10 (1990) (involving a bribe allegedly paid to Nigerian officials in exchange for a
government contract); Bandes v. Harlow & Jones, Inc., 852 F.2d 661, 666 (2d Cir. 1988)
(deciding dispute over return of funds from a U.S. company to an entity confiscated during
Nicaragua's civil war); Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 359 (2d Cir. 1986)
(enjoining former President of Philippines from transferring or encumbering property
purchased with funds wrongfully taken from the Philippine government), cert. dismissed, 480
U.S. 942, and cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987).
246. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 681 (1981) (executive agreement);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942) (same); Ocean Garden, Inc. v. Marktrade
Co., 952 F.2d 500, 503 (9th Cir. 1991) (Lanham Act); United States v. Larsen, 952 F.2d 1099,
1101 (9th Cir. 1991) (drug possession and distribution statute); Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan,
911 F.2d 117, 123 (8th Cir. 1990) (Endangered Species Act), rev'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct.
2130 (1992).
247. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that Alien Tort
Statute opens U.S. federal courts for adjudication of rights recognized by international law).
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today. An example of this evolution appears from modem applications
of the political question doctrine.248 Since Marbury v. Madison,249 the
Supreme Court has gradually limited the political question doctrine's use
as a bar to judicial consideration of international cases. 250 Although
the doctrine was once a stiff barrier to courts in the foreign relations
area,251 the Supreme Court has noted that "it is error to suppose that
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance. ' 25 2 Thus, while the doctrine continues to be
248. For discussions of the political question doctrine, see Louis Henkin, Is There a "Polit-
ical Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976) [hereinafter Henkin, Political Question], J.
Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 97 (1988),
Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031
(1984-1985), and Tigar, supra note 90.
249. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall foreshadowed the
doctrine when he asserted in dicta that "[q]uestions, in their nature political, or which are, by
the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court." Iad at
170.
250. See Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 1187-89; Tigar, supra note 90, at 1167-68.
251. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242-43 (1984) (declining to find a due process
violation of the right to travel to Cuba, because of deference to political branches in matters of
foreign policy); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)
(holding Court had no power to review Civil Aeronautics Board's order granting or denying
authority to engage in overseas transport); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942)
(refusing challenge to the United States' recognition of the Soviet Union in the Litvinov As-
signments); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938) (same); Oetjen v. Cen-
tral Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1918) (rejecting jurisdiction in a suit for recovery of
chattel seized by a faction in the Mexican Revolution, because the United States had officially
recognized that faction as the legitimate government of Mexico); United States v. Palmer, 16
U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634 (1818) (rejecting jurisdiction to decide a piracy case, turning on the
United States' official recognition of a foreign state involved in a civil war).
252. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). Under Baker, a court will defer under the
political question doctrine only in cases that "[i] turn on standards that defy judicial applica-
tion, or [ii] involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or
legislature,] ... [or] [lii] uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government's
views." Ia; see also Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 229-30
(1986) (rejecting political question argument against review of Secretary of Commerce's deci-
sion to refuse to certify to the President that Japan's violation of whale-harvesting restrictions
diminished the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program, which certifica-
tion would have permitted discretionary sanctions by the President); Antolok v. United States,
873 F.2d 369, 390-92 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Wald, C.J., concurring in judgment) (arguing against
use of the political question doctrine to bar review, on the basis of an international agreement,
of a claim by alleged victims of U.S. nuclear testing). This deference to the executive is often
justified by reference to the need for the nation to speak in one voice. See, e.g., United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) ("In respect of what was done here, the Executive had
authority to speak as the sole organ of [the] government."); see also Ralph G. Steinhardt,
Human Rights Litigation and the "One-Voice" Orthodoxy in Foreign Affairs, in WORLD JUS-
TICE? U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 23 (Mark Gibney ed., 1991) (crit-
icizing view that the United States must "speak with one voice" as a failed principle that
should be replaced in the context of human rights litigation). This rationale also forms part of
Baker's definition of nonjusticiable political questions, 369 U.S. at 211, as quoted above.
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applied, 253 there is a developing trend in favor of judicial scrutiny in an
area once thought to be beyond the domain of the judicial branch.
254
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
for example, reversed a district court's dismissal on political question
grounds of claims stemming from the United States' seizure of property
to train "contra" guerilla fighters in Honduras.255 Like many others, the
court expressed grave doubts about the usefulness and legitimacy of this
doctrine in contemporary cases:
The political question doctrine is a tempting refuge from the adju-
dication of difficult constitutional claims. Its shifting contours and un-
certain underpinnings make it susceptible to indiscriminate and
overbroad application to claims properly before the federal courts....
Despite confusion over whether a retreat to the political question doc-
trine is proper in particular cases, it is clear that the doctrine is, at best,
a narrow one.2
56
This trend has been encouraged by a number of academics who reject the
doctrine's underlying countermajoritarian fears and narrow view of judi-
253. One such application occurred in Antolok v. United States, 873 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir.
1989), discussed supra notes 224-229 and accompanying text. After holding that an interna-
tional agreement superseded the plaintiffs' right to sue under the FTCA for injuries resulting
from nuclear tests, one judge went on to note in dicta that he found jurisdiction equally objec-
tionable on the basis of the political question doctrine, which "protects the political realm from
judicial invasion." Id. at 383 (unjoined opinion of Sentelle, J.); see also Finzer v. Barry, 798
F.2d 1450, 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Defining and enforcing the United States' obligations
under international law require the making of extremely sensitive policy decisions, decisions
which will inevitably color our relationships with other nations."), affd in part and rev'd in
part sub nom. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
254. In Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), Justice Powell formulated a test for the
presence of political questions that strongly emphasizes the institutional legitimacy concerns
behind the doctrine. Under the Powell test, a court should ask: "(i) Does the issue involve
resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of
Government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of
judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?"
Id. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); see Antolok, 873 F.2d at 381 (unjoined opinion
of Sentelle, J.) (following Powell's test). But cf Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 803 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) ("That the contours of the doctrine are
murky and unsettled is shown by the lack of consensus about its meaning among the members
of the Supreme Court and among scholars." (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003
(1985). The political question doctrine has not barred review of the most controversial polit-
ical issues of this century, including the invalidation of President Truman's seizure of steel
mills during the Korean War, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589
(1952), and the review of the highly charged claims agreement with Iran, see Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981).
255. See Ramirez de Arrellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
banc), vacated on other grounds mem., 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
256. Id. at 1514 (footnote omitted).
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cial competence. 257 These academics offer an alternative institutional
view of the judiciary as an active player in the political process.
Past institutional legitimacy arguments afford an especially prob-
lematic basis for the presumption against extraterritoriality. Under the
auspices of institutional legitimacy, courts refuse to resolve questions
that the legislative or executive branches are better suited to consider,
given their technical or diplomatic elements. Questions with interna-
tional dimensions have always been viewed as highly complex and poorly
suited for judicial determination. Laden with complex diplomatic and
economic concerns, international questions are viewed as best left to the
offices of the President and Congress rather than individual judges and
their law clerks. This practical deference to the executive or legislative
branch reflects a common "institutional competence" concern of the
courts.258 Courts may also refuse to consider issues that they view as
constitutionally better suited for one of the other branches. Although
they might have the practical ability to resolve the question, the courts
are sometimes concerned about the content of the question itself. The
political question doctrine is an excellent example of this latter rationale.
When presented with a question that is highly policy-laden, a court will
257. Professor Martin Redish has strongly criticized the doctrine as based on four essen-
tially flawed presuppositions: Some questions are too complex for judicial resolution; courts
lack institutional capacity to review decisions of the political branches; courts must refrain
from such reviews due to their undemocratic nature; and courts will undermine their authority
by creating confrontations with the political branches, which may simply choose to ignore
decisions by the judicial branch. Redish, supra note 248, at 1043-44. Professor Redish con-
cluded: "Once we make the initial assumption that judicial review plays a legitimate role in a
constitutional democracy, we must abandon the political question doctrine, in all of its mani-
festations." Id at 1059-60; see also Henkin, Political Question, supra note 248, at 600 (arguing
that there is no legitimate basis for finding political questions nonjusticiable, and no legal doc-
trine requiring judges to abstain from reviewing such matters). For an equally able defense of
the doctrine, see Mulhern, supra note 248, at 175-76.
258. See, eg., Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding
that to grant relief against executive officials for supporting forces attempting to overthrow a
foreign government would be an abuse of discretion because the matter involved diplomatic
relations with at least four states and was therefore better suited to the political branches);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding act
of state doctrine barred exercise of federal jurisdiction over action to enjoin OPEC's price-
fixing activities), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Friedar v. Government of Isr., 614 F.
Supp. 395, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding act of state doctrine, rooted in concerns about
"the politically sensitive nature of judging the validity of acts by a foreign state and the relative
institutional competence of the judiciary to make such a determination," barred action for
veteran's benefits allegedly promised by a foreign government); DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 548
F. Supp. 1370, 1376 (D. Haw. 1982) (holding act of state doctrine barred foreign citizen's
claim against a U.S. newspaper for alleged libel in stories about loans made by a foreign gov-
ernment's development corporation to alleged "separatist" interests in another foreign state),
rev'd on other grounds, 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985).
January 1993] INTERNATIONAL LEGISPRUDENCE
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
defer on the basis of separation of powers to either of the "political
branches."
2 59
The constitutional periphery has moved considerably since Ameri-
can Banana. Although it was once extraordinary to regulate activities
abroad, Congress's regulatory concerns are no longer clearly territorial
or domestic. As the uniqueness of extraterritorial regulation diminishes,
so too does the institutional dilemma for courts. It is now common for
courts to resolve conflicts with foreign jurisdictions. In addition to the
growing number of expressly extraterritorial statutes,260 many statutes
raise transnational issues and have possible extraterritorial applica-
tions.261 In an earlier article, this author argued that the presumption
against extraterritoriality was fast becoming a legal relic with little or no
contemporary justification.262 Addressing the main premise of Foley
259. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 ("The conduct of the
foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and
Legislative-'the political'-Departments of the Government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.").
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188
(1992), presents an interesting example of this type of deference to the executive branch.
While not directly invoking the political question doctrine, the majority relied heavily on the
doctrine's underlying separation of power rationales. Alvarez-Machain involved the abduction
of a Mexican citizen, Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, by the United States Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (DEA). The DEA arranged the kidnapping of Alvarez-Machain from Guadala-
jara, Mexico in order to charge him with an assortment of crimes stemming from the torture
and murder of a DEA agent. Alvarez-Machain challenged the arrest on the basis of the 1978
Extradition Treaty between Mexico and the United States. That Treaty, he argued, denied
jurisdiction to the United States' courts in the absence of a formal extradition by the Mexican
government. See id. at 2190. Although the lower courts had agreed with this reading of the
Treaty, the Court reversed in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, holding that the text of
the Treaty did not expressly forbid abduction. Id. at 2190-91, 2197. Notably, the Court al-
lowed the extraterritorial application of United States penal laws with little discussion of the
presumption or the rationales found in nonmarket extraterritorial cases.
In rejecting the defendant's argument, the Court adopted a narrow interpretation of the
treaty language and specifically deferred the question of transnational abduction's propriety to
the executive branch. See id. at 2195-96. The Chief Justice further suggested that the proper
forum for this question was the diplomatic corps, not the federal courts. This "diplomatic
approach," he argued, had worked in earlier cases in which the Court had refused to resolve
international conflicts. Id. at 2196-97 n. 16. Ironically, the Court supported its decision not to
involve itself in diplomatic concerns by citing an example in which an earlier extraterritorial
decision by the Court had improved the United States' position in ongoing diplomatic negotia-
tions. See infra note 272.
260. These statutes now include Title VII, which Congress amended in 1991 to override
the Supreme Court's limitation of the Act to territorial applications in EEOC v. Arabian Amer-
ican Oil Co. See supra notes 181-184 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003 (1988); Act
of Oct. 8, 1976, § 2, 18 U.S.C. § 1116 (1988); Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism
Act of 1986, § 1202(a), 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988).
262. Turley, When in Rome, supra note 9, at 601.
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Bros. v. Filardo, the author suggested that the Court's assumption that
Congress's normal concerns are domestic is no longer valid in the age of
transnational markets and regulation.263 In EEOC v. Arabian American
Oil Co., however, the Court clearly reaffirmed the presumption as a use-
ful "backdrop" for congressional action.264 The Court viewed the pre-
sumption as a way for the judiciary to avoid creating international
conflicts and discord. Notably, while ARAMCO cuts back on a trend in
the lower courts to dilute the clarity requirement under the presumption,
the decision was not premised on the political question doctrine or the
countermajoritarian difficulty. Rather, the Court justified its decision by
reference to a traditional interpretative basis for clear-meaning canons:
ensuring statutory predictability in a sensitive policy area.265
Institutional legitimacy concerns stem from the perceived practical
or constitutional limitations of a court, but neither basis is particularly
useful in supporting the presumption against extraterritoriality. Courts
are clearly capable of resolving extraterritorial questions. There is noth-
ing mysterious or especially complex about extraterritorial disputes:
courts often deal with jurisdictional conflicts in both domestic cases and
cases involving expressly extraterritorial statutes. 266 Since these disputes
affect private parties, the central issues are primarily legal and not techni-
cal or political. There is, therefore, little basis for an institutional compe-
tence rationale for the presumption. Nor is there a true separation of
powers basis for the presumption. Various courts have suggested that
the presumption against extraterritoriality is needed to allow the prop-
erly authorized branches, rather than the judiciary, to resolve highly
political questions that are heavily steeped in foreign relations. 267 This
sentiment was strongly expressed in the recent ARAMCO decision.
268
This argument, however, is superficial. In ARAMCO and other extrater-
ritorial cases, the conflict was not between the United States and a for-
eign country, but between the United States and a United States citizen.
Extraterritorial decisions do not instruct another country in what laws
are appropriate; they define the prescribed behavior of United States citi-
zens doing business abroad.269 Although the Supreme Court created the
263. See id. at 639-55; supra text accompanying notes 173-179 (discussion of Foley Bros.).
264. See 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991).
265. See id. at 1235-36.
266. See Turley, When in Rome, supra note 9, at 603-34 (discussing cases).
267. See, eg., Boureslan v. ARAMCO, 857 F.2d 1014, 1017 (1988), affid on reh'g en banc,
892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990), affl'd sub. nom. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227
(1991); Pfeiffer v. Win. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1985).
268. See Ill S. Ct. at 1234.
269. There is an analogy here to the academic critique of the political question doctrine,
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presumption out of an institutional concern with avoiding international
conflict, transnational litigation is now a common feature of court dock-
ets. In this new context, institutional legitimacy should, if anything,
compel courts to play a more efficient regulatory role by adjusting legisla-
tive schemes to new global circumstances.
270
From the outset, the institutional legitimacy concerns underlying
Charming Betsy's presumption in favor of international law differed from
the concerns underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality. The
latter canon was designed to lessen tension between the judicial and legis-
lative branches. The presumption in favor of international law, in con-
trast, addresses conflicts between the judicial and both the legislative and
executive branches. Under the separation of powers rationale, courts are
loath to usurp the executive branch's unique voice in foreign affairs.
Similarly, courts wish to avoid making controversial decisions that
should be left to the deliberative processes of Congress. Thus, courts
have applied the presumption in favor of international law largely to
avoid jurisdiction or, more recently, to avoid an international conflict by
following the least controversial course available under international
law.27
1
The presumption in favor of international law is difficult to defend
on the grounds established by past cases. The heightened separation of
powers concerns with international sources are not lessened by the use of
this canon. A court does not remove itself from decisionmaking in the
area of foreign relations by adopting the presumption in favor of interna-
tional law. On the contrary, by interpreting international sources and
defining "conflicts" between municipal and international laws, the court
is actively engaged in a transnational dispute regardless of its ultimate
decision under the canon. The very selection of relevant and conflicting
international sources represents a significant judicial role in transnational
conflicts. Some role in these cases is unavoidable for United States courts
in the future.272 As with extraterritorial cases, these cases are no longer
particularly to Professor Redish's challenge to the "judicial humility" that marks the cases.
See Redish, supra note 248, at 1046-52 (arguing that political question doctrine should have no
relevance to exercise of judicial review).
270. Cf. Julius Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the Dimensions of Legislative Mean-
ing, 36 IND. L.J. 414, 420 (1961) ("[Textualism and judicial deference create] an inordinate
amount of delay in correcting what might not have actually been intended-granted the pres-
ent complicated machinery of the legislative process.").
271. See supra notes 131-145 and accompanying text.
272. The Supreme Court recently supplied a highly ironic example of the limitations of
this neutrality argument, although not in a Charming Betsy case. In United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, the Court ruled that an extradition treaty with Mexico did not bar the abduction
from Mexico of a Mexican citizen by the DEA for trial in the United States. 112 S. Ct. 2188,
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rare events along the constitutional periphery; instead, they represent in-
creasingly common source conflicts. The increasing frequency and mag-
nitude of these conflicts place corresponding pressures on courts to
update or gap-fill ambiguous statutes in transnational cases.
Moreover, even if a real separation of powers problem existed, both
the last-in-time doctrine and the political question doctrine offer direct
limitations on judicial action. The use of conflicts principles that can
weed out "unreasonable" attempts at extraterritorial regulation might
also partially ease judicial aversion to international conflict and
dispute.2
73
When viewed on their own terms, both presumptions appear to be
canons in search of a meaning. The traditional bases for a meta-rule are
simply absent in contemporary cases under either canon of construction.
The question remains, however, whether either canon retains any viabil-
ity as a matter of dualistic principle. The following discussion considers
the two canons from the alternative pluralistic perspective suggested in
Part II.
IV. Proceduralism and International Rent-Seeking in a
Representative Democracy
The two principal canons along the borderland are products of early
nineteenth and twentieth century cases that favored conservative judicial
roles in those areas better suited to the political branches. Dualism em-
2197 (1992); see supra note 259. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist specifically
deferred this complex diplomatic question to the executive branch. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.
Ct. at 2195-96. Yet, in support of the decision to defer this question, the Chief Justice further
suggested that deferral might prompt diplomatic action. The Chief Justice specifically referred
to the Court's 1923 ruling in Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, in which the Court allowed the
U.S. government to search foreign vessels within the territorial waters of the United States.
262 U.S. 100, 122-23, 127-29 (1923); see Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196-97 n.16. While
England and the United States were "at loggerheads" over the issue and unable to agree on a
treaty before the case, the decision forced a diplomatic confrontation and ultimately a new
treaty. See id. Cunard is an excellent example of how courts influence legislative and diplo-
matic decisionmaking. Regardless of whether the Court had allowed or barred the searches,
its decision in Cunard would have had an impact on the treaty negotiations between the
United States and England.
273. See Turley, When in Rome, supra note 9, at 659-61 (describing the "effects" and
"conduct" tests of prescriptive jurisdiction as placing a maximum limit on the extent of extra-
territorial legislation permissible under international law).
Moreover, for a conservative intentionalist, the presumption in favor of international law
will produce rather than avoid interbranch conflicts if it develops in a monistic way. The use
of the presumption to incorporate extrinsic sources into statutory schemes raises the type of
intentionalist concerns that the original dualistic rule was meant to avoid. Clearly, judges who
fear usurping the constitutional powers of other branches in foreign affairs cases would gravi-
tate toward a narrow interpretation of the statute at hand rather than rely on extrinsic sources.
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bodies a faith in proceduralism as a necessary facet of a pluralistic de-
mocracy. One central proceduralistic norm within dualism is a judicial
respect for deliberative dialogue within and between the representative
branches. Debate and negotiation that allow for consensus and
majoritarian decisionmaking are key to achieving harmony in a Madis-
onian system. Dualistic decisions can advance these goals by forcing
controversial issues of international conflict to come before Congress and
the executive branch, where such a process can forge a pluralistic
compromise.
Dualism also reflects a strong legal process fear of circumventing the
legislative process and its barriers to special interest measures. Even as
the tripartite system encourages compromise, it also inhibits favoritism
and factional advantage. By exposing legislation to both houses of Con-
gress, the drafters hoped to guard against abuses by special interests and
to check the potential excesses of the executive branch. Part of the legal
process tradition has been a belief that pluralism is a value sustained
principally through deliberative process. By subordinating international
law to domestic law, courts guarantee that domestic deliberation remains
the key to achieving legislative "goods." By refusing to act in matters of
international conflict, therefore, a court does much more than simply
protect its own institutional legitimacy; it defends pluralism itself, in the
form of representative voting and open debate. International law runs
against the Madisonian grain when used as an equal or controlling source
in domestic disputes. While decisions based on international law might
be subject to congressional reversal, the use of a legal source that devel-
ops outside the tripartite system is highly problematic for a Madisonian
democracy as it was first conceived. Remarkably, the gradual incorpora-
tion of international sources is often discussed with little attention to its
potential impact on this carefully balanced Madisonian system. This is
particularly troublesome when courts use international sources to aug-
ment or rebut conventional legislation. "International legislation" in the
form of treaties, executive agreements, and customary law can enter the
domestic system untouched by proceduralistic protections against special
interest dealing and political excess. 274 The contemporary challenge to
dualism presents a unique opportunity to examine the continued rele-
vance of these values.
274. As discussed below, treaties are not wholly outside this system, given the ratification
requirement. Likewise, executive agreements are often the result of informal consultation be-
tween the executive and legislative branches. Thus, for both treaties and executive agreements,
some proceduralistic pressures do apply. See infra notes 346-349 and accompanying text.
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In a representative democracy, legislation is a vehicle for
majoritarian compromise and deliberation.2 75 The Federalists believed
that institutional divisions and procedures would protect the country
from the ravages of the factional and countermajoritarian forces that had
plagued earlier governmental systems.276 While the Federalists clearly
viewed factions as inevitable forces in any democracy, they believed that
a system that contained checks and balances would allow collective pur-
poses to prevail against excess by any particular group or branch.2 77 The
separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches served as the system's central protection against factional-
ism. 278 These branches were meant to live in uneasy cohabitation, each
jealous of its own authority and suspicious of possible transgressions by
the other branches.
279
In economic terms, the problem of "factions" described by Madison
and Hamilton is a problem of rent-seeking-"the attempt to obtain eco-
nomic rents (i.e., rates of return on the use of an economic asset in excess
of the market rate) through governmental intervention in the market.
'2 80
Whether the rent is measured in dairy subsidies or pollution dollars,
rent-seeking is the mainstay of the modem special interest group. The
Federalists expected rent-seeking to occur primarily in the legislative
branch. Accordingly, the drafters divided legislative authority between
two houses with different constituencies, interests, and powers.2 81 The
bicameral system raises the costs of legislation in general. While this
275. See THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 63 (James Madison). For
an excellent discussion of both federalist and antifederalist principles, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 35-45 (1985) [hereinafter Sun-
stein, Interest Groups].
276. Madison defined a "faction" as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a major-
ity or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of pas-
sion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961).
277. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("[The tripartite system gives each branch] the necessary constitutional means and p'er-
sonal motives to resist encroachments of the others.").
278. Hamilton was most eloquent in his concern that antifactional measures prevail in the
new system of government "[w]hen occasions present themselves in which the interests of the
people are at variance with their inclinations." THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 432 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
279. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); BICKEL, supra note 76, at 16-23.
280. Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public
Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REv. 471, 472 n.4 (1988)
[hereinafter Macey, Transaction Costs].
281. See THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 378-79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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may inhibit some public interest legislation as well as rent-seeking, the
bicameral system decreases the efficacy of most hidden deals by forcing
them into the open through either the intervention of other representa-
tives or the actions of adversarial groups. Ideally, most narrow legisla-
tive deals become prohibitively expensive when forced into the open,
unless the wealth-maximizing faction can ally its interests with a secon-
dary, majoritarian purpose.28 2 This is why hidden deals are the greatest
danger to the Madisonian system. Special interest groups often cloak
rent-seeking in the guise of "public-regarding legislation. '283
The separation of powers doctrine offers barriers to rent-seeking be-
yond those intrinsic to the legislative branch. On the executive side, the
President is entitled to veto any legislation that does not benefit the na-
tional constituency. While a faction might easily capture a Member of
the House and possibly a Senator, the drafters thought it less likely that a
narrow interest could control a President, who is accountable to the wid-
est constituency. On the judicial side, the courts have the power to re-
view legislation for unconstitutional excess. The Federalists were quite
clear on the necessary judicial role vis-A-vis rent-seeking. Hamilton
stated that "where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes,
stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution,
the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. ' 284
Judicial review was the final structural barrier to rent-seeking, after
which the political system was expected to work for collectively benefi-
cial changes in regulations.2
85
As noted earlier, the two borderland canons address different insti-
tutional tensions. 28 6 The presumption against extraterritoriality was a
282. See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation, supra note 23, at 227-33.
283. As used here, the term "public-regarding" is taken from Professor Jonathan Macey's
work on interest group theory and legislation. See id. at 228. "Legislation may be said to be
public-regarding if it serves some purpose other than obtaining for particular legislators the
pecuniary advantage of the political support of some narrow interest group, even if this pur-
pose is the transfer of wealth from one group to another." Id. at 228-29 n.29. The original
roots of the term lie in the work of Professor Jerry Mashaw. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitu-
tional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849, 868 (1980).
284. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
285. Professor Cass Sunstein has argued that a court must actively resist rent-seeking
measures. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 6, at 1691. Professor Sunstein linked
this judicial interventionary role with the overall antifactional scheme of the Constitution:
"The notion that government actions must be responsive to something other than private pres-
sure is associated with the idea that politics is 'not the reconciling but the transcending of the
different interests of the society in the search for the single common good.' " Id. (quoting
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 58 (1972));
see also Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 275, at 49-55.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 258-273.
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response to tension produced primarily between the judicial and legisla-
tive branches when courts extended legislation abroad. The presumption
in favor of international law was a response to tension produced primar-
ily between the judicial and executive branches when courts resolved in-
ternational conflicts. This institutional difference is reflected in the
differing potential problems of rent-seeking under the two canons.
A. Rent-Seeking in the Legislative Branch
The presumption against extraterritoriality was originally advanced
as a clear meaning rule designed to reduce tension between the judicial
and legislative branches. This classic rationale was most recently put for-
ward by the Supreme Court in its ARAMCO decision.287 The presump-
tion's value as a clear meaning rule may substantially offset its cost as a
vehicle for rent-seeking. Under the public choice model, legislative rent-
seeking describes conduct aimed at acquiring affirmative gifts through
legislation of some good at a rate that a party could not have obtained in
the market.288 Rent-seekers, however, can often achieve their designs
through more surreptitious means, such as by securing the omission of
critical legislative elements to negate a statutory objective. Such an op-
portunity arises in extraterritorial cases, in which a multinational interest
can acquire a rent simply by forcing ambiguity in an otherwise transna-
tional statute.289 Courts then become the unwitting instrument of rent-
seeking when they exempt the multinational concern from regulation.
For a representative democracy, multinational interests in many
ways embody the worst of Madisonian fears. The multinational acts as a
special interest group that seeks legislative rents obtainable as easily
through legislative inaction as through legislative action. For example,
multinationals can avoid having to comply with environmental statutes
by encouraging lawmakers to leave extraterritorial application of the acts
ambiguous. 290 The presumption against extraterritoriality will suffice to
deliver on the hidden legislative deal. Public choice scholars have criti-
cized the traditional legal process theory of legislation precisely because
they do not share the latter's faith in the system's ability to resist special
interest legislation.291 Specifically, modern political conditions challenge
287. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230, 1231, 1235-36 (1991).
288. Macey, Transaction Costs, supra note 280, at 472 n.4 (describing rent-seeking as the
attempt to achieve economic rates of return (i.e., rents) from the use of an economic asset in
excess of the market rate through governmental intervention in the marketplace).
289. Turley, Transnational Discrimination, supra note 3, at 365-92.
290. Turley, When in Rome, supra note 9, at 627-34.
291. See, ag., Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 102 (arguing that trading of
votes in Congress to pass measures benefiting special interests makes legislative intent difficult
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the system's ability to winnow out the self-serving measures of special
interest groups and to further public-regarding measures in their place.
Multinationals as special interest groups have other, equally troub-
ling characteristics. Professor Mancur Olson showed that in comparison
to larger groups, such small interest groups tend to be very successful in
furthering their interests.292 Multinationals comprise a relatively small
group of companies with homogeneous, defined, and concentrated inter-
ests. Multinational players have a large stake in securing legislative rents
through limitations on employment, environmental, and other remedial
statutes. They can easily coordinate their lobbying efforts and, due to
their size and small numbers, the incidence of free riders among them is
low.
2 9 3
Multinationals also have an advantage over many domestic groups
in that United States citizens generally lack even the most fundamental
information about transnational regulation. Public choice scholars have
criticized the traditional school's failure to consider the informational
barriers that serve to hide legislative deals from most voters.294 This in-
formation deficiency protects hidden deals by special interest groups. If
the informational and transactional costs are high in the domestic polit-
ical realm, they are considerably higher when transnational interests are
involved. Since most transnational regulatory decisions have very diffuse
impacts on the population, there is generally no counteractive faction in
Congress to oppose such interests beyond the occasional effort by organ-
ized labor or environmentalists. 295 More importantly, the failure to regu-
late transnationally does not offer the same organizational potential for
opposing groups as would an overt congressional decision to allow extra-
to ascertain); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
Sc. 3 (1971) (describing the legislative process as a market in which special interest groups
purchase legislation). See generally FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 23 (describing interest
group impact on legislation and offering possible solutions); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987) (same).
292. See OLSON, supra note 25. For a discussion of Professor Olson's work and its appli-
cation to transnational regulation, see Turley, Transnational Discrimination, supra note 3, at
355-56.
293. Turley, Transnational Discrimination, supra note 3, at 355-56.
294. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro & Herbert Hovenkamp, Exchange on Public Choice, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 834, 835-38 (1990) (discussing voters' lack of relevant political information as
compared to availability of market information).
295. See Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of
Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 47-49 (1988) (describing dispersion of regulatory
effects across the population); Warren F. Schwartz & Eugene W. Harper, Jr., The Regulation
of Subsidies Affecting International Trade, 70 MICH. L. REV. 831, 850 (1972) (explaining that
groups with narrowly focused interests are more likely than broader groups to achieve their
regulatory goals).
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territorial discrimination or pollution. The informational and transac-
tional barriers severely frustrate attempts by citizens to sift through
legislation to discover such hidden deals. Because of these costs, it is
entirely possible for legislators to enact transnational special interest leg-
islation without incurring any political backlash.
Eliminating the presumption against extraterritoriality would close
this avenue for rent-seeking. Courts would then perform their traditional
role in statutory interpretation. It might be argued that eliminating the
presumption would simply create an incentive for the affected groups to
seek rents in the courts, but it has never been shown that such rent-
seeking is likely or even possible on a significant scale.296 Federal judges
do not receive direct compensation from the parties to disputes, and life
tenure reduces the value of such indirect benefits as campaign contribu-
tions or political action committee (PAC) support. While multinational
interests would clearly spend money to secure a "judicial rent," such ac-
tivity would meet with counseled opposition. Any legislation presents
the opportunity for some party to gain an advantage outside of either the
market or a voluntary exchange. Although judicial rent-seeking is
clearly more likely to occur today in the "age of regulation" than in years
past, the institutional dangers of such activity pale in comparison to
those presented by traditional legislative rent-seeking, given the character
of the adversarial process.
B. Rent-Seeking in the Executive Branch
While public choice scholarship has focused almost exclusively on
rent-seeking in the legislative arena, it is clear that rent-seeking occurs in
the executive branch as well. Since most international legislation begins
with the executive branch, initial rent-seeking will occur outside the bi-
cameral system, which has the greatest procedural barriers to faction and
special interest deals. Although the Supreme Court has never addressed
rent-seeking per se, it has shown some preference for bicameral legisla-
tive products over primarily executive products such as treaties. This
preference was evident in the Head Money Cases.297 In rejecting an argu-
ment that treaties should be considered superior to statutes, the Court
noted:
296. For discussions of the relationship between the judiciary and special interest groups,
see GRAHAM K. WILSON, INTEREST GRoups 62-64 (1990), and William N. Landes & Rich-
ard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON.
875 (1975).
297. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
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A treaty is made by the President and the Senate. Statutes are
made by the President, the Senate and the House of Representatives.
The addition of the latter body to the other two in making a law cer-
tainly does not render it less entitled to respect in the matter of its
repeal or modification than a treaty made by the other two. If there be
any difference in this regard, it would seem to be in favor of an act in
which all three of the bodies participate.
298
As noted above, the drafters appeared less concerned with rent-seek-
ing in the executive branch and erected fewer internal structural impedi-
ments to such activity. 299 They viewed the President as the virtual
personification of national interests, and saw the executive branch as a
check in itself on rent-seeking-its majoritarian vigilance to be expressed
through the executive veto. There is no indication that the drafters ex-
pected the President to be generally susceptible to factional forces, in
contrast to their expectations with respect to legislators. Their greatest
concern regarding the President's power was that it might promote not
factional favoritism but despotic insensitivity to local concerns . 3 °°
The executive branch, however, has evolved considerably since
Washington's pintsize cabinet.301 From Teapot Dome to the savings and
loan crisis, the executive branch has repeatedly been accused of serving
narrow special interests. 30 2 Presidents like Grant and Reagan were criti-
cized during their tenures as instruments of special interests. 30 3 The rise
of rent-seeking in the executive branch began after the Civil War, when
the President's power was radically inflated to include sweeping regula-
tory control. 30 4 Before the war, the executive branch was small.30 5 In
1789, there were only three departments in the cabinet (Department of
War, Department of State, and Department of the Treasury), compared
298. Id. at 582.
299. See supra text preceding note 281.
300. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (comparing President with
English monarch).
301. The first Congress established three executive departments: Foreign Affairs, War,
and Treasury. 5 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 162 (James Truslow Adams ed., 1940).
The Department of State (as it was soon renamed) had a staff of six, including Thomas Jeffer-
son. Id. In sharp contrast, there were 25,699 employees at State by September 1991. Revers-
ing the Reagan Staffing Trend, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, Feb. 1992, at 6.
302. For discussions of the President's role in serving narrow interests, see Peter L.
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 573, 657 (1984); Brad Waites, Note, Let Me Tell You What You Mean: An
Analysis of Presidential Signing Statements, 21 GA. L. REV. 755, 778-81 (1987).
303. Haynes Johnson, Rise of the 'Deaver Syndrome,' WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1986, at Al,
A10, All.
304. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Adminis-
trative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 465 n.57 (1989).
305. 5 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 301, at 162.
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with fourteen today.306 By 1816, the executive branch had grown expo-
nentially to encompass 1138 civilian personnel.30 7 The President exerted
control through political influence and his appointment and veto powers.
Federal agencies expanded in number and size along with this power.
The executive branch increasingly took responsibility for the various
public goods valued by special interest groups, particularly during the
administration of Franklin Roosevelt before World War 1.308 At last
count, the executive branch contained 14 cabinet-level departments, 12
offices in the Executive Office of the President, 61 "independent estab-
lishments and government corporations," and employed 3,067,167 per-
sons.309 Modem Presidents delegate most actual regulatory decisions,
beyond the overall policy objectives, to agencies. As President Carter
discovered, it is actually viewed as a sign of weakness for the President to
attempt to "micro-manage" the executive branch.
310
The size and complexity of the modem executive branch lends itself
to rent-seeking behavior. The classic form of rent-seeking in the execu-
tive branch is "agency capture," in which special interest groups gradu-
ally co-opt their regulators. 311 Most agencies rely heavily on industry
information and cooperation.312 This relationship between the regulator
306. This of course does not count the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which
will likely be elevated to the status of a cabinet department in 1993.
307. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES:
COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, pt. 2, at 1103 (1975). This figure and those that follow exclude
postal employees. See id The executive branch continued to grow in spurts until 1981, when
the number of civilian employees fell slightly. The pace of growth is impressive: 1821 (1760
employees); 1841 (3260 employees); 1861 (5837 employees); 1871 (13,459 employees); 1891
(55,395 employees); 1911 (176,127 employees); 1921 (298,720 employees); 1941 (1,081,436 em-
ployees); 1961 (1,824,578 employees); 1981 (2,143,025 employees); 1991 (2,250,281 employ-
ees). Id. at 1102-03; U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1982-1983, at 266-67 (1982); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1992, at 330 (1992) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1992].
308. See Farina, supra note 304, at 465 & n.57.
309. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1992, supra note 307, at 313, 330; see OFFICE OF THE FED.
REGISTER, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN., THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT MANUAL 1992-1993, at 91-780 (1992) (describing all executive branch departments and
agencies). These figures include the U.S. Postal Service and its employees.
310. See Dilys M. Hill, Domestic Policy, in THE CARTER YEARS: THE PRESIDENT AND
POLICY MAKING 13, 26-29 (M. Glenn Abernathy et al. eds., 1984).
311. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 308 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge,
Politics Without Romance]; Linda R. Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of
Administrative Discretion, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 646, 664, 674 (1988); William H. Page, Interest
Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legisla-
tion, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 635-36. See generally GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF
SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT SEEKING (1989).
312. For a case study of the interplay between industry groups and government agencies
contributing to the Montreal Protocol, an international agreement aimed at phasing out pro-
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and the regulated industry can become dangerously close, with industry
assuming a prominent role in regulatory changes. Agency capture is pos-
sible because of the high informational and transactional costs involved
in doing business with, or watching over, regulatory agencies. Citizens'
groups often face prohibitive costs in attempting to monitor the develop-
ment of several hundred thousand regulatory decisions and interpreta-
tions each year. Monitoring is especially difficult when a special interest
group seeks agency inaction, or the failure to regulate. Even the Office of
Management and Budget can do little to truly monitor federal agencies
beyond establishing broad budgetary guidelines.313 Unfortunately, most
agency deals do not appear in a budgetary form. Through information
control and regulatory proposals, special interest groups can silently
achieve their narrow objectives without exposing their interests to open
public scrutiny in the conventional legislative process.
Some rent-seeking, however, occurs entirely at the White House.
There is perhaps no better example of successful rent-seeking in the exec-
utive branch than appears from the recent decisions of the Council on
Competitiveness. Created in 1989 by President Bush and chaired by Vice
President Quayle, the Council was formed specifically to listen and re-
spond to industry's concerns with over-regulation. 314 After Congress
passed stiff new amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1990, for example,
industry groups sought assistance from the White House, which used the
Council to make over 100 requested changes in the law at the rule-mak-
ing stage. 315 Many of these changes ran counter to the legislative deci-
sions reflected in the Act and reinstated defeated industry
duction of certain ozone-depleting chemicals, see Robert W. Hahn & Albert M. McGartland,
The Political Economy of Instrument Choice: An Examination of the U.S. Role in Implement-
ing the Montreal Protocol, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 592 (1989) (concluding that policy choices are
dominated by political interest groups).
313. All agencies are required to submit major rule-making decisions to the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB) for review. Under Executive Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg.
13,193 (1981), the OMB must scrutinize agency decisions to ensure that they are efficient and
maximize the net benefits to society.
314. Ann Devroy, Quayle Panel Takes First Step with Murky Mandate, WASH. POST, June
21, 1989, at A21. In one of its first official acts, the Clinton Administration abolished the
Council. Martin Tolchin, Settling in: Rewriting the Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993, § 1, at
10.
315. Michael Duffy, Need Friends in High Places? For Industries Trying to Skirt the Law,
Dan Quayle's Council on Competitiveness Is a Good Place to Start, TIME, Nov. 4, 1991, at 25;
see also D.C. Bar Panel Debates Legitimacy of Quayle Council Regulatory Reviews, [Jan.-June]
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 37, at A20 (Feb. 25, 1992) (quoting congressional
sources as saying that "the council gutted EPA's recycling rule.., overturned EPA's decision
to ban burning of lead acid batteries, severely weakened the agency's ground water regulations,
undercut EPA's requirement for liners in municipal landfills, and rewrote the wetlands manual
to eliminate half of the protected acreage").
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amendments. 316 For example, while considering the 1990 legislation,
Congress hotly debated the new emission limitations for industrial
plants.317 Industry wanted to relax restrictions in the permitting process
to allow for increased emissions without new permits after giving proper
notice.318 Congress defeated the suggested amendments in a highly pub-
licized move to force compliance among state implementation plans. 319
After the Act's passage, however, industry groups used the Council to
suggest to the EPA the identical change, which was later published in the
Federal Register.3
20
In another case, the Administration pushed Congress to relax new
emissions abatement control technology requirements for electric utility
plants.321 The House and Senate defeated the Administration's proposal
three times but, using the Council as a conduit, the industry succeeded in
getting the same changes incorporated through the rule-making pro-
cess. 322 The Council has achieved similar rollbacks in other regulations,
as in its recent decision to narrow a key definition in wetlands legislation
to allow development or other private use of thirty million acres of wet-
lands that both Congress and, apparently, the EPA thought were pro-
tected.323 Many congressional leaders criticized the Administration for
intentionally waiting until after the public debate and voting in Congress
to silently achieve industry goals outside the open, deliberative legislative
process. Some critics specifically objected to the Council's refusal to
make its meetings and deliberations public. 324
316. Michael Weisskopf, Rule-Making Process Could Soften Clean Air Act, WASH. POST,
Sept. 21, 1991, at Al, A10; see also Michael Ross, Quayle Accused of Trying to Weaken Clean
Air Act, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1991, at Al ("[i]ndustry now seems to have found a new front
in their fight to undermine the new clean air law." (quoting Rep. Waxman)). One of the
drafters of the new amendments was quoted as saying: "The problem isn't just that [the new
rule-making proposals are] inconsistent with the law. The whole process is outrageous and
fragrantly illegal to allow polluters, which opposed the law, to go through the back door and
have the law rewritten to favor their point of view." Weisskopf, supra at A10.
317. Weisskopf, supra note 316, at A10.
318. Id ("[In] one of the most hotly argued provisions ... [i]ndustry repeatedly, and
unsuccessfully, petitioned for 'flexibility' in the limits, and the ability to exceed them without
going through the costly and time-consuming process of obtaining new permits.").
319. Id. at Al ("Administration efforts for the provision were rebuffed three times-in-
cluding on the Senate floor and during the House-Senate conference.").
320. Id
321. Id at A10.
322. Id at Al.
323. Duffy, supra note 315, at 25.
324. See, e.g., Philip J. Hilts, At Heart of Debate on Quayle Council: Who Controls Federal
Regulations?, N.Y. Tmsns, Dec. 16, 1991, at Bl1 ("[Ihe council has acted behind closed
doors, without disclosing who was seeking the changes or any other facts of its deliberations.
When several Congressional committees sought recently to obtain documents that would shed
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There are, of course, various potential rent-seekers in the executive
branch. Foreign interests, for example, often must look to the executive
branch as an alternative to Congress for rent-seeking. In Congress, for-
eign interests are barred from contributing to political campaigns and
thus stand in a weaker market position in relation to domestic groups. 3
25
Moreover, foreign interests must be particularly wary of triggering pro-
tectionist reactions in Congress. The executive branch, on the other
hand, is the most insulated from local pressures. It commonly uses trade
and regulatory benefits as a tool of foreign policy. While the President
cannot receive direct contributions from foreign interests, 326 the recent
Iran-Contra 32 7 and BCC1328 scandals show how a President can use for-
eign banks and nations to further political agendas. Moreover, foreign
light on these matters, the council refused, claiming that as an executive-branch agency, it was
not required to divulge such information.").
325. See 2 U.S.C. § 441e (1988). Foreign companies and countries spend considerable
funds to influence both legislators and public opinion generally. The Japanese government and
companies, for example, spend roughly $90 million a year on lobbying expenses. Stuart
Auerbach, Japan Tries to Blunt Toshiba Scandal, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1987, at B1.
326. See 2 U.S.C. § 441e (1988). There is, of course, the possibility of post-service re-
wards-a subject of much concern during and after the Reagan Administration. See infra note
331 and accompanying text. The BCCI scandal also shows the pervasive practice of high office
bribery in other countries. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, BC. C. Official Says Link to U.S. Bank Was
Obvious, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1991, at D1 (describing bribes to senior officials of developing
nations in the form of direct payments, hiring of relatives, payments of medical bills, and even
prostitutes).
327. See, e.g., Robert L. Jackson, McFarlane: Reagan Asked for Secrecy, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 1989, at Al (discussing the use of various countries, and even national charities, to
indirectly finance the contras); James O'Shea & Michael Tackett, Congress Gets Contra Probe,
CHI. TRIB., May 3, 1987, at Cl (giving chronological account of the efforts to indirectly fund
the contras); Jeffrey Schmalz, Bank Is Charged by U.S. With Money-Laundering, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 1988, at Al (discussing the use of BCCI in 1986 to transfer funds in the Iran-Contra
affair). The example of the contra scandal is particularly telling. In the early 1980s, the Rea-
gan Administration was intent on funding the contra forces in Nicaragua as a front line against
communism in Latin America. This effort was stymied by the "Boland Amendment," which
barred the U.S. government from funding the "overthrow" of the Sandinista government. Un-
able to use direct funding, therefore, the Reagan Administration used various friendly nations
and banks to divert funds to the contras. This dealing often appeared to be "tit for tat," with
the Administration assisting in arms agreements and sales. In one case, President Reagan used
his emergency powers to grant a request for missiles by Saudi Arabia; one month later, Saudi
Arabia began funding the contras. This funding later doubled after the President announced
an agreement to sell a $250 million weapon system to the Saudis. O'Shea & Tackett, supra at
Cl; Bob Woodward, Contra War Secretly Run by Three NSC Officials, WASH. PoST, Feb. 27,
1987, at Al.
328. As the BCCI scandal unfolded, it became clear that a number of governments, in-
cluding that of the United States, had used the bank for various purposes, including covert aid.
Steve Coll, Pakistan's Illicit Economies Affect BCCI, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1991, at A39; Ste-
phen Kurkjian, Suspicions of Fraud Shut Down BCCI's World Operations, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 6, 1991, at 31; Steve Mufson & Jim McGee, BCCI Scandal: Behind the 'Bank of Crooks
and Criminals,' WASH. POST, July 28, 1991, at Al.
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interests have proved highly successful at acquiring the assistance of past
and present administrative figures like Clark Clifford,329 Richard Al-
len,330 and even the occasional former President.
3 31
Of the various players in the regulatory market, multinational firms
clearly are one of the most likely to rent-seek and lobby the execu-
tive branch. Multinational interests have traditionally enjoyed a close
working relationship with the executive branch, often operating
as a virtual extension of the government. 332 Past Presidents have defined
foreign policy in terms of multinationals' interests333 and have even
engaged in combat over the property claims of multinationals
based in the United States. 334 Military forces were repeatedly sent to
329. See, eg., Michael Arndt, Once-Mighty Clifford Can't Dispel BCCI Doubts, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 12, 1991, at C1 (detailing the former Secretary of Defense's alleged involvement in
the BCCI scandal); Marjorie Williams, The Performance of a Lifetime, WASH. POST, Sept. 12,
1991, at DI (same).
330. John M. Goshko, President Agrees to Replace Allen in Security Post, WASH. POST,
Jan. 3, 1982, at Al (detailing allegations involving financial dealings with Japanese companies
against the former foreign policy advisor to President Reagan); Spencer Rich, Reagan Aide
Denies Personal Business Dealings While Serving U.S., WASH. PoST, Oct. 30, 1980, at A5
(same).
331. Former President Ronald Reagan was criticized for his acceptance of a speaking hon-
orarium totaling two million dollars from a Japanese firm. The firm was heavily involved in
the United States market during the Reagan Administration. Steve Johnson, Ex-Presidential
Privilege: Life After the Oval Office Has Its Deficits, But It Can Still Be a Capital Deal, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 19, 1990, at Cl; Colin Nickerson, Million-Dollar Reagan Visit to Japan Causes Stir,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 1989, at 2.
332. See generally MIRA WILKINS, THE EMERGENCE OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE:
AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO 1914 (1970) (describing history
of government action on behalf of U.S.-based multinational businesses).
333. Multinationals have always had a symbiotic relationship with their native country.
The United States is, of course, not unique in its close identification with business interests.
During the period of so-called U.S. "gunboat diplomacy," a number of other countries were
also supporting their multinationals with military force. For example, in 1902 German ships
bombarded Puerto Cabello, Venezuela as punishment for that nation's late payment of a debt.
See SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 522-23 (5th
ed. 1965). The United States, which would actually occupy the Dominican Republic to force a
debt payment two years later, protested the German intervention. See id. at 523-26.
Many early colonies were founded specifically to supply raw material, often operating
more as extensions of multinational corporations than as sovereign nations. WILKINS, supra
note 332, at 6. In cases like that of the East India Company, the distinction between country
and corporation was all but nonexistent. Id. Other early multinationals such as the Hudson
Bay Company, La Compagnie des Indes, and The Company of Adventurers of London Trad-
ing into Africa had similarly close relationships with their host colonies. Eugene Rostow and
George Ball noted that one of the distinctions between the usual corporate entity and these
early multinationals is that the latter "undertook to govern as well as to trade." Eugene V.
Rostow & George W. Ball, The Genesis of the Multinational Corporations, in GLOBAL COMPA-
NIES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WORLD BUSINESS 4, 5 (George W. Ball ed., 1975).
334. In the 1800s and 1900s, United States multinationals enjoyed tremendous govern-
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Cuba, 335  the Dominican Republic, 336  Honduras, 337  Nicaragua,338
mental support-particularly of the military and diplomatic varieties. See Rostow & Ball,
supra note 333, at 8-10.
335. Large numbers of U.S. troops first landed in Cuba during the Spanish-American War
in 1898. The troops remained for four years to direct and, at times, control the transition from
colony to nation. In 1906, the United States intervened in a Cuban civil war, installed a
friendly government, and occupied the country for three years. In 1917, U.S. troops again
intervened to prevent a revolt and to protect U.S. interests. THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER
H. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA 257-58 (1984). The most famous intervention, how-
ever, was the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. This latter invasion, of course, had strong geopolit-
ical underpinnings, as did the 1962 air and naval quarantine of the island. See id. at 275-76.
The nonmilitary U.S. interests in Cuba were primarily sugar mills and plantations and, later,
resort holdings. See id. at 258-63, 272.
336. The United States first sent troops to the Dominican Republic in 1902 to protect U.S.
business interests and to force the country to make good on a debt owed U.S. banks. A year
later, the United States intervened again to support U.S. businesses, which had complained of
harassment by the government. By that time, the United States had taken over the collection
of Dominican customs duties to service the country's debts to U.S. creditors, an arrangement
that continued until 1911. JAN KNIPPERS BLACK, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: POLITICS
AND DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNSOVEREIGN STATE 21 (1986); JULIUS WILLIAM PRATT, A
HISTORY OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 220-21 (3d ed. 1972); see also BRUCE
PALMER, JR., INTERVENTION IN THE CARIBBEAN: THE DOMINICAN CRISIS OF 1965, at 12
(1989). In 1916, U.S. Marines landed and established martial law, in part to protect U.S.
financial interests. During the eight years of occupation that followed, the United States insti-
tuted a number of "reforms" to benefit U.S. business interests. See BLACK, supra at 21-25.
The most spectacular intervention occurred in 1965, when President Johnson sent in 22,000
troops to crush an insurrection that the United States considered communistic and threatening
to U.S. interests. See PALMER, supra; McBee, supra note 164, at 36.
337. The United States has invaded Honduras and Nicaragua on thirteen separate occa-
sions. Colman McCarthy, 'National Security,' Mother of Intervention, WASH. POST, Mar. 27,
1988, at F6. In 1903, President Roosevelt sent in troops four times to protect U.S. interests.
In 1907, U.S. troops again entered six Honduran cities to protect the large U.S. banana and
banking interests there. Id.
338. Nicaragua has a long history of U.S. intervention in support of U.S. businesses, par-
ticularly railroad and fruit companies. The Greytown bombardment in 1854 was the first, but
in no way the most remarkable, episode of U.S. intervention. See infra note 341. In 1894,
1898, and 1899, the United States sent troops to defend U.S. economic interests against revolu-
tionary forces. The Record of U.S. Intervention, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 17, 1983, at
38. In 1907, the Nicaraguan government of Jos6 Santos Zelaya cancelled lucrative concessions
to U.S. businesses, prompting an invasion of U.S. Marines at Bluefields, Nicaragua. THOMAS
L. KARNES, TROPICAL ENTERPRISES: THE STANDARD FRUIT AND STEAMSHIP COMPANY IN
LATIN AMERICA 107 (1978). In 1910, U.S. troops were sent to protect U.S. interests, and
actively supported a rebellion against the government. In 1912, the National Bank of Nicara-
gua (a U.S. company) complained that Nicaragua was cancelling lucrative contracts with U.S.
businesses. United States troops again intervened, defeated the government forces, and essen-
tially took over police operations for the nation, a situation that continued with one brief
interruption until 1933. WILKINS, supra note 332, at 162. In 1926, Calvin Coolidge sent 5000
troops to help fight popular revolutionary C6sar Augusto Sandino. See NEILL MACAULAY,
THE SANDINO AFFAIR (1985). Most recently, the U.S. government financed a long guerilla
campaign. See TOM BARRY, CENTRAL AMERICA INSIDE OUT: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO
ITS SOCIETIES, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIES 407-08 (1991); supra note 327. See generally
[V/ol. 44HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
INTERNATIONAL LEGISPRUDENCE
Panama,339 and other countries34° to protect and advance United States
business interests. 341 Although it is less likely to prompt direct interven-
THOMAS WALKER, NICARAGUA IN REVOLUTION 63-77 (1982) (discussing first years of Nica-
ragua's Sandinista Revolution).
One of the more interesting interventions was led by William Walker, a Tennessean, who
in 1855 successfully overthrew the Nicaraguan government with the help of 58 Americans.
Walker, who had earlier tried to overthrow the Mexican government, was funded and sup-
ported by Cornelius Vanderbilt, who owned large railroad interests in that country. Vander-
bilt was unhappy with the restrictions placed on his enterprises by the Nicaraguan
government. In 1857, U.S. troops captured Walker and removed him from his self-proclaimed
dictatorship. It is interesting to note that a year before the U.S. intervention, Walker had
turned on Vanderbilt and attempted to regulate U.S. corporate interests. See JOHN A. BOOTH,
THE END AND THE BEGINNING: THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION 18-20 (1982).
339. Throughout the period of American Banana, U.S. forces were sent to Panama to
protect U.S. interests. Interventions occurred in 1873, 1885, 1901, and 1903, when concerted
U.S. military and diplomatic efforts led directly to Panama's independence from Columbia and
the signing of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, giving the United States the right to build and
control the Panama Canal. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, THE PATH BETWEEN THE SEAS:
THE CREATION OF THE PANAMA CANAL, 1870-1914, at 175-79, 305-98 (1977).
340. The United States has used troops on sixty separate occasions in Central America
and the Caribbean. McBee, supra note 164, at 36. Mexico has been repeatedly invaded by
large and small U.S. forces. United States troops first occupied part of Mexico in 1846, which
led to the Mexican-American War. See MICHAEL C. MEYER & WILLIAM L. SHERMAN, THE
COURSE OF MEXICAN HISTORY 342-46 (2d ed. 1983); SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 335, at
228-29; RICHARD N. CURRENT ET AL., AMERICAN HISTORY: A SURVEY 380-84 (6th ed.
1983). In Guatemala, the United States has intervened repeatedly since 1920. In 1953, Guate-
malan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmin expropriated large landholdings of the United Fruit
Company in a moderate agrarian reform. A dispute arose over the amount of compensation
owed UFC, and UFC lobbyists and their allies in the Eisenhower Administration branded
Arbenz a "stooge" for communists and a threat to U.S. security. On the orders of President
Eisenhower in 1954, the CIA organized and funded an exile group that overthrew Arbenz
within the year. The new government quickly returned UFC's land. SKIDMORE & SMITH,
supra note 335, at 316-19.
341. The direct military support of U.S. business interests was so close that one of the
senior military officers of this period, Marine Major General Smedley Butler, later described
himself as "a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and for the bankers."
Butler, who later became an ardent isolationist, also described himself as a "racketeer for
capitalism." Jonathan Peterson, Economics and the Route to War, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1990,
at Dl.
By contemporary standards, this governmental involvement often reached incredible
levels. In one noteworthy case, General Butler, then commanding a contingent of U.S.
Marines at Bluefields, Nicaragua, told the Nicaraguan army that the Nicaraguan government
could not attack a town containing a rebel force because U.S. property might be damaged.
General Butler insisted that the government could only attack the rebels if it did so without
weapons. The government withdrew. See IVAN MUSICANT, THE BANANA WARS: A HIs-
TORY OF UNITED STATES MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA FROM THE SPAN-
ISH-AMERICAN WAR TO THE INVASION OF PANAMA 141 (1990). In another case, in
Greytown, Nicaragua, the Navy sloop-of-war Cyane was sent to protect a U.S. company, the
Bluefields Steamship Company, that was involved in a local dispute. WILKINS, supra note 332,
at 25. The captain of a company steamboat had shot and killed a native boatman after their
ships collided. The captain was arrested, and a U.S. diplomat was slightly injured by debris
thrown during the resulting melee. The Cyane demanded an apology and damages for the
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tion today, this symbiotic relationship is still present in the executive
branch.
342
The efficiency of small interest groups and the insularity of the exec-
utive branch combine to make rent-seeking a great danger in the execu-
tive branch.343 Multinationals can sometimes achieve by executive
agreement what they could not hope to achieve through congressional
legislation. A small industry may be unable to secure an exception to an
environmental law with extraterritorial application. If its proposal is un-
popular, the industry may come up against well-organized environmental
groups that would oppose any express exception to the legislation. That
industry, however, might be able to secure the same rent through a su-
perseding executive agreement or treaty. By waiving jurisdiction over
certain areas, the President can substantially assist certain multinational
interests. Likewise, although a firm may be unable to secure a direct
bailout, as Lockheed did in the 1970s,34 4 it might be able to secure guar-
anteed sales for products and spare parts under a defense agreement or
international loan guarantee.
345
company. On July 13, 1853, after the local authorities failed to issue an apology, the Cyane
bombarded and destroyed the entire town. Id.; see also Perrin v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 543
(1868) (involving suit for damages stemming from Cyane bombardment), affd, 79 U.S. 315
(1871); Wiggins v. United States, 3 Ct. Cl. 412 (1867) (same).
342. WILSON, supra note 296, at 61-62 (discussing interest group access to the White
House); see also Robert L. Pacholski, Note, The FCC and Reciprocity: An Examination of the
"Public Interest" Standard, 62 TEX. L. REV. 319, 321 (1983) (describing the FCC's efforts to
reduce market barriers overseas for U.S. telecommunications firms); cf. Seymour J. Rubin,
Multinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty: A Skeptic's Analysis, 3 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1, 6 (1971) (arguing that "expansion of international investment ... could not
move forward without at least tacit governmental concurrence, if not active support").
343. Obviously, the presence of rivalling political parties serves as a check on agency cap-
ture and executive abuses. Such was the case with the partisan criticism of a little-known
program called "Trade, Not Aid," run by the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID). See Michael deCourcy Hinds, Workers Say U.S. Program Took Their Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1992, at A8. Through this program, the AID subsidized the transfer of facto-
ries from the United States to Central America as a way of stabilizing Central American gov-
ernments. Id. It is unlikely that such a program would have received much public support
during a recession, as evidenced by the outcry following media reports. The insularity of the
executive branch and the complexity of the budget process, however, allowed the program to
remain largely unknown for twelve years.
344. See generally WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: IN-
DUSTRY, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 290-308 (1986) (discuss-
ing government bailouts of big businesses, particularly Lockheed and Chrysler); Walter
Adams & James W. Brock, Corporate Size and the Bailout Factor, 21 J. ECON. ISSUES 61, 63-
66, 70 (1987) (same).
345. See generally JANE H. BAYES, IDEOLOGIES AND INTEREST-GROUP POLITICS: THE
UNITED STATES AS A SPECIAL-INTEREST STATE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 31 (1982)
(describing interconnections between global and domestic political affairs that characterize
modern political life and interest groups).
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Nevertheless, the strong potential for rent-seeking in the executive
branch clearly does not mean that all international sources are products
of rent-seeking or even that rent-seeking is more common in the execu-
tive branch than in Congress. Most cases along the borderland involve
one of three types of international sources: treaties, executive agree-
ments, and customary international law. A public choice critique of
these principal sources fails to offer a decisive argument for either a dual-
istic or a monistic interpretation of Charming Betsy or the other interna-
tional canons. Nevertheless, some proceduralistic arguments might be
raised in favor of a dualistic rule. The high transactional and informa-
tional costs of dealing with the executive branch may make it easier to
secure rents through treaties and executive agreements. Moreover, the
lack of strong congressional interest in treaties or international agree-
ments makes special deals less susceptible to the test of deliberative pro-
cess that underlies the legal process model of Professors Hart and Sacks.
From a proceduralistic perspective, however, the dualistic argument
against the use of international law in the municipal system is under-
mined by the fact of congressional involvement in the making of both
treaties and executive agreements. Today formal obligations under trea-
ties and conventions are considered fully enforceable under United States
law, absent a later revocation or modification by Congress.346 While bi-
cameralism is missing in the treaty-making process, the supermajority
requirement for senatorial approval can function as a barrier to executive
excess and special dealing. 347 In executive agreements, informal arrange-
ments also enhance participation and agreement between the executive
346. Rainbow Navigation, Inc. v. Department of the Navy, 699 F. Supp. 354, 357 (D.D.C.
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 911 F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1106
(1991); Smith v. Dainichi Kinzoku Kogyo Co., 680 F. Supp. 847, 850 n.1 (W.D. Tex. 1988);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 111,
115 (1986); see also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). As equal sources to
federal law, treaties supersede all inconsistent state law. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203, 230-31 (1942).
347. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators pres-
ent concur. .. ."). Courts interpreting treaties face difficult questions of how to determine
legislative intent, and must resolve the same competing textualist and contextualist arguments
that underlie the interpretation of conventional legislation. See supra notes 85-88, 97-101 and
accompanying text. This debate is probably most evident when treaties are ambiguous as to
their application. Treaties are usually characterized as either self-executing or non-self-execut-
ing. Non-self-executing treaties are agreements that contain obligations but no express provi-
sions for remedies or adjudication of claims. See, eg., Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d
353, 356 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981) (defining self-executing treaties as "binding domestic law
of their own accord, without the need for implementing legislation"), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S.
1130, and vacated on other grounds mem., 457 U.S. 1128 (1982), appeal dismissed, 725 F.2d
970 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984); Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, 452 F.2d
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and legislative branches. After an increase in the use of executive agree-
ments became controversial, Congress and the President reached a com-
promise in a process called "Circular 175. ''348 Executive agreements are
now limited to areas not covered by treaties. Thus, the President cannot
undermine an earlier bargain with Congress by using executive agree-
ments to achieve what Congress denied in negotiation. Moreover, an ex-
ecutive agreement will normally be executed only if (1) it is made in
accordance with an existing treaty or statute, (2) it is subject to a con-
gressional vote, or (3) it is made in accordance with the President's con-
stitutional power.349 While not a complete substitute for a ratification
798, 801-02 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting that the Warsaw Convention is self-executing-"needing no
Congressional implementation to make it... thereon constitutionally enforceable").
Some treaties expressly state an intention to be non-self-executing, but most do not.
While some courts and commentators have argued that all treaties are self-executing, the
Court has recognized the distinction since 1887, repeatedly holding that non-self-executing
treaties deserve less weight than federal statutes under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitu-
tion. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ...."); Cook
v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-19 (1933); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95
(1888); Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116, 120 (1887); see also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[A treaty is] to be regarded in courts of justice as
equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract ... the legisla-
ture must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court."). There is, of
course, ongoing debate over whether a given treaty should be presumed self-enforcing. Many
courts continue to presume that a treaty does not confer domestic rights of action without
express language to that effect. See, e.g., United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1550
(lth Cir. 1985); Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed,
479 U.S. 957 (1986).
348. See generally State Department Procedures on Treaties and Other International
Agreements, Partial Text Circular 175, Oct. 25, 1974, reprinted in 3 SENATE COMM. ON FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS & HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., LEGISLA-
TION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS THROUGH 1980, at 91-106 (Joint Comm. Print 1981).
349. See id. at 93. Circular 175 guarantees "that the making of treaties and other interna-
tional agreements for the United States is carried out within constitutional and other appropri-
ate limits." Id. at 91. Executive agreements are similarly broken down in the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 (1986):
Subject to § 302(2),
(1) the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate may make any
international agreement of the United States in the form of a treaty;
(2) the President, with the authorization or approval of Congress, may make an
international agreement dealing with any matter that falls within the powers of Con-
gress and of the President under the Constitution;
(3) the President may make an international agreement as authorized by treaty
of the United States;
(4) the President, on his own authority, may make an international agreement
dealing with any matter that falls within his independent powers under the
Constitution.
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process, working agreements like Circular 175 enhance the claim of exec-
utive agreements as authoritative sources by deflecting criticism that
these agreements circumvent the treaty clause or represent the sole deci-
sion of the executive branch.
Moreover, while the executive branch's insularity increases the po-
tential for rent-seeking, the actual level of rent-seeking in the drafting of
treaties and executive agreements is difficult to gauge. If the drafters of
the Constitution were correct, the executive branch may present less of a
rent-seeking potential because of the President's national constituency
and the "dilemma of the ungrateful electorate. ' 350 There is little ques-
tion that the executive branch often does work for the "national constitu-
ency." A treaty or executive agreement may actually introduce a
collectively beneficial change in a regulation or negate a hidden legisla-
tive deal. The Office of Management and Budget, in particular, was cre-
ated to weed out special dealing and agency excesses. Through executive
orders and agreements, the President may act to protect national over
special interests.
Perhaps the most interesting extrinsic source along the borderland is
customary international law. The precedential authority of customary
international law in this country is usually traced to the case of The Pa-
quete Habana.351 In that case, the Court recognized the authority of cus-
tomary international law, but defined it as a lesser legal source in
comparison to constitutional, statutory, or treaty obligations.352 The ap-
plicability of customary international law under Charming Betsy remains
350. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67, 105
(1988) (describing "an axiom of human nature under which voters and interest groups will
remember the things the legislator did to hurt them more strongly than they will remember the
things done for their benefit").
351. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). In that 1898 case, the United States Navy seized two Spanish
vessels operating out of Havana, Cuba. Congress had declared war on Spain and had ordered
the seizure of all hostile vessels. Id at 712-13. The Supreme Court considered the seizure and
sale of the vessels under customary international law and held it an established rule of interna-
tional law that "coast fishing vessels... are exempt by the general consent of civilized nations
from capture" as prizes of war. Id. at 711. Even more significant, however, was the Court's
express application of a "law" that was neither enacted by Congress nor agreed to by the
President:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right de-
pending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where
there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations ....
Id. at 700.
352. Id. at 708, 710-11. The Paquete Habana followed another case, United States v.
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820), which is also considered an endorsement of the use of
customary international law in United States courts. See also Steven M. Schneebaum, The
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a matter of some dispute, even after The Paquete Habana.353 The
Charming Betsy Court clearly envisioned conflicts with formal interna-
tional sources or jurisdictional principles when it established the pre-
sumption in favor of international law, but it has been suggested that the
decision should extend more broadly to customary international law as
well. 354 The implications of a statute being limited by customary interna-
tional law, however, are a dualist's nightmare. As shown below, this in-
terpretation goes well beyond the general understanding of The Paquete
Habana to suggest that customary international law could control in
some cases of domestic statutory interpretation.
355
Even though customary international law does not possess the pro-
cedural foundation of treaties or executive agreements, the danger of
rent-seeking is probably the lowest in this area because most rent-seekers
have little ability to influence the creation of customary law. The poten-
tial for rent-seeking in some forms of customary international law, how-
ever, cannot be discounted altogether. International organizations with
increasing regulatory powers present a new avenue for rent-seeking.
Customary international law is created in part by the decisions and prac-
tices of such bodies. Unlike conventional representative legislatures,
these bodies are generally elitist and nonparticipatory in character. Vari-
ous public interest groups have challenged new international organiza-
tions like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as
inimical to both national sovereignty and nonbusiness interests. 356 It is
not clear how these new international regulatory bodies will evolve with
Enforceability of Customary Norms of Public International Law, 8 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 289
(1982).
353. Professor Henkin has argued persuasively that The Paquete Habana did not establish
the legitimacy of customary international law in any domestic case. Henkin, United States
Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 874 n.92. He noted that The Paquete Habana was an admiralty
case that arose under a statute that compelled reference to the international law governing
maritime prizes. Id.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 148-150.
355. See infra notes 393-401 and accompanying text. Moreover, this argument sharply
contrasts with such Supreme Court decisions as United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct.
2188 (1992). Writing for the Court in that case, Chief Justice Rehnquist dismissed the argu-
ment that an abducted Mexican doctor should be released from federal custody and returned
to Mexico solely under the authority of customary international law. While acknowledging
that the abduction might have violated customary international law, the Chief Justice stated in
dicta that "as a matter outside of the Treaty, [any violation of customary international law] is a
matter for the Executive Branch." Id. at 2196.
356. One such group is Public Citizen, a well-known consumer advocacy organization run
by Ralph Nader, which criticized GATT as a group of "unelected, unknown bureaucrats [who
are] heavily lobbied by big business." Nancy Dunne, Environmental Rules Set Stage for GA TT
Conflicts, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1991, § 1, at 6. Public Citizen challenged the right of such a
group to "establish world health, safety and environmental policy" and warned that "[a] na-
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the unification of various markets. The proliferation of international
bodies and regulations, however, raises new questions regarding the defi-
nition and authority of customary international law. While it is clear
that any dualistic argument against customary international law finds lit-
tle support in a rent-seeking rationale, the full incorporation of custom-
ary international law would certainly arouse other dualistic concerns. As
shown below, strong arguments based on pluralism can be raised against
any presumption in favor of customary international law.35 7
C. Summary
The preceding discussion explored alternative bases for dualistic val-
ues-bases other than the classic institutional legitimacy arguments of
past cases. Although courts once avoided international law and conflicts
as part of the "constitutional periphery," the rise in international sources
and extraterritorial jurisdiction has made common what was once for-
eign for United States courts. Courts now accept a legitimate institu-
tional role of interpreting treaties and statutes in light of international
conflicts, obligations, and norms.358 This shift in judicial attitudes is ap-
parent in the narrowing of the political question doctrine as a bar to
judicial review,3 59 the recognition of extraterritorial regulation in areas
like antitrust and securities laws,360 and the preference given interna-
tional sources under the last-in-time doctrine. 361 Moreover, courts treat
many of these "international sources" no differently than municipal
sources for the purposes of judicial review. Thus, a treaty should not put
a court on the "constitutional periphery" any more than a statute would
tion's sovereignty to set and enforce health, safety, and environmental laws is compromised."
Id.
357. See infra notes 393-401 and accompanying text.
358. With the rise of the European Community, European courts are confronting a major
shift in relevant sources of law from municipal to international bodies. One recent example of
the difficult political questions that may result appears in a decision by the High Court of
Ireland to enjoin a 14-year-old rape victim from seeking an abortion in England. Glenn Fran-
kel, Irish Supreme Court Allows Teenager to Seek Abortion, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1992, at
A27. Abortion is illegal in Ireland, but allowed in England. The High Court rejected a claim
that the Irish government could not bar travel under European Community law. William E.
Schmidt, Girl, 14, Raped and Pregnant, Is Caught in Web of Irish Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18,
1992, at Al. The Irish Supreme Court overturned the High Court's ruling without an opinion.
Frankel, supra at A27. This tension between Irish and EC law represents a continuation of
earlier cases. See, eg., Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ir.), Ltd. v. Grogan,
1989 I.R. 760 (Ir. S.C.); Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ir.), Ltd. v. Grogan,
[1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (E.C.J.).
359. See supra notes 248-257 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 189-195 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 208-236 and accompanying text.
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in the typical case of interpretation. Nevertheless, like the proceduralis-
tic rationale, the separation of powers rationale for dualism continues to
have some motivating power for courts deciding international cases.
This Article suggests that dualism is best understood as advancing
the pluralistic values of Madisonian democracy. Viewed from this per-
spective, the two principal canons of construction have little contempo-
rary value as mechanisms for advancing the deliberative and dialogic
goals. Strong pluralistic arguments support the elimination of the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality. Ironically, the loss of this canon
may result in increased attention to international principles in domestic
cases. This possible application of international principles, however,
would not pose the problems associated with monistic systems. The pre-
sumption is primarily jurisdictional and thus the incorporation of cus-
tomary international law would be limited to this threshold question.
Moreover, courts already discuss such principles in the context of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction or conflicts review in cases with expressly extraterri-
torial statutes. 362 Eliminating the presumption would simply require
courts to deal directly with the international dimensions of statutory in-
terpretation. Under conflicts principles, a court must consider prescrip-
tive questions even after it asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction under a
statute. 363 Finally, courts would analyze prescriptive jurisdiction on a
statute-by-statute basis. Thus, the courts would be working within a set
statutory context or regulatory scheme defined by Congress.
While eliminating the presumption against extraterritoriality would
not produce monistic difficulties for a Madisonian system, it would close
an avenue for rent-seeking and increase the pressure for open debate on
extraterritorial questions. Absent the presumption, a court would be free
to interpret any given statute in the fashion most faithful to its "public-
regarding purpose." If a statute misleads the court by its sweeping lan-
guage, Congress could then reverse the court's decision in an open legis-
lative process. This would serve to force hidden deals to the surface and
buttress the deliberative norms of a Madisonian democracy. From this
perspective, the Supreme Court's recent ARAMCO decision cannot be
justified under either an institutional legitimacy or a public choice
rationale.3
64
362. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577-78, 592-93 (1953); Laker Airways v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 921-26 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also The Antelope,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825); Turley, When in Rome, supra note 9, at 604-08.
363. See supra note 203.
364. See supra notes 181-188, 264-270 and accompanying text.
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Examining the presumption in favor of international law also reveals
little pluralistic basis for preserving the canon as a dualistic principle. In
most cases of conflict, a court must decide not between international and
municipal sources, but between two municipal sources in the form of
treaties (or occasionally executive agreements) and statutes. Pluralistic
forces have already come to bear in varying degrees on the creation of
treaties and executive agreements, and any conflict can be handled under
traditional interpretative approaches. The most worrisome case involves
the application of customary international law under the canon. While
such an application would not necessarily raise rent-seeking problems, it
would depart from the canon's function as a dualistic principle.
The presumption in favor of international law has far greater monis-
tic potential than either the presumption against extraterritoriality or the
last-in-time doctrine. While courts have modified the last-in-time doc-
trine to give some preference to treaties, the presumption in favor of in-
ternational law is not clearly limited to treaties or executive agreements
and does not depend on a temporal justification to overcome a statute.
Thus, a statute might control under the last-in-time doctrine but fail
under the presumption in favor of international law. Likewise, the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality is a narrow rule relating to only one
international principle: prescriptive jurisdiction. Thus, a statute could
conceivably satisfy the presumption against extraterritoriality as transna-
tional in application but fail under the presumption in favor of interna-
tional law as violative of a treaty or some other international obligation.
Some international scholars clearly approve of a greater monistic
perspective for United States courts, arguing that Charming Betsy should
be viewed not as simply a jurisdictional restraint but rather as a positive
endorsement of the use of international principles in domestic deci-
sions. 365 While it seems doubtful that Charming Betsy will ever evolve
into a purely monistic rule, courts and commentators evidently view the
incorporation of international law as increasingly important in the devel-
oping transnational system.
The possible monistic use of the presumption in favor of interna-
tional law, however, shifts its emphasis from protecting institutional le-
gitimacy to a more aspirational function. To put it another way, the
dualistic use of the presumption focuses on proceduralistic concerns with
avoiding the constitutional periphery represented by foreign relations
and international conflict. The monistic use of the presumption focuses
365. See, eg., Steinhardt, supra note 1, at 1161-62.
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on normative concerns regarding the content of the decision. 366 The next
Part looks at the possible role for this canon absent a dualistic rationale.
V. The Decanonization of Charming Betsy
The presumption in favor of international law is one of the last great
American canons. Although once standard fare for all law students, ca-
nons of construction have been on the decline since the legal realist
movement of the 1940s. 367 Professor Karl Llewellyn hastened the de-
mise of canons by showing how judges could use alternative canons to
reach diametrically opposed results in any given case. 368 The facial neu-
trality of canons sheltered judicial bias from criticism. Most canons thus
fell out of favor in the 1950s and 1960s. The presumptions from both
Charming Betsy and American Banana, however, survived.
The presumption in favor of international law fulfills many of the
stereotypes of Llewellyn's classic canon: it is highly susceptible to the
type of selective applications that Llewellyn criticized. 369 Most cases
that involve international sources apply only one of the canons discussed
in this Article. In still other cases, the courts ignore the canons entirely
and apply conventional interpretative devices. 370 This is surprising since
most cases that involve source conflicts raise questions under all of the
previously discussed interpretative principles-the presumption in favor
of international law, the presumption against extraterritoriality, the last-
in-time doctrine, and the political question doctrine. 371
366. Interestingly, in both canons, the transnationalization of markets and economies may
ultimately shift the institutional legitimacy argument in favor of judicial rather than legislative
or presidential resolution. As shown below, the judicial role in the new transnational regula-
tory era will necessarily be more comprehensive than thought at the turn of the century.
367. See generally Turley, Transnational Discrimination, supra note 3, at 392 (explaining
that "[t]he ascendancy of canons [of construction] ... was cut short by the legal realists, who
showed how canons often hide the political or class bias of courts").
368. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950).
369. See id.
370. Turley, When in Rome, supra note 9, at 603-17.
371. One recent case shows how both presumptions can apply to a given dispute. In
United States v. Javino, 960 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 477 (1992), the court
considered a person's conviction for possession of a bomb in violation of a federal statute that
regulated the licensing and taxing of such devices. The government argued that this law would
apply extraterritorially, if the bomb was manufactured in another country. The court first
ruled that the law was not sufficiently clear to overcome the presumption against extraterritori-
ality, id. at 1142, and then suggested that, even if the law was extraterritorial, international
principles of jurisdiction would still limit its application, id. at 1142-43. Although the court
did not cite Charming Betsy, its jurisdictional argument closely resembles those of some of the
original cases under the presumption in favor of international law. See also United States v.
Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (applying both presumptions in holding that "the
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Consider an environmental statute that is presumptively extraterri-
torial but, when applied in a particular case, might violate a treaty or an
international principle. In Defenders of the Wildlife v. Hodel,372 a district
court considered the extraterritoriality of the Endangered Species Act.373
Environmentalists had sued the Secretary of the Interior for issuing a
regulation that limited a critical provision of the Endangered Species
Act374 to territorial application.375 Previously, the Secretary had allowed
extraterritorial application, even though the statute itself was ambiguous
on the question. The district court found that the statute contained lan-
guage of sufficient clarity to rebut the presumption against extraterritori-
ality,376 basing its conclusion equally on the language of the statute377
and the clear transnational objectives of the Act.3 7
8
While holding that the Act applied extraterritorially, the court in
Defenders of the Wildlife cautioned that it "expresse[d] no view as to the
'best' or most diplomatic way of dealing with the preservation of endan-
gered species in other countries, or how international relations regarding
statute in question reflects an unmistakable congressional intent, consistent with treaty obliga-
tions of the United States, to authorize prosecution of those [persons who violate the extrater-
ritorial statute]"); cf Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353, 356, 362 (5th Cir. Unit A
Apr. 1981) (applying both the presumption in favor of international law and the last-in-time
doctrine in holding that a prior treaty trumped the later enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1130, and vacated on other grounds mem., 457 U.S. 1128
(1982), appeal dismissed, 725 F.2d 970 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984).
372. 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Minn. 1989), affid sub. nom. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan,
911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
373. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
374. The critical portion of the Act, the "consultation provision," provided in part: "Each
federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that
any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency.., is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species .... " 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)(2) (1988).
375. Defenders of the Wildlife, 707 F. Supp. at 1082. Under the agency's interpretation,
the consultation provision only applied "to those actions occurring within the United States or
on the high seas." I.
376. Id. at 1084.
377. Id. at 1085. The court reasoned:
In addition to this "general" international concerns [sic] of the statute. . ., [the
statute] requires the Secretary to list all species that are determined to be endangered
or threatened. That section clearly states that the actions of foreign nations are to be
considered in determining which species to list, and many species not native to or
present in the United States appear on the list.
Id.
378. Id ("Congress' concern with the international aspects of the endangered species
problem is unmistakable and appears repeatedly throughout the statute."). The court also
noted the plaintiff's statement that "493 of the 883 species listed as endangered in 1986 had
their primary range outside the United States." Id. at 1084 n.6.
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this issue should be structured. '379 In so stating, the court avoided ap-
plying the presumption in favor of international law. Yet, both presump-
tions might easily apply in a specific regulatory action under the Act.3 0
For example, suppose that the case involved the specific application of
the Act to the killing of an endangered migratory bird in Canada. The
United States and Canada have a treaty governing the protection of
birds, a treaty that gives each country sole authority over the regulation
of its own territory.381 Essentially, while establishing certain levels of
protection to be recognized by the parties, the treaty mandates the strict
territorial application of each party's protective laws.382 The district
court's decision in Defenders of the Wildlife would allow the Endangered
Species Act to apply to Canada under the presumption against extraterri-
toriality. Violation of the treaty between Canada and the United States,
however, would trigger a secondary analysis under the presumption in
favor of international law. Applying the rule from Charming Betsy, the
district court might rule that the Act was intended to apply extraterrito-
rially, but that Congress did not intend for such application to occur in
contravention of the United States' obligations under treaties with other
nations. At the very least, the district court might argue that a court
should not assume such an extraordinary intent without more express
statements from Congress to that effect. In this example, the selection of
the relevant canon determined the outcome of the case. A similarly out-
come-determinative analysis would have resulted from applying either
the last-in-time or political question doctrines. Applied in isolation, any
one of these canons would produce either the denial or extension of
transnational environmental protection.
Courts have traditionally used Charming Betsy to interpret a statute
in conformity with international agreements that existed before the time
of the statutory enactment. Since treaties are equal to statutes as legal
obligations under the Constitution, courts tried to read statutes in con-
379. Id. at 1085 n.7.
380. It is not uncommon for courts to refer implicitly or explicitly to the presumptions
against extraterritoriality and in favor of international law in the same case. For example, in
FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the
District of Columbia Circuit, after considering "established and fundamental principles of in-
ternational law," ruled that the FTC could not use registered mail to serve its investigatory
subpoenas on a French company in France. Id. at 1304. The court held that it was restricted
under both canons in reaching its conclusion. Id. at 1322-23; see also supra note 371.
381. See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918); Convention for the
Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-G.B., 39 Stat. 1702. The Migratory Bird
Treaty Act prohibits the killing of any migratory bird by any means or in any manner. Id. It
was signed by Great Britain on behalf of Canada.
382. See Migratory Bird Treaty Act §§ 2-5, 40 Stat. at 755-56.
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formity, when possible, with existing international obligations. 383
Charming Betsy, however, can also be used in the inverse case: to read a
statute in conformity with a later international agreement. This applica-
tion can serve a monistic function by shifting the emphasis away from
determining congressional intent toward upholding international princi-
ples and obligations whenever possible.384 While such an interpretation
might be explained in Calabresian terms as fulfilling Congress's likely
intent by updating a statute,385 the use of postlegislative agreements is
clearly antagonistic to the traditional intentionalistic and proceduralistic
purposes of the presumption in favor of international law.3
86
While the courts have generally not applied the presumption in
favor of international law in a monistic fashion, the presumption presents
the greatest potential for outcome selection and judicial bias. Since "in-
ternational law" can be interpreted variously to include treaties, agree-
ments, and customary law, a court can use this presumption in virtually
any case with international dimensions. A liberal interpretation might
include the customary international rule against extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion and other customary principles that run contrary to the regulatory
interests of the United States. The fact that the canon is neither strictly
jurisdictional (like the presumption against extraterritoriality) nor tem-
poral-dependent (like the last-in-time doctrine) further strengthens the
monistic potential of the presumption in favor of international law.
Thus, a court may use the presumption in virtually any case to trump
rival interpretations, or even rival canons.
As noted earlier, there is a strong institutional legitimacy argument
for eliminating the presumption in favor of international law. Although
the maintenance of courts' institutional legitimacy once supported the
use of this meta-rule to avoid the constitutional periphery, newly trans-
nationalized markets and economies may now compel greater judicial in-
383. See, eg., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-19 (1933) (holding that treaty
would not be abrogated or modified by a later statute unless Congress clearly expressed such a
purpose); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981) (same),
cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1130, and vacated on other grounds mem., 457 U.S. 1128 (1982),
appeal dismissed, 725 F.2d 970 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984).
384. This differs from the last-in-time doctrine in that the court is not determining which
source controls but presuming conformity between the two sources.
385. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 85.
386. Interpreting legislative intent by reference to postenactment authority can also be
analogized to Professor Eskridge's dynamic statutory interpretative approach. See, eg., Es-
kridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 90, at 1484 (describing evolutionary per-
spective of dynamic statutory interpretation, which accounts for subsequent changes in society
and law); Eskridge, Politics Without Romance, supra note 311, at 308 (discussing public choice
implications for dynamic approach to statutory interpretation).
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volvement in transnational regulation. It is simply unlikely that
Congress will correct conflicts or ambiguities in most statutory schemes
until the flaws become so severe that action is politically feasible. A
court is in a unique position to gap-fill and even update statutory
schemes to conform with contemporary realities and norms. Rather
than rely on canons that assume unlikely political responses from Con-
gress, courts can perform a needed institutional role in interpreting stat-
utes to best advance their stated "public-regarding purposes. '387
Congress can then directly reverse unacceptable judicial measures with
new enactments, subject to the pluralistic pressures of the legislative
process.
It is difficult to find a contemporary role for the presumption beyond
purely monistic applications. As for cases of direct conflict between stat-
utes and treaties, it is well established that treaties are equal to statutes
under the Constitution. 38 8 Executive agreements have also received
broad judicial support as authoritative sources.389 These are municipal
sources with international dimensions-not strictly international law.
There is no need for a presumption covering treaties or executive agree-
ments unless the purpose of the rule is to treat such sources as superior to
conventional municipal sources.
Assuming that treaties and some executive agreements are not
treated as inferior to other municipal sources, the contemporary role of
the presumption in favor of international law is reduced to one of two
possible applications: a presumption that all international sources (in-
cluding treaties, agreements, and customary law) are superior to munici-
pal sources, or a general presumption in favor of customary international
law.
An obvious institutional problem arises when the presumption is
read to require deference to international over municipal sources. The
courts have indeed become increasingly active in international conflicts,
but to prefer international sources over municipal sources is to reject not
only the dualistic model but also the concept of legislative supremacy.
There is no difference in a tripartite system between a court creating a
new regulation or statutory provision and a court recognizing interna-
tional law as a superior and authoritative source. The Supreme Court
expressed an analogous position in the Head Money Cases when it re-
387. See supra note 283.
388. See supra notes 346-347 and accompanying text.
389. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1982); supra notes 141-145 and
accompanying text (discussion of Weinberger); see also supra notes 348-349 and accompanying
text.
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jected the argument that treaties should not be subject to later legislative
changes.390 While the previous discussion did not support a purely dual-
istic approach based on separation of powers or proceduralistic ratio-
nales,391 there also is no support for treating the executive or judicial
branches as better avenues to legislation. A presumption in favor of in-
ternational over municipal sources would suggest such a conclusion by
creating a supremacy rule for international legislation created by the
courts and the President.
A presumption in favor of customary international law is equally
troubling. As shown above, the danger of international sources is not
that they are the products of rent-seeking. A special interest group is not
likely to succeed in influencing the creation of customary international
law. 392 The danger, rather, lies in the judicial power to apply interna-
tional sources selectively under the presumption, a power that will serve
to undermine the deliberative process. The danger to the separation of
powers from a monistic presumption is evident from the varying defini-
tions of what constitutes "international law." Courts could conceivably
apply any source suggesting a general practice, from United Nations res-
olutions to diplomatic or legal texts to boilerplate treaty provisions.
A presumption in favor of customary international law would pres-
ent obvious difficulties for dualistic courts. The place of customary inter-
national law in the domestic legal hierarchy is a matter of long dispute.
The debate primarily concerns the relative authority of customary inter-
national law and statutory law. There is little argument that a court
cannot apply customary international law that conflicts with the Consti-
tution,393 but Professor Henkin has argued with considerable force that
customary international law cannot be easily dismissed as a "subconsitu-
tional" source inferior to domestic legislation. 394 "Indeed," Professor
Henkin noted, "there are plausible arguments that the Framers accepted
customary law as binding on the United States, including Congress, and
that it was intended to be of higher status than the laws of Congress in
the domestic legal hierarchy. '395 He acknowledged, however, that the
incorporation of customary international law as part of the "interna-
390. See The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (suggesting that treaties be-
tween the United States and other nations are "subject to such acts as Congress may pass for
their enforcement, modification, or repeal").
391. See supra Part IV.
392. See supra notes 351-357 and accompanying text.
393. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1957).
394. See Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 930
(1986).
395. Id. at 933.
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tional law" described in The Paquete Habana does not resolve its author-
ity vis-A-vis other sources like statutes.
396
While Professor Henkin's work is compelling in a number of re-
spects, his suggestion that customary international law is equal (let alone
superior) to statutes remains controversial in the United States legal
academy. Clearly, a court adopting a dualistic approach based on
Madisonian values would have particular difficulty accepting customary
international law as equal to a statute. Given the earlier discussion, it is
not necessary to revisit here the value of legislative process in the ranking
of legal sources in a representative democracy. Ironically, if courts were
to accept customary international law as superior to statutory law under
the Constitution, there would be no need for any presumption in favor of
international law since the Constitution would resolve any conflicts.
Likewise, if customary international law were viewed as equal to statutes,
any presumption would be contradictory to the established hierarchy of
sources.
Assuming that the supremacy of statutory authority is recognized, a
presumption in favor of customary international law could be defended
by analogy to the treatment of domestic common law in cases of ambigu-
ous statutory authority. Courts sometimes interpret statutes in accord-
ance with common law under the theory that state and federal legislators
act in the shadow (and presumed awareness) of the common law. Such
an argument might be made with respect to customary international law.
Like customary international law, common law often develops from pri-
vate transactions and undemocratic processes. 397 Despite the common
law's undemocratic sources, courts still refer to common-law principles
in statutory interpretation and, explicitly or implicitly, attempt to con-
form their decisions to those principles.398
396. Id. at 931-33; see supra notes 351-355 and accompanying text (discussion of The Pa-
quete Habana).
397. Tort law is rife with examples of doctrine changing along with the patterns of private
transactions and expectations. The definition of an abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous
activity is such an example. In determining whether an activity fits into this strict liability
category, courts often consider the evolving utility, familiarity, and appropriateness of the ac-
tivity to a given community. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmts. f, i-k
(1977). Similarly, the definition of a defective product provided by the Restatement (Second)
of Torts can change dramatically according to either evolving consumer expectations in the
market or the fluctuating relationship of a product's risk to its utility. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1977).
398. Professor Cass Sunstein recently criticized the continuing relevance of the common
law in statutory interpretation. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION:
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 207-16 (1990).
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The comparison of customary international law to municipal com-
mon law is telling. Professor Henkin's position would accord interna-
tional custom greater weight than common law.399 In contrast to the
suggested equality between customary international law and statutory
authority, municipal common law is viewed as inferior to statutory law.
Moreover, this enforced hierarchy is unmodified by any last-in-time prin-
ciple, making common law lesser in authority to any statutory law re-
gardless of when the statute was enacted.4°° While the analogy with
common law does suggest a role for customary international law, it does
not offer a strong foundation for a presumption in its favor. After all,
common law is a domestic product, albeit a nonlegislative product.
Although the common law may be more a product of market forces than
of political judgment, it is a reflection of decisionmaking and values in-
trinsic to the municipal system. Moreover, courts cannot safely assume
that Congress legislates with such an understanding of customary inter-
national law as it does regarding common law. Few legislators (or their
constituents) have knowledge of or experience with customary interna-
tional law to the same extent as they do with common-law principles of
property or torts.
This is not to say that customary international law cannot be used in
statutory interpretation. Rather, as with common law, courts must con-
sider the types of customary international law and their relation to stat-
utes on a case-by-case basis. In cases in which a statute is clear, a court
must reject conflicting customary arguments. When a statute is ambigu-
ous, the court must evaluate the source of the relevant customary inter-
national law, as it would with a common-law rule. Among other
considerations, the court should look at the likely intent of Congress to
override or disregard the principle. There are a variety of possible
sources of customary international law, each with varying degrees of rel-
evance to a particular statute or, more generally, to the United States. A
court is in a unique position to judge the relative significance of these
sources. By incorporating some customary sources, courts perform a
traditional gap-filling function in the interpretation of ambiguous stat-
utes. In many ways, this traditional gap-filling function enhances the
open and deliberative process valued so highly in a Madisonian democ-
racy. Courts may force open and deliberative debate on significant issues
399. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Federal Statutes, Executive Orders and "Self-Executing
Custom," 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 371, 372-73 (1987).
400. Id. at 373 ("[I]n a democratic society that has placed rule-making power in the hands
of elected representatives, the principle [that common law yields to statutory law] is the same




that Congress might otherwise wish to ignore in its legislation. Congress,
of course, can override any incorporation of customary international law
through later legislation. The result is the selective incorporation of in-
ternational norms within the legislative process, which ultimately con-
trols their continued use.
The monistic use of the presumption in favor of international law
compels the courts to consider fundamental questions regarding the lim-
its of judicial interpretation within a representative democracy. Specifi-
cally, monism reflects a normative ideal that emphasizes the role of
government as a facilitator of moral and civic virtue. Dualism is based
more on a pluralistic view of government as facilitating conflict and com-
promise between factions to reach a majoritarian decision. "Under the
pluralist view," as Professor Sunstein put it, "politics mediates the strug-
gle among self-interested groups for scarce social resources." 4 1 Any in-
ternational principle or source is likely to benefit some group interest,
even though that group may have only narrow domestic political sup-
port. A group so advantaged by a favorable international principle is less
likely to compromise within the deliberative process. Viewed from this
perspective, dualism reflects only a preference for the deliberative process
and not necessarily a rejection of international law.
Eliminating the presumption, therefore, would not mean the rejec-
tion of international law's relevancy in domestic disputes. Instead, it
would leave courts to their conventional interpretative function, using
statutory text, legislative history, and other sources, possibly including
international law, in a hierarchy of relevant sources. Dualistic values
simply require courts to treat municipal laws as controlling in direct con-
flicts between international and municipal sources. In the context of stat-
utory construction, courts can, and should, consider international
standards in determining Congress's likely intent. The difference from a
purely monistic system is that Congress still structures any judicial inter-
pretation and retains the ultimate authority to reverse the outcome of
that interpretative process. Under any definition of legislative
supremacy, it is impossible within a Madisonian democracy for a court to
ignore the primacy of collective legislative decisions.
VI. Conclusion
Dualistic values run deep within United States jurisprudence, shap-
ing our view of both the political system and the world around us. This
Article has attempted to provide a missing historical and conceptual con-
401. Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 275, at 32.
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text for dualistic values and canons. Understanding the possible bases
for dualism is essential if the courts are to resolve the increasing tension
along the borderland between municipal and international sources. In
the past, dualistic values became reified expressions of national sover-
eignty and self-determination. When viewed in narrow sovereign-centric
terms, however, dualistic values may appear to be a form of legal isola-
tionism that treats international sources as an inherently hostile influence
on the domestic system. Conversely, monism often strikes jurists as
"one-worldism," at best a rejection of legislative supremacy and at worst
a form of judicial elitism. These concerns are rooted in a strong institu-
tional legitimacy tradition and embody a more general preference for the
legislative process. International legal sources often come from bodies
wholly outside the municipal system, bodies that typically have little rep-
resentative character. Application of these international sources by life-
tenured judges easily fulfills the Madisonian nightmare of elitist
countermajoritarianism.
This Article suggests that dualism is best understood as a reaction to
a new form of legislation in a Madisonian democracy. International
legisprudence presents challenges and opportunities for a system built on
concepts of pluralism and deliberative process. Yet, by moving beyond
the traditional rationales of institutional legitimacy, courts can serve a
central political function in the developing transnational arena.
Although institutional legitimacy was once a barrier to the consideration
of extraterritorial and transnational cases, courts are now the best-and
perhaps only-institution for reconciling conflicts between municipal
and international values.
The role of modern courts along the borderland must, however, be
tempered by central Madisonian democratic values. To put it succinctly,
in a Madisonian democracy all sources are not created equal. While the
institutional legitimacy concerns raised in the past were largely over-
stated, courts must recognize some proceduralistic differences between
sources. This Article suggests that, in direct conflicts with municipal
sources, international sources should be distinguished along a compari-
son with conventional legislation. Regardless of the basis for this differ-
entiation, however, it is clear that there is a natural limit in the degree to
which the legal institutions of a Madisonian system can become monistic.
The linkage drawn here between dualism and the Madisonian democracy
will clearly be controversial in some quarters. Many will view this state-
ment as a betrayal of normative values in favor of proceduralistic safe-
guards. This may be true. The strength of the Madisonian democracy,
however, has always been its ability to adjust to changing circumstances
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and forge majoritarian compromise among once-disparate factional
groups. This quality would seem no more relevant than in the rapidly
changing world around us.
